Abstract
One of the challenges in managing the Earth’s common pool resources, such as a livable climate or the supply of safe drinking water, is to motivate successive generations to make the costly effort not to deplete them. In the context of sequential contributions, intergenerational reciprocity dynamically amplifies low past efforts by decreasing successors’ rates of contribution. Unfortunately, the behavioral literature provides few interventions to motivate intergenerational beneficence. We identify a simple intervention that motivates decision makers who receive a low endowment. In a large online experiment with 1378 subjects, we show that asking decision makers to forecast future generations’ actions considerably increases their rate of contribution (from 46% to over 60%). By shifting decision makers’ attention from the immediate past to the future, the intervention is most effective in enhancing intergenerational beneficence of subjects who did not receive a contribution from their predecessors, effectively neutralizing negative intergenerational reciprocity effects. We provide suggestive evidence that the attentional channel is the main channel at work.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Data Availability
Data used in this study are accessible at https://data.mendeley.com/datasets/ycstzykj58/2. Further information regarding the code used and the data produced are available from the corresponding author upon request.
Notes
Another effective nudge in the related literature is to set the sustainable option as default (Böhm et al. 2020).
Studies that explored donations in a dictator game with different α /d ratios find that, when α /d = 2, the average contribution increases to somewhat above 50%, from 27% in the case of α = d (Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001). In a field experiment on matching in a charitable contribution (Karlan and List, 2007), the effect of the multiplier appears to asymptote at about 2.
A closely related practice in the literature is to keep the endowment of the decision maker constant after generous and non-generous predecessors to provide decision makers with the same ability to leave money for the future (Bang et al. 2017; Wade-Benzoni, 2002). To achieve this, the generous and non-generous predecessors have different endowments and contribute different proportions but the same amount (e.g., a generous predecessor contributes $6 out of $8 while a non-generous one contributes $6 out of $24). This practice keeps the same endowment for decision makers while the endowments differ between generations ($9 vs. $8 or $24) and differ between predecessors of different decision makers ($8 vs. $24). Our setting has the same two levels of endowments, high and low, in all generations to increase comparability across generations and decision makers. To limit the impact of the endowment on the decision maker’s ability to contribute, we set the contribution to be a dichotomous decision with a modest amount.
The labels in the brackets were not shown to the subjects, the same for (b) and (c).
The implementation of simulated decisions was not communicated with our subjects. The acceptability of such a practice of providing incomplete information has been discussed (Charness et al. 2021; Colson et al. 2016; Hey, 1998). Our simulation aimed to mimic what would have happened if the subjects had made decisions in a predetermined order. We do not consider this practice problematic because the subjects were not misled to make sub-optimal decisions. Trying one’s best to forecast is always in the best interest of the subjects, knowing or not knowing the unrevealed details regarding our implementation.
The proportion of contribution is greater if the belief elicitation is not incentivized though the difference is not statistically different (Chi-square = 1.15, p = 0.28).
Assuming the expected contribution rate of generation \(i\) being \({P}^{i}\), then \({P}^{i+1}={P}^{i}\times {p}_{B}+\left(1-{P}^{i}\right)\times {p}_{A}={P}^{i}\times \left({p}_{B}-{p}_{A}\right)+{p}_{A}\), and the contribution rate of generation \(i+k\) is \({P}^{i+k}={P}^{i}\times {\left({p}_{B}-{p}_{A}\right)}^{k}+\sum_{1}^{k}[{p}_{A}\times {\left({p}_{B}-{p}_{A}\right)}^{k-1}]\). The long-run proportion can be obtained by \(\underset{\mathrm{k}\to \infty }{\mathrm{lim}}{P}^{i+k}={p}_{A}/(1-({p}_{B}-{p}_{A}))\).
Please see Table S7 in Appendix III for results and discussion regarding how the reported relevance correlates with the contribution decision.
This finding is consistent with a previous study (Wade-Benzoni, 2002), showing that information suggesting decision norms has little impact when the decision maker is not materially affected by the decisions disclosed in the information.
References
Andreoni J, Vesterlund L (2001) Which is the fair sex? Gender differences in altruism. Q J Econ 116:293–312. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355301556419
Bahr G, Requate T (2014) Reciprocity and giving in a consecutive three-person dictator game with social interaction. Ger Econ Rev 15:374–392. https://doi.org/10.1111/geer.12013
Bang HM, Zhou Koval C, Wade-Benzoni KA (2017) It’s the thought that counts over time: the interplay of intent, outcome, stewardship, and legacy motivations in intergenerational reciprocity. J Exp Soc Psychol 73:197–210. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2017.07.006
Bhargava S, Loewenstein G (2015) Behavioral economics and public policy 102: beyond nudging. Am Econ Rev 105:396–401. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.p20151049
Böhm R, Gürerk Ö, Lauer T (2020) Nudging climate change mitigation: a laboratory experiment with inter-generational public goods. Games 11:42. https://doi.org/10.3390/g11040042
Carpenter J, Verhoogen E, Burks S (2005) The effect of stakes in distribution experiments. Econ Lett 86:393–398. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2004.08.007
Charness G, Samek A, van de Ven J (2021) What is considered deception in experimental economics? Exp Econ. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-021-09726-7
Chermak JM, Krause K (2002) Individual response, information, and intergenerational common pool problems. J Environ Econ Manag 43:47–70. https://doi.org/10.1006/jeem.2000.1173
Colson G, Corrigan JR, Grebitus C, Loureiro ML, Rousu MC (2016) Which deceptive practices, if any, should be allowed in experimental economics research? Results from surveys of applied experimental economists and students. Am J Agric Econ 98:610–621
Fan CS (2005) Survival of the gene, intergenerational transfers and precautionary saving. J Dev Econ 76:451–479. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2004.01.003
Fehr E, Fischbacher U (2003) The nature of human altruism. Nature 425:785–791. https://doi.org/10.1038/nature02043
Fischer M-E, Irlenbusch B, Sadrieh A (2004) An intergenerational common pool resource experiment. J Environ Econ Manag 48:811–836. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2003.12.002
Gächter S, Nosenzo D, Renner E, Sefton M (2010) Sequential vs. simultaneous contributions to public goods: experimental evidence. J Public Econ 94:515–522. https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JPUBECO.2010.03.002
Hagmann D, Ho EH, Loewenstein G (2019) Nudging out support for a carbon tax. Nat Clim Change. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-019-0474-0
Hauser OP, Rand DG, Peysakhovich A, Nowak MA (2014) Cooperating with the future. Nature 511:220–223. https://doi.org/10.1038/nature13530
Hernandez M, Noval LJ, Wade-Benzoni KA (2015) How leaders can create intergenerational systems to promote organizational sustainability. Organ Dyn 2:104–111. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orgdyn.2015.02.004
Hey J (1998) Experimental economics and deception: a comment. J Econ Psychol 19:397–401
IPCC (2018) Summary for policymakers. In Masson-Delmotte V, Zhai P, Pörtner H-O, Roberts D, Skea J, Shukla PR, Pirani A, Moufouma-Okia W, Péan C, Pidcock R, Connors S, Matthews JBR, Chen Y, Zhou X, Gomis MI, Lonnoy E, Maycock T, Tignor M, Waterfield T (eds) Global warming of 1.5 °C. An IPCC special report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty. World Meteorological Organization, Geneva, p 32
Jacquet J, Hagel K, Hauert C, Marotzke J, Röhl T, Milinski M (2013) Intra- and intergenerational discounting in the climate game. Nat Clim Change 3:1025–1028. https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2024
Johnson EJ, Häubl G, Keinan A (2007) Aspects of endowment: a query theory of value construction. J Exp Psychol Learn Mem Cogn 33:461–474. https://doi.org/10.1037/0278-7393.33.3.461
Kamijo Y, Komiya A, Mifune N, Saijo T (2017) Negotiating with the future: incorporating imaginary future generations into negotiations. Sustain Sci 12:409–420. https://doi.org/10.1007/S11625-016-0419-8
Karlan D, List JA (2007) Does price matter in charitable giving? Evidence from a large-scale natural field experiment. Am Econ Rev 97:1774–1793
Kölle F, Lauer T (2020) Understanding cooperation in an intertemporal context. Working paper no. 046. ECONtribute discussion paper
Kube R, Löschel A, Mertens H, Requate T (2018) Research trends in environmental and resource economics: insights from four decades of JEEM. J Environ Econ Manag 92:433–464. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2018.08.001
Li Z, Liu P, Swallow SK (2021) Assurance contracts to support multi-unit threshold public goods in environmental markets. Environ Resour Econ 80:339–378. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-021-00588-4
Lohse J, Waichman I (2020) The effects of contemporaneous peer punishment on cooperation with the future. Nat Commun 11:1815. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-15661-7
Mason CF, Phillips OR (1997) Mitigating the tragedy of the commons through cooperation: an experimental evaluation. J Environ Econ Manag 34:148–172. https://doi.org/10.1006/jeem.1997.1006
Milinski M, Semmann D, Krambeck H-J, Marotzke J (2006) Stabilizing the Earth’s climate is not a losing game: supporting evidence from public goods experiments. Proc Natl Acad Sci 103:3994–3998. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0504902103
Milinski M, Sommerfeld RD, Krambeck H-J, Reed FA, Marotzke J (2008) The collective-risk social dilemma and the prevention of simulated dangerous climate change. Proc Natl Acad Sci 105:2291–2294
Normann H-T, Rau HA (2015) Simultaneous and sequential contributions to step-level public goods: one vs. two provision levels. J Confl Resolut 59:1273–1300. https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1763442
Peer E, Vosgerau J, Acquisti A (2014) Reputation as a sufficient condition for data quality on Amazon Mechanical Turk. Behav Res Methods 46:1023–1031. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13428-013-0434-y
Rand DG (2012) The promise of Mechanical Turk: How online labor markets can help theorists run behavioral experiments. J Theor Biol Evol Cooper 299:172–179. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.03.004
Rockenbach B, Milinski M (2006) The efficient interaction of indirect reciprocity and costly punishment. Nature 444:718–723. https://doi.org/10.1038/nature05229
Sherstyuk K, Tarui N, Ravago M-LV, Saijo T (2016) Intergenerational games with dynamic externalities and climate change experiments. J Assoc Environ Resour Econ 3:247–281. https://doi.org/10.1086/684162
Thaler RH, Sunstein CR (2009) Nudge: improving decisions about health, wealth, and happiness. Penguin
Tol RSJ (2009) The economic effects of climate change. J Econ Perspect 23:29–51. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.23.2.29
Tost LP, Wade-Benzoni KA, Johnson HH (2015) Noblesse oblige emerges (with time): power enhances intergenerational beneficence. Organ Behav Hum Decis Process 128:61–73. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2015.03.003
Tversky A, Kahneman D (1986) Rational choice and the framing of decisions. J Bus 59:S251–S278
Wade-Benzoni KA (2019) Legacy motivations & the psychology of intergenerational decisions. Curr Opin Psychol Time 26:19–22. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2018.03.013
Wade-Benzoni KA (2002) A golden rule over time: reciprocity in intergenerational allocation decisions. Acad Manage J 45:1011–1028. https://doi.org/10.2307/3069327
Wade-Benzoni KA, Hernandez M, Medvec V, Messick D (2008) In fairness to future generations: the role of egocentrism, uncertainty, power, and stewardship in judgments of intergenerational allocations. J Exp Soc Psychol 44:233–245. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2007.04.004
Wade-Benzoni KA, Sondak H, Galinsky AD (2010) Leaving a legacy: intergenerational allocations of benefits and burdens. Bus Ethics Q 20:7–34. https://doi.org/10.5840/beq20102013
Wade-Benzoni KA, Tost LP (2009) The egoism and altruism of intergenerational behavior. Personal Soc Psychol Rev 13:165–193. https://doi.org/10.1177/1088868309339317
Wade-Benzoni KA, Tost LP, Hernandez M, Larrick RP (2012) It’s only a matter of time: death, legacies, and intergenerational decisions. Psychol Sci 23:704–709. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797612443967
Weber EU, Johnson EJ (2009) Mindful judgment and decision making. Annu Rev Psychol 60:53–85. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.60.110707.163633
Weber EU, Johnson EJ, Milch KF, Chang H, Brodscholl JC, Goldstein DG (2007) Asymmetric discounting in intertemporal choice: a query-theory account. Psychol Sci 18:516–523. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01932.x
Zaval L, Markowitz EM, Weber EU (2015) How will I be remembered? Conserving the environment for the Sake of one’s legacy. Psychol Sci 26:231–236. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797614561266
Zhou H, Fishbach A (2016) The pitfall of experimenting on the web: how unattended selective attrition leads to surprising (yet false) research conclusions. J Pers Soc Psychol 111:493–504. https://doi.org/10.1037/pspa0000056
Acknowledgements
The study protocol of this paper was approved by the Institutional Review Board at Columbia University (protocol number IRB-AAAB1301). The research leading to these results received funding from the European Research Council under the European Community’s Programme “Ideas”—Call identifier: ERC-2013-StG/ERC Grant Agreement No. 336703—project RISICO “RISk and uncertainty in developing and Implementing Climate change pOlicies”, the Global Thinking Foundation, Yale NUS College through grant number R-607-264-235-121, National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant 72103015), the European Research Council under the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013)/ERC Grant Agreement No. 336155—Project COBHAM" The role of consumer behaviour and heterogeneity in the integrated assessment of energy and climate policies", and US National Science Foundation (Grant SES-DRMS 2049796). We thank the editor and two anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments and queries that considerably improved the paper. We thank Matthew Sisco for his technical support.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Contributions
V.B., F.D., N.L., M.T., and E.U.W. designed the experiment. V.B., N.L., and M.T. carried out the experiments. N.L. and V.B. analyzed the results. V.B., F.D., N.L., M.T., and E.U.W. wrote the paper.
Corresponding author
Ethics declarations
Conflict of Interest
The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.
Additional information
Publisher's Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Supplementary Information
Below is the link to the electronic supplementary material.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Bosetti, V., Dennig, F., Liu, N. et al. Forward-Looking Belief Elicitation Enhances Intergenerational Beneficence. Environ Resource Econ 81, 743–761 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-022-00648-3
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-022-00648-3