Abstract
A conceptual model of consumer sorting in markets for housing, labor and health care is outlined and used to make three points about how benefit transfers are used for environmental policy evaluation. First, the standard approach to assessing benefits of air quality improvements by transferring the value of a statistical life from labor market studies embeds several untested (but testable) assumptions. Second, if the cost of an environmental policy exceeds its capitalized effect on housing prices, then the capitalization effect is an insufficient statistic for determining whether benefits exceed costs. Third, there are several ways in which equilibrium sorting models may be usefully extended to assess distributional welfare effects of environmental policies.



Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
This yields a conservatively high $1.09 billion estimate for the annualized cost. Walker shows that the regulation’s effect on earning is indistinguishable from zero after 7 years.
I refer to these studies as quasi-national because they use data from a large but incomplete portion of the United States, focusing on nonrandom subsets of the people who live in the areas they study. Specifically, Chay and Greenstone’s estimates are based on the median self-assessed value of owner occupied houses in approximately one third of US counties. Bayer, Keohane and Timmins focus on household heads under the age of 35 living in 242 metropolitan statistical areas.
Specifically, I start with Chay and Greenstone’s (2005) household MWTP estimate of $243 per permanent microgram per cubic meter reduction of total suspended particulates (TSP) and Bayer’s et al. (2009) household estimate of $149 in annualized MWTP per microgram per cubic meter reduction in PM\(_{10}\). Then I convert TSP and PM\(_{10}\) to PM\(_{2.5}\) using a conversion factor of 1.82 to go from TSP to PM\(_{10 }\) as suggested by Bayer, Keohane and Timmins and a conversion factor of 0.55 to go from PM\(_{10}\) to PM\(_{2.5}\) based on my calculations from a population-weighted regression of PM\(_{2.5 }\)on PM\(_{10}\) in the year 2000. Since Chay and Greenstone measure MWTP for a permanent reduction in air pollution, I annualize their measure assuming a user cost of housing of 7.86% based on Blomquist et al. (1988). Finally, I assume 123 million households in 2020 based on multiplying the Census Bureau’s 1-year ACS estimate for 2015 (118 million) by their projection for U.S. population growth between 2015 and 2020 (4.1%). All dollar values are converted to year 2006 dollars using the GDP deflator.
Sullivan (2017) makes a similar observation and suggests that at least part of the discrepancy is because the standard approaches that economists use to assign air pollution exposures to people at their residential locations introduce severe measurement error that attenuates hedonic estimates of their marginal willingness to pay for air quality.
I abstract from other local public goods and non-environmental amenities that affect the quality of life in Roback (1982) style models to avoid extraneous notation and to focus attention on environmental policy. Other amenities could be added to without altering the main points of this paper.
One might prefer to condition on a broader set of characteristics when defining baseline mortality risk such as gender, race and genetic markers. Here I condition on age alone for notational simplicity and to help relate the conceptual framework to VSL estimates from Hall and Jones (2007).
For simplicity, I assume that these investments do not affect occupational or neighborhood mortality risk. However, it would be interesting to consider potential interactions. For example, people who take statins to address hypertension may face a lower risk of having an air-pollution induced heart attack.
Hall and Jones (2007) give an example of how to estimate the age specific cost of reducing mortality risk.
This composite numeraire good includes the physical characteristics of housing.
If two locations provided identical bundles of amenities and mortality risk, then additional assumptions would be needed to rule out the possibility that they sell at different prices. For example, one could guarantee existence of a price function by adding the assumptions of free mobility and full information as in Bajari and Benkard (2005).
While Eq. (5) describes an equilibrium relationship it is not a traditional “hedonic” price function in the sense that amenities and mortality risk are not direct attributes of the product being purchased.
Specifically, I take the mortality distribution by age from Table 5-4 of EPA’s report.
Additional assumptions are also required to interpret the change in housing prices as a measure of willingness to pay, as discussed in Sect. 5.
This assumes weak complementarity holds in the sense that one must live near the improved rivers and lakes in order to derive utility from the quality improvement.
Hence, capitalization is used to describe comparative statistics for the transition from an initial equilibrium to a new equilibrium. I follow this convention despite the fact that it has potential to create confusion. Banzhaf (2015) explains that this convention differs from prior literature that used “capitalization” to describe cross-sectional correlation between prices and amenities in a single equilibrium.
Hedonic price functions may change shape over time due to changes in market primitives such as preferences, technology and institutions, macroeconomic shocks to wealth, or increased housing supply.
Even if the quality change is small, concomitant changes in technology, preferences, and information may cause the shape of the price function to change. Indeed, such changes are likely to occur over the 10 to 30-year study periods that are common in empirical capitalization studies.
Greenstone and Gallagher (2008) focus on median housing prices in neighborhoods around Superfund sites. Gamper-Rabindran and Timmins (2013) demonstrate that focusing on the median priced house may understate the capitalization effects of Superfund cleanups because those effects tend to be concentrated among houses at lower quantiles of the within-neighborhood distributions of housing prices.
In some cases, the use of administrative data sets may also pose new challenges in terms of sample selection. For example, Walker’s (2013) use of LEHD administrative records to analyze the effects of air quality regulations on the labor market was necessarily limited to just four states and Ketcham et al. (2016) analysis of Medicare administrative records to assess the welfare effects of choice architecture polices proposed for health insurance markets necessarily excluded individuals who received low income subsidies because they faced a different choice structure that would have invalidated the research design.
References
Armona L, Fuster A, Zafar B (2016) Home price expectations and behavior: evidence from a randomized information experiment. Working paper
Bajari P, Benkard CL (2005) Demand estimation with heterogeneous consumers and unobserved product characteristics: a hedonic approach. J Polit Econ 113(6):1239–1276
Banzhaf HS (2015) Panel-data hedonics: Rosen’s first stage and differences-in-differences as “sufficient statistics”. NBER working paper 21485
Banzhaf HS, Walsh RP (2008) Do people vote with their feet? An empirical test of Tiebout’s mechanism. Amer Econ Rev 98(3):843–63
Bayer P, Keohane N, Timmins C (2009) Migration and hedonic valuation: the case of air quality. J Environ Econ Manag 58(1):1–14
Bieri D, Kuminoff NV, Pope JC (2014) National expenditures on local amenities. Working paper
Bishop RC, Boyle KJ, Carson RT, Chapman D, Hanemann WM, Kanninen B, Kopp RJ, Krosnick JA, List J, Meade N, Paterson R, Presser S, Smith VK, Tourangeau R, Welsh M, Wooldridge JM, DeBell M, Donovan C, Konopka M, Scherer N (2017) Putting a value on injuries to natural assets: the BP oil spill. Science 356(6335):253–254
Blomquist GC, Berger MC, Hoehn JP (1988) New estimates of quality of life in urban areas. Am Econ Rev 78(1):89–107
Chay KY, Greenstone M (2005) Does air quality matter? Evidence from the housing market. J Polit Econ 113(2):376–424
Costa DL, Kahn ME (2004) Changes in the value of life, 1940–1980. J Risk Uncertain 29(2):159–180
Cropper M, Sinha P (2013) The value of climate amenities: evidence from US migration decisions. NBER working paper #18756
Davis L (2004) The effect of health risk on housing values: evidence from a cancer cluster. Am Econ Rev 94(5):1693–1704
English E, McConnell K (2015) Overview of the damage assessment for lost recreational use. Technical Memorandum A: DWH-AR0021412. https://www.doi.gov/deepwaterhorizon/adminrecord
Ekeland I, Heckman JJ, Nesheim L (2004) Identification and estimation of hedonic models. J Polit Econ 112:S60–S109
Finkelstein A, Gentzkow M, Williams H (2016) Sources of geographic variation in health care: evidence from patient migration. Q J Econ 131(4):1681–1726
Galiani S, Murphy A, Pantano J (2015) Estimating neighborhood choice models: lessons from a housing assistance experiment. Am Econ Rev 105(11):3385–3415
Gamper-Rabindran S, Timmins C (2013) Does cleanup of hazardous waste sites raise housing values? Evidence of spatially localized benefits. J Environ Econ Manag 65:345–360
Graff-Zivin J, Neidell M (2013) Environment, health, and human capital. J Econ Lit 51(3):689–730
Greenstone M, Gallagher J (2008) Does hazardous waste matter? Evidence from the housing market and the superfund program. Q J Econ 123:951–1003
Hall RE, Jones CI (2007) The value of life and the rise in health spending. Q J Econ 122(1):39–72
Hamilton T, Phaneuf D (2015) An integrated model of regional and local residential sorting with application to air quality. J Environ Econ Manag 75:71–93
Hazilla M, Kopp RJ (1990) Social cost of environmental quality regulations: a general equilibrium analysis. J Polit Econ 98(4):853–873
Keiser DA, Shapiro JS (2017) Consequences of the clean water act and the demand for water quality. Q J Econ (Forthcoming)
Ketcham JD, Kuminoff NV, Powers CP (2016) Estimating the heterogeneous welfare effects of choice architecture: an application to the medicare prescription drug insurance market. NBER working paper #22732
Kneisner TJ, Viscusi WK, Woock C, Zilak JP (2012) The value of a statistical life: evidence from panel data. Rev Econ Stat 94(1):74–87
Kuminoff NV, Pope JC (2014) Do capitalization effects measure the willingness to pay for public goods? Int Econ Rev 55(4):1227–1250
Kuminoff NV, Parmeter C, Pope JC (2010) Which hedonic models can we trust to recover the marginal willingness to pay for environmental amenities. J Environ Econ Manag 60:145–160
Lee J, Taylor L (2014) Randomized safety inspections and risk exposure on the job: quasi-experimental estimates of the value of a statistical life. Working paper
Leggett CG (2002) Environmental valuation with imperfect information. Environ Resour Econ 23:343–355
Lind RC (1973) Spatial equilibrium, the theory of rents, and the measurement of benefits from public programs. Q J Econ 87:188–207
Mangum K (2015) Cities and labor market dynamics. WJ usery workplace research group paper series working paper 2015-2-3
Mrozek JR, Taylor LO (2002) What determines the value of life? A meta-analysis. J Policy Anal Manag 21(2):253–270
Murphy SL, Xu J, Kochanek KD (2013) Deaths: final data for 2010. Natl Vital Stat Rep 61(4):1–118
Pope JC (2008) Buyer information and the hedonic: the impact of a seller disclosure on the implicit price of airport noise. J Urban Econ 63:498–516
Roback J (1982) Wages, rents, and the quality of life. J Polit Econ 90(6):1257–1278
Schlenker W, Walker RW (2016) Airports, air pollution, and contemporaneous health. Rev Econ Stud 83(2):768–809
Sieg H, Smith VK, Banzhaf HS, Walsh R (2004) Estimating the general equilibrium benefits of large changes in spatially delineated public goods. Int Econ Rev 45(4):1047–77
Smith VK, Sieg H, Banzhaf HS, Walsh R (2004) General equilibrium benefits for environmental improvements: projected ozone reductions under EPA’s prospective analysis for the Los Angeles air basin. J Environ Econ Manag 47(3):559–584
Starrett DA (1981) Land value capitalization in local public finance. J Polit Econ 89:306–327
Sullivan DA (2017) The true cost of air pollution: evidence from the housing market. Working paper
Tiebout CM (1956) A pure theory of local expenditures. J Polit Econ 64(5):416–24
Turner MA Benefits transfer and spatial equilibrium. Environ Resour Econ
United States Environmental Protection Agency (1999) The benefits and costs of the clean air act: 1990 to 2010. EPA-410-R-99-001
United States Environmental Protection Agency (2010) Guidelines for preparing economic analyses. EPA-240-R-10-001
United States Environmental Protection Agency (2011) The benefits and costs of the clean air act: 1990 to 2020
Von Haefen RH (2016) Damage estimates and sensitivities. In: Presentation slides from AERE summary conference, 10 June 2016. https://sites.google.com/site/aeresummerconference/special-session
Walker WR (2013) The transitional costs of sectoral reallocation: evidence from the clean air act and the workforce. Q J Econ 128(4):1787–1835
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
Guest Editor: V. Kerry Smith.
I am grateful to Jared Carbone and V. Kerry Smith for helpful comments and suggestions on this paper. I also benefitted from discussions with Kelly Bishop, Jonathan Ketcham, Alvin Murphy, Sophie Mathes, Nirman Saha and participants in the December 2016 EPA Workshop on “Benefit Transfer: Evaluating How Close is Close Enough”.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Kuminoff, N.V. Can Understanding Spatial Equilibria Enhance Benefit Transfers for Environmental Policy Evaluation?. Environ Resource Econ 69, 591–608 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-017-0214-8
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-017-0214-8


