Environmental and Resource Economics

, Volume 70, Issue 2, pp 323–341 | Cite as

Windows of Opportunity for Sustainable Fisheries Management: The Case of Eastern Baltic Cod

  • Martin F. QuaasEmail author
  • Max T. Stoeven
  • Bernd Klauer
  • Thomas Petersen
  • Johannes Schiller


We study under which conditions a ‘window of opportunity’ for a change from an overfishing situation, with high fishing effort, but low stocks and catches, towards sustainable fishery management arises. Studying the Eastern Baltic cod fishery we show that at very low stock sizes (as they prevailed in the early 2000s) all interest groups involved in the fishery unanimously prefer maximum-sustainable-yield management (as prescribed by the management plan in place since 2007) over the previous overfishing situation. With increasing stock sizes, the present value of fishermen surplus would be higher when switching back to overfishing again, while other interest groups maintain their preference for sustainable fishery management.


Sustainable resource use Fisheries economics Resource rent Consumer surplus Worker surplus 

JEL Classification

Q22 Q28 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Martin F. Quaas
    • 1
    Email author
  • Max T. Stoeven
    • 1
  • Bernd Klauer
    • 2
  • Thomas Petersen
    • 2
  • Johannes Schiller
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsChristian-Albrechts-Universität zu KielKielGermany
  2. 2.Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research - UFZLeipzigGermany

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