Skip to main content
Log in

Assessing the Impact of Antitrust Intervention by the Italian Competition Authority

  • Published:
De Economist Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Summary

In the last 2 years the Italian Competition Authority conducted several impact analyses, two of which – regarding baby milk and fresh milk markets – are presented here. A few lessons can be learned from these analyses. First, uncovering a cartel and imposing fines by themselves do not necessarily interrupt the effects of the anticompetitive behaviour. Second, by disclosing new information to the general public, an investigation can make the market more transparent so as to increase the probability of a successful entry. Third, in complex markets, remedies that have been imposed in clearing mergers may work out in unexpected ways. Fourth, mergers involving nationwide sellers should not be assessed only by watching the local relevant markets, as the incentive structure for coordination can be modified also at national level. Fifth, it seems advisable to appoint an independent trustee when divestures are imposed.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Arisi, E. and F.M. Esposito (2007), ‘L’attività di advocacy dell’Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato: un bilancio dei primi 15 anni’ (Advocacy by the Italian Competition Authority: an overview over the first fifteen years), unpublished paper. Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, forthcoming in Economia e Politica Industriale.

  • Bernheim B.D. and Winston M.D. (1990). ‘Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behaviour’. RAND Journal of Economics 21: 1–26

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • European Commission (2005), ‘DG Competition discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary abuses’, Available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf.

  • Farrell J. (2003). ‘Negotiation and Merger Remedies: Some Problems’. In: Léveque, F. and Shelanski, H. (eds) Merger Remedies in American and European Union Competition Law, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, pp. 95–105.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gual, J., M. Hellwig, A. Perrot, M. Polo, P. Rey, K. Schmidt and R. Stenbacka (2005), ‘An Economic Approach to Article 82, Report to the European Commission by the European Advisory Group on Competition Policy (EAGCP)’, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/publications/studies/eagcp_july_21_05.pdf.

  • White H. (2006). ‘Time Series Estimation of the Effects of Natural Experiments’. Journal of Econometrics 135: 527–566

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Pierluigi Sabbatini.

Additional information

Italian Competition Authority. The views expressed in the article are those of the author and do not involve the responsibility of the Italian Authority. I want to thank Fabio Massimo Esposito and an anonymous referee for comments and observations. All remaining errors are my own.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Sabbatini, P. Assessing the Impact of Antitrust Intervention by the Italian Competition Authority. De Economist 156, 491–505 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10645-008-9106-1

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10645-008-9106-1

Keywords

JEL Code(s)

Navigation