Skip to main content
Log in

Elections and Environmental Quality

  • Published:
Environmental and Resource Economics Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

This paper investigates how political elections influence environmental quality. From this perspective, we rely on the reward-punishment hypothesis (RPH) developed by democratic accountability theories. RPH implies that legislators can be held accountable by voters for increased pollution and/or environmental disasters. Consequently, incumbent politicians tend to limit environmental degradation during election campaigns because voters may switch their political preference as punishment for such degradations. Using a panel data set of 67 developed democracies over the period 2002–2015, our estimates reveal that the environmental quality tends to improve during the periods of legislative elections mainly in non-OECD countries. Such results provide evidence of the capacity of voters to influence incumbent politicians to embrace pro-environmental behavior as legislative elections approach.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. 4% is the difference between 1 and the exponential coefficients of Legislative Elections and Legislative Electionst−1.

  2. We are grateful to two anonymous referees for their helpful suggestions in identifying those measures of environmental awareness.

  3. In the case of missing data, the values reported for one wave were used for the missing periods.

  4. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.

References

Download references

Funding

This study benefited from the financial support of the Bourgogne-Franche-Comté Regional Council (DEFI-ENV project).

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Nicolae Stef.

Additional information

Publisher’s Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Rights and permissions

Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Stef, N., Ben Jabeur, S. Elections and Environmental Quality. Environ Resource Econ 84, 593–625 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-022-00739-1

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-022-00739-1

Keywords

JEL Classification

Navigation