Optimal Waste Disposal Fees When Product Durability is Endogenous: Accounting for Planned Obsolescence

  • Hiroshi Kinokuni
  • Shuichi Ohori
  • Yasunobu Tomoda


Considering the Coase conjecture (J Law Econ 15:143–149, 1972), we explore the optimal disposal fee of solid waste through the choice of product durability by a producer. We find that introducing a disposal fee curbs planned obsolescence and increases product durability. This increased durability decreases the social cost of waste and increases the service flow from the durable product. Therefore, the optimal disposal fee is higher than the Pigouvian level in the closed-loop.


Solid waste management Design for environment Disposal fee Durability choice Planned obsolescence 



We are grateful to the editor, the two anonymous referees, Masanobu Ishikawa, Tomomichi Mizuno, Akihisa Shibata, Takayoshi Shinkuma, Kenji Takeuchi, Tomoki Fujii, and Makoto Yano. This research was supported by MEXT/JSPS KAKENHI Grant Numbers 26380338 and 26380344.


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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of EconomicsRitsumeikan UniversityKusatsuJapan
  2. 2.Faculty of InformaticsKansai UniversityTakatsukiJapan
  3. 3.Kobe City University of Foreign StudiesKobeJapan

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