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European Journal of Law and Economics

, Volume 48, Issue 1, pp 29–42 | Cite as

Do we need behavioral economics to explain law?

  • Peter T. LeesonEmail author
Article

Abstract

Do we need behavioral economics to explain law? I analyze Judge Guido Calabresi’s claim that we do. I find that, actually, we don’t; traditional economic theory can explain law just fine.

Keywords

Calabresi Behavioral economics Rent-seeking Merit goods Altruism Organ sales Conscription Minneapolis 5% tradition The Future of Law and Economics 

JEL Classification

K00 

Notes

Acknowledgements

I thank Paola Suarez, the Editors, and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsGeorge Mason University, MS 3G4FairfaxUSA

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