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A model of constitutional design and corruption

European Journal of Law and Economics volume 44, pages 67–90 (2017)Cite this article

Abstract

The present work proposes a theoretical framework to examine if details in the design of a consensual political system that incorporates proportional representation in the election process are necessary for it to take advantage of an inherent affinity to better accommodate the preferences of the members of a society. It is also examined if these details relate to the introduction of a satisfactory level of accountability for officials and lower levels of corruption.

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Acknowledgments

We thank Emma Galli, Giorgios Chortareas, Dimitris Makris, Konstantinos Pilpilidis, as well anonymous referees for extensive and constructive comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Hellenic Federation of Enterprises, 1 Paschalias str., 154 52, Psychico, Greece

    Michael Mitsopoulos

  2. The Brookings Institution, US and Professor of Economics, University of Piraeus, 21 Gr. Lambraki Str., 185 33, Piraeus, Greece

    Theodore Pelagidis

Authors
  1. Michael Mitsopoulos
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  2. Theodore Pelagidis
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Correspondence to Michael Mitsopoulos.

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Mitsopoulos, M., Pelagidis, T. A model of constitutional design and corruption. Eur J Law Econ 44, 67–90 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-015-9486-z

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Keywords

  • Constitutions
  • Corruption
  • Institutions

JEL Classification

  • D02
  • D72
  • D73