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Absence of a market in the Dutch balancing mechanism: European rules versus specific investments

European Journal of Law and Economics volume 38, pages 71–90 (2014)Cite this article

Abstract

The European directives for the electricity industry prescribe the creation of a market for balancing electricity supply and demand. In this paper, we demonstrate that a market for balancing has not emerged in the Dutch electricity industry, and that, instead, the balancing transactions are governed by regulated, long-term contracts and a bidding mechanism. We explain the absence of a balancing market by using the framework of transaction cost economics, in which the efficiency of a market decreases with increasing investments in specific assets. The results of a questionnaire among the energy firms that supply balancing power in the Dutch setting show that these firms have invested in specific physical, temporal and dedicated balancing assets. The need for these specific investments to balance supply and demand does not only explain the absence of a market, but also the lack of participation by small firms in the balancing mechanism. We recommend several policies, such as stimulating technological developments for the storage of electricity and demand side management, which reduce these specific investments in balancing assets, and thereby stimulate the creation of a market and the participation of small firms.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Geosciences, Innovation Studies, Copernicus Institute of Sustainable Development, Utrecht University, P.O. Box 80115, 3508 TC, Utrecht, The Netherlands

    Eva Niesten

  2. Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University Rotterdam, P.O. Box 1738, 3000 DR, Rotterdam, The Netherlands

    Albert Jolink

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  1. Eva Niesten
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Correspondence to Eva Niesten.

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Niesten, E., Jolink, A. Absence of a market in the Dutch balancing mechanism: European rules versus specific investments. Eur J Law Econ 38, 71–90 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-013-9411-2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-013-9411-2

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