A model of constitutional design and corruption

Abstract

The present work proposes a theoretical framework to examine if details in the design of a consensual political system that incorporates proportional representation in the election process are necessary for it to take advantage of an inherent affinity to better accommodate the preferences of the members of a society. It is also examined if these details relate to the introduction of a satisfactory level of accountability for officials and lower levels of corruption.

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Acknowledgments

We thank Emma Galli, Giorgios Chortareas, Dimitris Makris, Konstantinos Pilpilidis, as well anonymous referees for extensive and constructive comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.

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Correspondence to Michael Mitsopoulos.

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Mitsopoulos, M., Pelagidis, T. A model of constitutional design and corruption. Eur J Law Econ 44, 67–90 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-015-9486-z

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Keywords

  • Constitutions
  • Corruption
  • Institutions

JEL Classification

  • D02
  • D72
  • D73