Abstract
This research explores the presence of the income–pollution relationship in a dynamic two-country setting. We argue that the initial conditions of an economy, as described by its initial stock of physical capital, its total factor productivity, and the degree of environmental awareness, are critical determinants of the income–pollution paths. More importantly, these initial conditions have a more pronounced effect in a world where economies interact with one another and transboundary and global pollutants are affecting more than one country. We show that, in the presence of pollution externalities between two countries, the income–pollution paths these countries follow depend on the stage of development of each country, on their relative and absolute productivities, on the degree of environmental awareness and on the transboundary nature of the pollutants. In a two-country setting with pollution externalities, even more complex patterns may arise compared to single country models, thereby confirming the nonlinear effect of growth on environmental outcomes. It is shown that even small asymmetries span income–pollution relationships that are significantly different than the prescribed inverted U-shaped patterns.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
We further assume a constant labor force equal to the country’s population and no population growth.
Stokey (1998) introduces a similar index of production technology and assumes that “[p]otential output is attained by using all productive resources in the dirtiest way.”
Note that in our model we allow for \(\rho _{ij}\ne \rho _{ji}\). For example, in an upstream-downstream pollution model, with country i being upstream and country j being downstream, we can set \(\rho _{ij}=0\) and \(\rho _{ji}=1\).
Here we consider only the part of the utility that corresponds to \(c_{t,1}\) and \(c_{t+1,2}\) such that \(u^{\prime }>0\). It can be shown that the optimal values of current and future consumption are such that this condition is not violated.
Chen et al. (2019) have assumed that environmental awareness varies among different countries, suggesting limited public awareness of environmental issues in developing economies. For their empirical analysis, they have constructed two indexes of environmental awareness based on regional statistics from Google Trends.
The parameter values for deriving these graphs are \(k\left( 0\right) =0.0001\) , \(\beta =0.0001\), \(\gamma =0.4\), and \(B=10\). TFP in part (a) is set to \(A=1.85\), while in part (b) is set to \(A=3.4\).
The parameter values are \(k\left( 0\right) =0.0001\), \(A_{i}=A_{j}=3.2\), \(\beta =2.15\), \(\gamma _{i}=\gamma _{j}=0.2\), and \(B=10\) for case 1 and \(k\left( 0\right) =0.0001\), \(A_{i}=A_{j}=6\), \(\beta =0.01\), \(\gamma _{i}=\gamma _{j}=1.8\), and \(B=10\) for case 2.
The parameter values for deriving these graphs are \(k_{i}\left( 0\right) =k_{j}(0)=0.0001\), \(A_{i}=A_{j}=3.2\), \(\beta =0.0001\), \(\gamma _{i}=\gamma _{j}=0.2\), and \(B=100\).
The parameter values for all \(i\in \left\{ 1,2\right\}\) are \(k_{i}\left( 0\right) =0.0001\), \(A_{i}=3.2\), \(\beta =2.15\), \(\rho _{ij}=0.5\), \(B=100\). Moreover, it is assumed that \(\gamma _{2}=4\).
References
Andreoni J, Levinson A (2001) The simple analytics of the environmental Kuznets curve. J Public Econ 80(2):269–286
Apergis N, Ozturk I (2015) Testing environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis in Asian countries. Ecol Ind 52:16–22
Balaguer J, Cantavella M (2018) The role of education in the environmental Kuznets curve. Evidence from Australian data. Energy Econ 70:289–296
Beck KA, Joshi P (2015) An analysis of the environmental Kuznets curve for carbon dioxide emissions: evidence for OECD and non-OECD countries. Eur J Sustain Dev 4(3):33–45
Boucekkine R, Krawczyk JB, Vallee T (2011) Environmental quality versus economic performance: a dynamic game approach. Optim Control Appl Methods 32(1):29–46
Chen X, Huang B, Lin CT (2019) Environmental awareness and environmental Kuznets curve. Econ Model 77:2–11
Chimeli AB, Braden JB (2005) Total factor productivity and the environmental Kuznets curve. J Environ Econ Manag 49(2):366–380
Copeland BR, Taylor MS (1995) Trade and transboundary pollution. Am Econ Rev 85:716–737
Dalgaard CJ, Strulik H (2014) Optimal aging and death: understanding the Preston curve. J Eur Econ Assoc 12(3):672–701
Diamantoudi E, Filippiadis E (2012) The Environmental Kuznets Curve in a multi-country setting. Unpublished manuscript. http://www.cireqmontreal.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/filippiadis.pdf
Galeoti M, Lanza A, Pauli F (2006) Reassessing the environmental Kuznets curve for CO2 emissions: a robustness exercise. Ecol Econ 57:152–163
Grossman GM, Krueger AB (1993) Environmental impacts of the North American free trade agreement. In: Garber P (ed) The U.S.–Mexico free trade agreement. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 13–56
Hutchinson E, Kennedy P (2014) The relationship between emissions and income growth for a transboundary pollutant. Resour Energy Econ 38:221–242
John A, Pecchenino R (1994) An overlapping generations model of growth and the environment. Econ J 104:1393–1410
Johnson EW, Schwadel P (2019) It is not a cohort thing: interrogating the relationship between age, cohort, and support for the environment. Environ Behav 51(7):879–901
Kanagy CL, Humphrey CR, Firebaugh G (1994) Surging environmentalism: changing public opinion or changing publics? Soc Sci Q 75:804–819
Kim YE, Loayza NV (2019) Productivity growth: patterns and determinants across the world. The World Bank
Lopez R (1994) The environment as a factor of production: the effects of economic growth and trade liberalization. J Environ Econ Manag 27:163–184
Marrouch W, Chaudhuri AR (2016) International environmental agreements: doomed to fail or destined to succeed? A review of the literature. Int Rev Environ Resour Econ 9(3–4):245–319
Monderer D, Shapley L (1996) Potential games. Games Econ Behav 14:124–143
Peuckert J (2014) What shapes the impact of environmental regulation on competitiveness? Evidence from executive opinion surveys. Environ Innov Soc Trans 10:77–94
Prieur F (2009) The environmental Kuznets curve in a world of irreversibility. Econ Theor 40(1):57–90
Selden T, Song D (1994) Environmental quality and development: is there a Kuznets Curve for air pollution emissions? J Environ Econ Manag 27:147–162
Stokey N (1998) Are there limits to growth? Int Econ Rev 39:1–31
Strulik H (2018) Smoking kills: an economic theory of addiction, health deficit accumulation, and longevity. J Health Econ 62:1–12
Sundaram RK (1996) A first course in optimization theory. Cambridge University Press, New York
Wagner M, Müller-Fürstenberger G (2008) The carbon Kuznets curve: a cloudy picture emitted by bad econometrics? Resour Energy Econ 30(3):388–408
Wang SX, Fu YB, Zhang ZG (2015) Population growth and the environmental Kuznets curve. China Econ Rev 36:146–165
World Bank (1992) World development report. Oxford University Press, New York
Yaguchi Y, Sonobe T, Otsuka K (2007) Beyond the environmental Kuznets curve: a comparative study of SO2 and CO2 emissions between Japan and China. Environ Dev Econ 12:445–470
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
Publisher's Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Appendices
Appendix 1
See Table 4.
Appendix 2
Maximizing conditions for optimization problem (10). Optimization problem (10) can be expressed as
For \(i=1,2\), the necessary Kuhn–Tucker conditions are the first-order conditions
along with complementarity slackness conditions
positivity of the Lagrange multipliers
and feasibility conditions
and
where \(h_{i}\left( x_{i,t},s_{i,t}\right)\), \(i=x,s\), denotes the respective constraint function. Note that the objective function is defined over the compact set \(\left( x_{i,t},s_{i,t}\right) \subset {\mathbb {R}} _{+}^{2}\). Moreover, \(U_{i}\left( \cdot \right)\) is everywhere continuous. Therefore, according to the Weierstrass Theorem, this problem has a global minimum and a global maximum. Furthermore, the constraint qualification is satisfied since the rank of the matrix below is equal to the number of the constraints:
According to Proposition 6.5 in Sundaram (1996), this ensures that conditions (29)–(36) define the solution \(\left( x_{i,t}^{*},s_{i,t}^{*}\right)\) in the case of a single country, or the best responses \(\left( x_{i,t}^{*}\left( x_{j,t},s_{j,t}\right) ,s_{i,t}^{*}\left( x_{j,t},s_{j,t}\right) \right)\) in the case of two countries. \(\square\)
Proof of Proposition 1
For the proof of this proposition, we have to examine the sign of
We start with the sign of the \(\partial x^{*}\left[ k\left( t\right) \right] /\partial k\left( t\right)\). Differentiating equation (18) with respect to the capital yields
Note that this is a continuous function for all \(k\left( t\right) \ge 0\). Setting the derivative equal to zero under the assumptions that
yields two solutions:
It is straightforward to show that
and that, under (13),
Therefore, \({\underline{k}}\left( t\right)\) is a local maximum and \(\overline{ k}\left( t\right)\) is a local minimum of the \(x^{*}\left[ k\left( t\right) \right] .\) We compare the extrema to the steady-state value of capital defined by equation (14). Note that \(k^{SS}-{\overline{k}} \left( t\right) =-\left( A^{4}-10A^{2}\gamma +9\gamma ^{2}\right) ^{1/2}/\beta A^{2}<0\). This shows that the local minima can never be reached. On the other hand,\(~k^{SS}-{\underline{k}}\left( t\right) =\left( A^{4}-10A^{2}\gamma +9\gamma ^{2}\right) ^{1/2}/\beta A^{2}>0\), so that a maximum is always reached. We now turn on the sign of \(\partial k\left( t\right) /\partial t\) that by assumption is nonnegative. There are two cases. When the \(k^{SS}~\)is reached before \(\partial x^{*}\left[ k\left( t\right) \right] /\partial k\left( t\right)\) turns negative, the dynamics of emissions over time are positively monotonic. If, on the other hand, \(k^{SS}\) is reached once \(\partial x^{*}\left[ k\left( t\right) \right] /\partial k\left( t\right) <0\), the dynamics of \(x^{*}\left( t\right)\) will depend only on the initial condition. \(\square\)
Lemma 5
For any positive values of domestic and foreign emissions, country i’ s optimal savings equals half the disposable income, i.e.,
Therefore, the following optimization problem is equivalent to problem (28):
Proof of Lemma 5
Consider some \(x_{i,t}^{o}\in [0,{\overline{x}}_{i,t}]\), \(x_{j,t}^{o}\in [0,{\overline{x}}_{j,t}]\), and also \(s_{i,t}^{*}= \frac{1}{2}\left( A_{i}k_{t,i}^{1/2}x_{t,i}-k_{t,i}\right)\). Evaluating ( 7) at \(\left( x_{i,t}^{o},x_{j,t}^{o},s_{i,t}^{*}\right)\) yields
Consider now any \(s_{i,t}^{**}\ne s_{i,t}^{*}\). Evaluating (7) at \(\left( x_{i,t}^{o},x_{j,t}^{o},s_{i,t}^{**}\right)\) yields
Taking the difference
implying that \(s_{i,t}^{*}=\left( A_{i}k_{t,i}^{1/2}x_{t,i}-k_{t,i}\right)\) is indeed the maximizer of (28). Therefore, by substituting \(s_{i,t}^{*}\)the optimization problem (28) transforms to
\(\square\)
Maximization of problem (37). Maximization of problem (37) requires the following conditions:
and
Conditions (38)–(41) for \(i=1,2\) characterize the solution of the pollution game. \(\square\)
Proof of Lemma 3
First, note that \(\forall i\in \left\{ 1,2\right\}\), the welfare functions are defined as \(U_{i}:X_{i}\rightarrow {\mathbb {R}}\), where \(X_{i}\subset {\mathbb {R}}\) and they are continuously differentiable. Function \(P:X_{i}\rightarrow {\mathbb {R}}\) is also continuously differentiable and \(\forall i\in \left\{ 1,2\right\}\) we have
Therefore, according to Lemma 4.4 in Monderer and Shapley (1996), (22) is a potential function of the pollution game. Moreover, the Hessian of P(x) is given by
Consider \({\mathbf {z}}\in {\mathbb {R}} ^{2}\diagup \{{\mathbf {0}}_{2\times 1}\}\) and construct the quadratic form
Thus the Hessian matrix of the potential function is negative definite and, therefore, the potential function \(P({\mathbf {x}})\) is strictly concave. \(\square\)
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Filippiadis, E., Litina, A. A dynamic analysis of the income–pollution relationship in a two-country setting. Econ Change Restruct 55, 775–801 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10644-021-09328-6
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10644-021-09328-6