European Journal of Law and Economics

, Volume 44, Issue 1, pp 67–90 | Cite as

A model of constitutional design and corruption

  • Michael MitsopoulosEmail author
  • Theodore Pelagidis


The present work proposes a theoretical framework to examine if details in the design of a consensual political system that incorporates proportional representation in the election process are necessary for it to take advantage of an inherent affinity to better accommodate the preferences of the members of a society. It is also examined if these details relate to the introduction of a satisfactory level of accountability for officials and lower levels of corruption.


Constitutions Corruption Institutions 

JEL Classification

D02 D72 D73 



We thank Emma Galli, Giorgios Chortareas, Dimitris Makris, Konstantinos Pilpilidis, as well anonymous referees for extensive and constructive comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Hellenic Federation of EnterprisesPsychicoGreece
  2. 2.The Brookings Institution, US and Professor of EconomicsUniversity of PiraeusPiraeusGreece

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