De Economist

, Volume 154, Issue 1, pp 41–62 | Cite as

Price Anomalies in the Used Car Market

  • Peter KooremanEmail author
  • Marco A. Haan


Using two different samples – one based on newspaper advertisements, the other Internet-based – we identify some price anomalies in the used car market in the Netherlands. First, prices of used cars depend on their age in calendar years rather than months. Second, there is some evidence that crossing 100,000 km induces a sudden additional price reduction. Third, a new license plate format, something with no intrinsic value whatsoever, increases a car’s price by about 4%. We discuss possible explanations for these results.


price anomalies used car market 

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Copyright information

© Springer 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of GroningenGroningenthe Netherlands

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