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Determinants of judicial efficiency: a survey

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Abstract

Court delay has been much lamented about the world over. Judicial efficiency is one important element in keeping it under control. This paper surveys the available evidence concerning the determinants of differences in judges’ output. It points out weaknesses in the literature and makes a number of proposals how these could be relieved.

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Notes

  1. In Voigt (2008), I am making exactly the same point arguing that judicial independence refers to independence from the other government branches and the conflicting parties whereas judicial accountability refers to accountability to the (letter of the) law.

  2. See already Tullock (1980): “In discussing the efficiency of the law, there are two quite different problems. The first is whether the law itself is well designed to achieve goals that society regards as desirable. The second is whether the process of enforcing the law is efficient … As far as I know, no one has ever questioned the desirability of efficiency in the process of law enforcement, though if a law is undesirable, poor enforcement may be preferable.”

  3. In a sense, Di Vita has implicitly dealt with this issue in a number of papers (2010, 2012). He is interested in legal complexity, a concept described by Schuck (1992) as consisting of four dimensions, namely density, technicality, differentiation, and indeterminacy. Having constructed an indicator of normative complexity relying on the more quantitative dimensions density and differentiation for the regions of Italy, Di Vita finds that complexity is correlated with court delay.

  4. Of course, both dimensions are important for both the directly involved individuals as well as potential future users of the court. An additional aspect that plays an important role is the time preferences of the litigants. We refrain from discussing this issue further. Another aspect is that court delay can be in the interest of one party: knowing that I will have to pay at the end, I might have incentives to take a (weak) case to court anticipating that it will take years before it is resolved—and I have to pay.

  5. In a very similar fashion, Tullock (1980) claims: “As an empirical observation, there is fortunately little clash between ethical criteria and efficiency considerations.”

  6. Note that I do not include the ideology of judges here. There is a vast literature, in particular with regard to the U.S., that asks to what degree a judge’s ideology can be used to predict her decisions. I do not know any convincing argument that would establish an association between the ideology of a judge and her productivity, hence, this literature is not included here. For a recent and encompassing treatment, the reader is referred to Epstein et al. (2013).

  7. A reviewer pointed out that lower court judges’ attempts not to be overturned does not necessarily imply a high quality of their judgments. In fact, it might also induce more homogenous decisions across court levels which does not necessarily imply better decisions.

  8. The quality of legislation could be yet another determinant. Other potentially relevant factors are lawyers and their incentives; depending on how they are paid, their advice to potential clients can vary hugely. In Italy, the number of lawyers dramatically increased over a relatively short period of time. Scholars began to ask whether there is such a thing as “supply-induced-demand” for lawyerly services. Buonanno and Galizzi (2014) find evidence in support for this hypothesis and claim that a ten percent increase in the number of lawyers is associated with an increase in the civil litigation between 1.6 and 6 percent.

  9. Prima facie, the assumption that members of different societies display systematically different general propensities to litigate seems not well grounded in economic analysis. The same would seem to hold for “peoples’ customs”. Following the economic approach, one would first look at typical cost and benefit factors, such as monetary costs of going to court, expected court outcome and the like. Yet, if going to court is generally judged upon as something “one doesn’t do”, then expected benefits from using the court system might indeed be so low that it could be in less demand.

  10. In very large countries with citizens belonging to different cultures that are separable to a sufficient degree, cross-regional studies might be possible. The number of countries in which they can be applied seems, however, rather limited.

  11. Counting cases, no matter how resolved, can be further complicated by cases with more than one plaintiff (one case or as many as plaintiffs?).

  12. A possible downside being that the validity of the findings beyond the countries comprising the Council of Europe is uncertain.

  13. This is entirely different regarding studies concerned with efficiency of health care. Hollingsworth and Peacock (2008) reviewed 289 studies analyzing efficiency in the that sector, 48 % of which use DEA, while another 20 % use a 2 stage DEA, combining DEA with a regression model.

  14. Bhat et al. (2001) is an excellent and extremely accessible summary of DEA. Among the papers here surveyed, some contain very useful discussions regarding the potential but also the pitfalls of DEA. These include, for example, Finocchiaro Castro and Guccio (2014), Santos and Amado (2014) as well as Falavigna et al. (2015).

  15. In fact, when courts are made up of exactly one single judge, then individual and court level analysis collapse which is, e.g., the case in Spain.

  16. One important example is comparing the productivity of First Instance courts across European countries based on CEPEJ data. This has been done a number of times, for instance by Deyneli (2012), Ippoliti et al. (2015) or Melcarne and Ramello (2015). FICs are considered the lowest degree courts in Spain. They manage only ordinary jurisdictions and are managed by one individual judge, whereas in Germany FICs manage ordinary as well as appellate jurisdictions and are composed of a variable number of judges depending on the nature and complexity of the case.

  17. But there are some such studies in the field of health care management. Jacobs (2001) used both DEA and SFA to measure the efficiency of 232 English hospitals and found significant differences between the efficiency scores provided by the different estimation methods, concluding that these differences may be due to random noise and data deficiencies. The author recommended not interpreting different efficiency scores obtained by the models as accurate point estimates of efficiency but rather considering them as indicators of general efficiency trends. Martin and Smith (2010) examined 152 English primary care trusts (PCTs) using three different models, namely DEA, SFA and COLS. The average efficiency score obtained by the three estimation techniques were 0.92, 0.96 and 0.88 respectively. SFA efficiency ratings are found to be highly correlated with the COLS ratings (with a correlation coefficient between 0.90 and 0.95), but less so with the DEA ratings (a correlation coefficient between 0.70 and 0.80).

  18. Murrell (2001) showed that larger caseloads do cause longer delays and that previous findings to the contrary were usually arrived at by relying on OLS—which is a biased estimator in this case because the interdependence between demand and supply is not recognized. But at the time Murrell wrote his study, the papers just cited were not available yet.

  19. Yet, some shortcomings should be mentioned: His attempt to separate reforms explicitly intended to increase speed and all others appears awkward. Also (on page 236) the categorization of the demand-side amendments into nine different categories seems haphazard.

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    Stefan Voigt

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Nora El Bialy provided superb research assistance, in particular in producing the Appendix. Voigt also thanks Matthias Dauner, Jerg Gutmann, Konstantinos Pilpilides, Ines Reith, Marwa Mamdouh, Agnes Strauß and the editors of this journal for critically and constructively discussing a previous version of the paper.

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Voigt, S. Determinants of judicial efficiency: a survey. Eur J Law Econ 42, 183–208 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-016-9531-6

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