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Green Trade Unions: Structure, Wages and Environmental Technology

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Abstract

This paper investigates the effect of trade union structure on firms’ technological choices when unions care about environmental protection. We compare a decentralized with a centralized union structure in a Cournot duopoly. Our results suggest that a decentralized structure provides higher incentives for the investment in cleaner technologies, although emissions may be lower under a centralized structure. The effect of the environmental damage parameter on wages and output may be non-monotonic.

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Notes

  1. (Obach (1999), p. 51) “The United AutoWorkers union was one of the sponsors of the first Earth Day in 1970, which served as a springboard for a number of environmental groups at the beginning of the decade. Other international unions, such as the Oil, Chemical and AtomicWorkers, formed links early on with those in the environmental community and engaged in mutual support efforts (Truax 1992)” cited in Obach (1999). For a theoretical analysis on the relationship between labor and environmental groups with more case studies and a further literature review see Obach (2002, 2004).

  2. Particularly, p. 377 “In May of 1999, labor unions and environmental activists created the “Alliance for Sustainable Jobs and the Environment”, whose primary objective was to demand that Maxxam, a Houston based corporation, was held accountable for its questionable environmental and labor practices. The Alliance included various environmental groups, such as Earth First!, Sierra Club, Earth Island Institute,Worldwatch Institute, Friends of the Earth, Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, Rainforest Action Network, and Labor unions such as the United Steelworkers of America, The Newspaper Guild Communications Workers of America, and the American Federation of Government Employees”.

  3. For Australian examples see Snell and Fairbrother (2010).

  4. Available at http://www.unep.org/labour_environment/PDFs/UNEP-labour-env-synergy.pdf.

  5. http://www.ituc-csi.org/rio-20.html (date of access 16 Sept 2012).

  6. See for example the United Nations Environmental programme (http://www.unep.org) date access 23 Mar 2013. Silverman (2004) provides evidence on the participation and involvement of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, the International Trade Secretariats (Global Union Federations) and the European Trade Union Confederation “\(\ldots \)in a variety of international conferences and institutions such as the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Environment, the 1992 Rio Earth Summit and the 2002 Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development”.

  7. For some references see Ulph and Ulph (1998), Dobson (1994) and for surveys, see Menezes-Filho et al. (1998) and Menezes-Filho and Van Reenen (2003).

  8. The interaction between the application of environmental policy and unionisation has been considered in Stavins (1998) and Fredriksson and Gaston (1999), for example. However the literature has mostly focused on the case where unions opposed to the environmental policies under the threat of higher unemployment.

  9. For example, emissions from a given firms’ production could influence negatively the health of the firm’s workers, due to higher concentration of pollutants in the local environment.

  10. This modelling implies that there are constant returns to scale, which is a usual assumption in bargaining models (Manasakis and Petrakis 2009; Petrakis and Vlassis 2004). An alternative modelling could be a quadratic relation like \(q_{i}=\frac{1}{a}L_{i}^{2}\) where parameter \(a\) represents the level of the technical efficiency (e.g. Menezes-Filho et al. 1998). However, for tractability reasons we favour the constant returns to scale assumption.

  11. We assume the absence of a technology which can eliminate completely emissions from production, that is \(k_{i}>0\).

  12. The technology could be a (i) production technology, therefore any change in the technology could influence the level of the production or (ii) an environmental technology without any direct relation to production. For example the number of the filters in a refinery’s pipe for CO\(_{2}\) reduction or ‘scrubbers’ to remove of SO\(_{2}\) from a fuel gas coal fired electric plant. For references on the latter see Keohane (2002), Chao and Wilson (1993) and Srivastava et al. (2001).

  13. This is the so-called Monopoly Union model (Dunlop 1944; Oswald 1982; Petrakis and Vlassis 2004), which is a special case of the Right to Manage model (see Nickell and Andrews 1983; Espinosa and Rhee 1989; Booth 1995; Lopez and Naylor 2004 and Mukherjee 2008), where the union has full power to set wages while the firm has full power to choose the level of employment.

  14. Another usual assumption is that all workers are unionised, homogeneous and have equal opportunities to be employed (e.g. Oswald 1985).

  15. The linear damage or constant marginal damage function has been widely used in the literature. For example, see Kennedy (1999), Kennedy and Laplante (1999) and Requate (2005).

  16. One could consider that union members have a mission—oriented characteristic which is environmental protection and press the firm to adopt a less polluting technology (Besley and Ghatak 2005).

  17. The SOC for maximization in this stage is met since \(\partial ^{2}\pi _{i}/ \partial q_{i}^{2}=-2<0.\)

  18. The SOC for a maximum if fulfilled: \(\frac{\partial ^{2}U_{i}}{\partial w_{i}^{2}}= -4/3\).

  19. The SOC is \(\frac{\partial ^{2}\Pi _{i}}{\partial k_{i}^{2}}<0\) for any \(e\) and \(\gamma \) such that \(e^{2}<9\gamma \). Hence the conditions for a maximum are fulfilled.

  20. It is intuitive and straightforward to check that as \(e\) increases, \(y_{i}^{D}\) decreases.

  21. Proposition 1 depicts two possible scenarios. In scenario i, the technology costs \((\gamma )\) are high relative to the size of the market \((a)\). Hence, it is comparatively cheaper for firms to reduce pollution by reducing output. In contrast, in scenario ii, the technology costs are low relative to the size of the market. Thus, firms have stronger incentives to invest in cleaner technologies (hence, the equilibrium \(k_{i}^{D}\) will tend to be lower in this scenario).

  22. The SOC for a maximum are fulfilled since \(\frac{\partial ^{2}U^{C}}{\partial w_{i}^{2}}=\frac{\partial ^{2}U^{C}}{\partial w_{j}^{2}}=-4/3\) and \( (\frac{\partial ^{2}U^{C}}{\partial w_{i}^{2}})^{2}-2\frac{\partial ^{2}U^{C} }{\partial w_{i}\partial w_{j}}=(-4/3)^{2}-4/3=4/9>0.\)

  23. The SOC is \(\frac{\partial ^{2}\Pi _{i}^{C}}{\partial k_{i}^{2}}<0\) for any \( e\) and \(\gamma \) such that \(e^{2}<9\gamma \). Hence, the conditions for a maximum are fulfilled.

  24. As in the case of decentralization, it is intuitive and straightforward to check that as \(e\) increases, \(y_{i}^{C}\) decreases.

  25. This general result is illustrated with some numerical examples in the “Appendix”.

  26. We do not introduce the damage function in the social welfare in order to avoid double counting since it is already part of the unions’ utility function.

  27. Note that \(w_{i}\) has disappeared as a variable because wages are a direct transfer from firms to unions, which do not affect directly the level of social welfare.

  28. We focus on \(4\gamma >e^{2}\) for positive output.

  29. The detailed calculations are available from the authors upon request.

  30. The SOCs for maximisation are fulfilled in all the stages.

  31. Given Lemma 5 and remarks (i) and (ii) here, it is straightforward to see that \(k_{i}^{O}<k_{i}^{UN}\) and \(q_{i}^{O}>q_{i}^{UN}\). Thus, underproduction and underinvestment also take place in a centralised structure with uniform wage.

  32. The intuition for this last statement can be easily understood if one thinks about the two extreme cases: If goods are perfect substitutes (\(b=1\)), it is as if firms are sharing one market while if goods are independent (\(b=0\)), it is as if firms were monopolists in two separate markets.

  33. The parameter combinations \(e\) and \(\gamma \) used in the tables meet the condition \(e^{2}<9\gamma \), to guarantee an interior solution in the technology choice stage. The values of \(a\) used in the tables have been chosen to be just below and just above the critical value identified in Proposition 5. Finally, note that U indicates aggregate utility in the case of a decentralized union, so that it is comparable with the utility of a centralized union.

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Authors and Affiliations

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Correspondence to Elias Asproudis.

Additional information

We are grateful for the comments by two anonymous referees and the editor, which have substantially helped us improve this paper. We are also grateful for comments and suggestions by Tom Weyman-Jones, Stuart McDonald and participants at RES 2011, ASSET 2012 and EAERE 2012. All remaining errors are our own.

Appendix

Appendix

1.1 Proofs

1.1.1 Proofs to Lemmata and Propositions in Sect. 45 and 6

Proof of Lemma 1

It follows immediately from the analysis of the first derivatives with respect to \(k_{i}\) and \(k_{j}: \frac{\partial w_{i}^{D}}{\partial k_{i}}= \frac{8e}{15}>0, \frac{\partial w_{i}^{D}}{\partial k_{j}}=\frac{2e}{15} >0. \square \)

Proof of Lemma 2

It is straightforward to calculate that \(\frac{\partial y_{i}^{D}}{\partial a }=\frac{90\gamma (28e(e-2a)+405\gamma )}{(28e^{2}-405\gamma )^{2}}\). Setting \(\frac{\partial y_{i}^{D}}{\partial a}=0\) and solving with respect to \(a\) we calculate the \(a_{cv}^{D}=\frac{28e^{2}+405\gamma }{56e}.\) The second order derivative is \(\frac{\partial \overline{y}_{i}^{D}}{\partial a}=\frac{ -90\gamma (56ea))}{(28e^{2}-405\gamma )^{2}}<0\). Hence \(y_{i}^{D}\) reaches its maximum at \(a_{cv}^{D}.\)

Proof of Proposition 1

It is straightforward to check that \(\frac{\partial q_{i}^{D}}{\partial e}= \frac{90(56ae-28e^{2}-405\gamma )\gamma }{(28e^{2}-405\gamma )^{2}}\) and \( \frac{\partial w_{i}^{D}}{\partial e}=-\frac{270(56ae-28e^{2}-405\gamma )\gamma }{(28e^{2}-405\gamma )^{2}}.\) Hence, the signs of \(\frac{\partial q_{i}^{D}}{\partial e}\) and \(\frac{\partial w_{i}^{D}}{\partial e}\) depend on the sign of \((56ae-28e^{2}-405\gamma )\), which is continuous in \(e\). Recall that \(a>e>0\). At \(e=0,\) this term is negative\(.\) Hence, initially \( \frac{\partial q_{i}^{D}}{\partial e}<0\) and \(\frac{\partial w_{i}^{D}}{ \partial e}>0\). The derivative of \((56ae-28e^{2}-405\gamma )\) with respect to \(e\) is \(56(a-e)\), which is positive. Thus, \((56ae-28e^{2}-405\gamma )\) may turn positive (and therefore \(\frac{\partial q_{i}^{D}}{\partial e}\) and \(\frac{\partial w_{i}^{D}}{\partial e}\) positive and negative respectively) as \(e\) increases. In fact, at \(a=e, \frac{\partial q_{i}^{D}}{\partial e}= \frac{90\gamma }{(28e^{2}-405\gamma )^{2}}>0\) and \(\frac{\partial w_{i}^{D}}{\partial e}=-\frac{270\gamma }{(28e^{2}-405\gamma )^{2}}<0.\) Setting \( 56ae-28e^{2}-405\gamma =0\), we find \(e_{cv}^{D}=\frac{1}{14}(14a-\sqrt{7} \sqrt{28a^{2}-405\gamma }\)) (we can discard the other root as it implies \( e>a\)). \(e_{cv}^{D}\) is only a real root if \(a^{2}>405/28=14.46\). Thus, if \( a^{2}\le 14.46, \frac{\partial q_{i}^{D}}{\partial e}<0\) and \(\frac{ \partial w_{i}^{D}}{\partial e}>0\). If \(a^{2}>14.46, \frac{\partial q_{i}^{D}}{\partial e}\) and \(\frac{\partial w_{i}^{D}}{\partial e}\) move from negative to positive and from positive to negative respectively as \(e\) increases, with the turning point at \(e_{cv}^{D}\). \(\square \)

Proof of Lemma 3

It follows immediately from the analysis of the first derivatives with respect to \(k_{i}\) and \(k_{j}: \frac{\partial w_{i}^{c}}{{\partial k_i}}= \frac{1e}{2}>0, \frac{\partial w_{i}^{D}}{\partial k_{j}}=0. \square \)

Proof of Lemma 4

It is easy to check that \(\frac{\partial y_{i}^{C}}{\partial a}=\frac{ 3\gamma (e^{2}-2ae+18\gamma )}{(e^{2}-18\gamma )^{2}}\). Setting \(\frac{\partial y_{i}^{C}}{\partial a}=0\), we find \(a_{cv}^{D}=\frac{e^{2}+18\gamma }{2e}\). The second derivative is \(\frac{\partial ^{2}y_{i}^{C}}{\partial a^{2}}=-\frac{6\gamma e}{(e^{2}-18\gamma )^{2}}<0\). Hence, \(y_{i}^{C}\) reaches a maximum at \(a_{cv}^{D}\). \(\square \)

Proof of Proposition 2

Calculating the derivatives of the equilibrium levels of output and wages with respect to \(e\) yields \(\frac{\partial q_{i}^{C}}{\partial e}=\frac{ 3(2ae-e^{2}-18\gamma )\gamma }{(e^{2}-18\gamma )^{2}}\) and \(\frac{\partial w_{i}^{C}}{\partial e}=-\frac{9\gamma (2ae-e^{2}-18\gamma )}{(e^{2}-18\gamma )^{2}}.\) Hence, the signs of \(\frac{\partial q_{i}^{C}}{\partial e}\) and \(\frac{\partial w_{i}^{C}}{\partial e}\) depend on the sign of \( (2ae-e^{2}-18\gamma )\), which is continuous in \(e\). Recall that \(a>e>0\). At \( e=0,\) this term is negative\(.\) Hence, initially \(\frac{\partial q_{i}^{C}}{ \partial e}<0\) and \(\frac{\partial w_{i}^{C}}{\partial e}>0.\) The derivative of \((2ae-e^{2}-18\gamma )\) with respect to \(e\) is \(2(a-e)>0\), which implies that \((2ae-e^{2}-18\gamma )\) may potentially turn positive (and therefore \( \frac{\partial q_{i}^{C}}{\partial e}>0\) and \(\frac{\partial w_{i}^{C}}{ \partial e}<0\)) for a sufficiently large \(e\). In fact, at \(e=a, \frac{\partial q_{i}^{C}}{\partial e}=\frac{ 3\gamma }{(e^{2}-18\gamma )^{2}}>0\) and \(\frac{\partial w_{i}^{C}}{\partial e }=-\frac{9\gamma }{(e^{2}-18\gamma )^{2}}<0.\) Setting \((2ae-e^{2}-18\gamma )=0\), we find \(e_{cv}^{C}=a-\sqrt{a^{2}-18\gamma }\) (we can discard the other root as it implies \(e>a\)). Note that \(e_{cv}^{D}\) is only a real root if \(a^{2}>18\gamma \). Thus, if \(a^{2}\le 18\gamma , \frac{\partial q_{i}^{D}}{\partial e}<0\) and \(\frac{\partial w_{i}^{C}}{\partial e}>0\). If \(a^{2}>18\gamma , \frac{\partial q_{i}^{D}}{\partial e}\) and \(\frac{\partial w_{i}^{D}}{\partial e}\) move from negative to positive and from positive to negative respectively as \(e\) increases, with the turning point taking place at \(e_{cv}^{C}\). \(\square \)

Proof of Proposition 3

It is easy to check that \(q_{i}^{C}-q_{i}^{D}=\frac{3(a-e)(2e^{2}-135\gamma )\gamma }{(28e^{2}-405\gamma )(e^{2}-18\gamma )} <0\) and \( w_{i}^{C}-w_{i}^{D}=\frac{3(a-e)(135\gamma -2e^{2})\gamma }{ (28e^{2}-405\gamma )(e^{2}-18\gamma )}>0\) given that \(a>e>0, \gamma >0\) and \(e^{2}<9\gamma \). \(\square \)

Proof of Proposition 4

It is immediate to check that \(k_{i}^{C}-k_{i}^{D}=(99(a-e)e\gamma )/((28e^{2}-405\gamma )(e^{2}-18\gamma )) >0\) since \(a>e>0\) and \( e^{2}<9\gamma . \square \)

Proof of Proposition 5

Note that \(y_{i}^{C}-y_{i}^{D} =\frac{3(a-e)\gamma R}{(28e^{2}-405\gamma )^{2}(e^{2}-18\gamma )^{2}}\) where \(R=56ae^{5}-7{,}560ae^{3}\gamma +1{,}962e^{4}\gamma +108{,}135ae\gamma ^{2}+29{,}160e^{2}\gamma ^{2}-984{,}150\gamma ^{3} \). Given that \(a>e>0\), the sign of \(y_{i}^{C}-y_{i}^{D}\) depends on the sign of \(R\). Note that at \(a=0, R=1{,}962e^{4}\gamma +29{,}160e^{2}\gamma ^{2}-984{,}150\gamma ^{3}<0\) for \(e^{2}<9\gamma \). Moreover, \(\frac{\partial R}{ \partial a}=56e^{5}-7{,}560e^{3}\gamma +108{,}135e\gamma ^{2}>0\) for \( e^{2}<9\gamma \). Thus, \(R\) may change sign as \(a\) increases. Setting \(R=0\) and solving for \(a\), we get \(a=35\gamma A/eB\) where \(A=(501.6\gamma ^{2}-e^{2}(e^{2}+14.86\gamma ))\) and \(B=(e^{2}(e^{2}-135\gamma )+1{,}930.9\gamma ^{2})\) where both \(A>0\) and \(B>0\) for \(e^{2}<9\gamma \). All in all, \(R<0\) if \(a<35\gamma A/eB\) and positive if \(a>35\gamma A/eB.\) Therefore, \(y_{i}^{C}<y_{i}^{D}\) for \(a<35\gamma A/eB\) and \( y_{i}^{C}>y_{i}^{D}\) for \(a>35\gamma A/eB\). At \(35\gamma A/eB, y_{i}^{C}=y_{i}^{D}. \square \)

Proof of Proposition 6

Note that \(\pi ^{C}-\pi ^{D}=-\frac{27(a-e)^{2}\gamma ^{2}(244e^{4}-6{,}573e^{2}\gamma +42{,}525\gamma ^{2})}{(28e^{2}-405\gamma )^{2}(e^{2}-18\gamma )^{2}}\). Given that \(a>e, \gamma >0\) and \( e^{2}<9\gamma \), the sign of \(\pi ^{C}-\pi ^{D}\) depends on the sign of \( (244e^{4}-6{,}573e^{2}\gamma \,+\,42{,}525\gamma ^{2})\). Moreover, at \(e=0\), this term is positive. This term will be zero if \(e^{2}=16.14\gamma \) or \(e^{2}=10.79\gamma \). Given that \(e^{2}<9\gamma \), we know \((244e^{4}-6{,}573e^{2} \gamma +42{,}525\gamma ^{2})>0\). As a consequence, we can state that, \(\pi ^{C}-\pi ^{D}<0.\)

Furthermore, \(U_{i}^{C}-\sum U_{i}^{D}=\frac{54(a-e)^{2}\Psi }{(405\gamma -28e^{2})^{2}(18\gamma -e^{2})^{2}}\) where \(\Psi =(334e^{4}-6{,}480\gamma e^{2}+18{,}225\gamma ^{2}).\) Hence, the sign of \(U_{i}^{C}-\sum U_{i}^{D}\) is determined by the sign of \(\Psi \). At \(e=0, \Psi =18{,}225\gamma ^{2}>0\). Evaluating \(\Psi \) for \(e^{2}=9\gamma \), we have \(-13{,}031\gamma ^{2}<0.\) The derivative of \(\Psi \) with respect to \(e\) is \(e(13{,}36e^{2}-12{,}960\gamma )\) which is negative for any \(e>0\) such that \(e^{2}<9\gamma \). Hence we know that \(\Psi \) moves from positive to negative and will cross only once in the interval \(e\in (0,\sqrt{9\gamma }\)). Setting \(\Psi =0\) if \(e^{2}=3.41\gamma \). Thus, if \(e^{2}<3.41\gamma , U_{i}^{C}-\sum U_{i}^{D}>0\) and if \(e^{2}>3.41\gamma , U_{i}^{C}-\sum U_{i}^{D}<0\). At \(e^{2}=3.41\gamma , U_{i}^{C}-\sum U_{i}^{D}=0\). \(\square \)

Proof of Proposition 7

It is straightforward to check that \(SW^{D}-SW^{C}=2(a-e)^{2}\gamma \varsigma \) where \(\varsigma =-\frac{99\gamma (140e^{4}+909e^{2}\gamma -18{,}225\gamma ^{3})}{(405\gamma -28e^{2})^{2}(18\gamma -e^{2})^{2}}>0\) for any \(e\) such that \(e^{2}<9\gamma \). Hence, \(SW^{D}- SW^{C}>0\). \(\square \)

Proof of Lemma 5

It is straightforward to see that \(k_{i}^{D}-k_{i}^{O}=\frac{293(a-e)e\gamma }{(405\gamma -28e^{2})(4\gamma -e^{2})}>0\) since \(a>e>0\) and \((4\gamma -e^{2})>0\) (otherwise \(q_{i}^{O}<0\)). Hence, we also know that \( k_{i}^{C}-k_{i}^{O}>0\) since from proposition 4, we know that \( k_{i}^{C}-k_{i}^{D}>0\). Hence, \(k_{i}^{C}>k_{i}^{D}>k_{i}^{O}\). Likewise, it is straightforward to see that \(q_{i}^{D}-q_{i}^{O}=\frac{2(a-e)\gamma (17e^{2}+225\gamma )}{(405\gamma -28e^{2})(4\gamma -e^{2})}>0\). Hence, we also know that \(q_{i}^{C}-q_{i}^{O}<0\) since from proposition 5, we know that \(q_{i}^{C}-q_{i}^{D}<0\). Hence, \(q_{i}^{C}<q_{i}^{D}<q_{i}^{O}\).

As for emissions: \(y_{i}^{C}-y_{i}^{O}=\frac{(a-e)\gamma }{(18\gamma -e^{2})^{2}(4\gamma -e^{2})^{2}}\chi \) where \(\chi =-59ae^{2}+96ae^{3}\gamma +62e^{4}\gamma -696ae\gamma ^{2}-720e^{2}\gamma ^{2}+3{,}456\gamma ^{3}\). Hence, the sign of \(y_{i}^{C}-y_{i}^{O}\) depends on the sign of \(\chi \). The derivative of \(\chi \) with respect to \(a\) is \(e(-5e^{4}+96e^{2}\gamma -696\gamma ^{2})<0\) if \(4\gamma -e^{2}>0\). Hence, \(\chi \) is decreasing in \( a \). Recall that \(a>e\). At the limit (\(a=e\)), \(\chi =62e^{4}\gamma -720e^{2}\gamma ^{2}+3{,}456\gamma ^{3}>0\). Hence, \(\chi \) is positive in the begining and may turn negative at a given value of \(a\). Setting \(\chi =0\) and solving for \(a\), we find: \(a=\frac{2(31e^{4}\gamma -360e^{2}\gamma ^{2}+1{,}728\gamma ^{3})}{e(5e^{4}-96e^{2}\gamma +696\gamma ^{2}).}\). If \(a< \frac{2(31e^{4}\gamma -360e^{2}\gamma ^{2}+1{,}728\gamma ^{3})}{ e(5e^{4}-96e^{2}\gamma +696\gamma ^{2}).}, y_{i}^{C}>y_{i}^{O}\) and if \(a> \frac{2(31e^{4}\gamma -360e^{2}\gamma ^{2}+1{,}728\gamma ^{3})}{ e(5e^{4}-96e^{2}\gamma +696\gamma ^{2}).}, y_{i}^{C}<y_{i}^{O}.\) If \(a= \frac{2(31e^{4}\gamma -360e^{2}\gamma ^{2}+1{,}728\gamma ^{3})}{ e(5e^{4}-96e^{2}\gamma +696\gamma ^{2}).}, y_{i}^{C}=y_{i}^{O}\).

As for emissions: \(y_{i}^{D}-y_{i}^{O}=\frac{(a-e)\gamma }{(405\gamma -28e^{2})^{2}(4\gamma -e^{2})^{2}}\Gamma \) where \(\Gamma =-2{,}044ae^{5}+32{,}760ae^{3}\gamma +21{,}361e^{4}\gamma -184{,}185ae\gamma ^{2}-236{,}520e^{2}\gamma ^{2}+947{,}700\gamma ^{3}\). Hence, the sign of \( y_{i}^{D}-y_{i}^{O}\) depends on the sign of \(\Gamma \). The derivative of \( \Gamma \) with respect to \(a\) is \(-2{,}044e^{5}+32{,}760e^{3}\gamma -184{,}185e\gamma ^{2}<0\) if \(4\gamma -e^{2}>0\). Hence, \(\Gamma \) is decreasing in \(a\). Recall that \(a>e\). At the limit (\(a=e\)), \(\Gamma =(585\gamma -73e^{2})(405\gamma -28e^{2})(4\gamma -e^{2})>0\). Hence, \(\chi \) is positive in the beginning and may turn negative at a given value of \(a\). Setting \(\Gamma =0\) and solving for \(a\), we find: \(a=\frac{\gamma (21{,}361e^{4}-236{,}520e^{2}\gamma +947{,}700\gamma ^{2})}{2{,}044e^{5}-32{,}760e^{3} \gamma +184{,}185e\gamma ^{2}}\). Thus, if \(a<\frac{\gamma (21{,}361e^{4}-236{,}520e^{2}\gamma +947{,}700\gamma ^{2})}{2{,}044e^{5}-32{,}760e^{3} \gamma +184{,}185e\gamma ^{2}}, y_{i}^{D}>y_{i}^{O}\) and if \(a>\frac{\gamma (21{,}361e^{4}-236{,}520e^{2}\gamma +947{,}700\gamma ^{2})}{2{,}044e^{5}-32{,}760e^{3} \gamma +184{,}185e\gamma ^{2}}, y_{i}^{D}<y_{i}^{O}\). If \(a=\frac{\gamma (21{,}361e^{4}-236{,}520e^{2}\gamma +947{,}700\gamma ^{2})}{2{,}044e^{5}-32{,}760e^{3} \gamma +184{,}185e\gamma ^{2}}, y_{i}^{D}=y_{i}^{O}\). Hence, in both regimes, for sufficiently small \(a\), the equilibrium emissions are larger than the socially optimal level of emissions.

1.1.2 Proofs of Results in Sect. 7.1

Proof of remark (i)

Note that \(q_{i}^{C}-q_{i}^{UN}=\frac{9(a-e)e^{2}\gamma }{(e^{2}-72\gamma )(e^{2}-18\gamma )}\) and \(w_{i}^{UN}-w_{i}^{C}=\frac{27(a-e)e^{2}\gamma }{ (e^{2}-72\gamma )(e^{2}-18\gamma )}\). Given that \(a>e>0, \gamma >0\) and \( e^{2}<9\gamma \), it is immediate to see that \(q_{i}^{C}-q_{i}^{UN}>0\) and \( w_{i}^{UN}-w_{i}^{C}>0\). Moreover from Proposition 1, we know that \( q_{i}^{C}-q_{i}^{D}<0\) and \(w_{i}^{C}-w_{i}^{D}>0\). It follows that \( q_{i}^{D}>q_{i}^{C}>q_{i}^{UN}\) and \(w_{i}^{D}<w_{i}^{C}<w_{i}^{UN} \square \)

Proof of remark (ii)

Note that \(k_{i}^{UN}-k_{i}^{C}=(54(a-e)e\gamma )/((72\gamma -e^{2})(18\gamma -e^{2}))\). Given that \(a>e, \gamma >0\) and \(e^{2}<9\gamma \), it is easy to see that \(k_{i}^{UN}-k_{i}^{C}>0\). Moreover, we know that \( k_{i}^{C}>k_{i}^{D}\), it follows that \(k_{i}^{UN}>k_{i}^{C}>k_{i}^{D}. \square \)

Proof of remark (iii)

Note that \(y_{i}^{UN\ }-y_{i}^{C} =-3(a-e)\gamma e\Upsilon /((72\gamma -e^{2})^{2}(18\gamma -e^{2})^{2}),\) where \(\Upsilon =(ae^{4}-90e^{3}\gamma -1{,}296(a-2e)\gamma ^{2})\). Since \(a>e>0\) and \(\gamma >0\), the sign of \( y_{i}^{UN\ }-y_{i}^{C}\) depends on the sign of \(\Upsilon \) (if \(\Upsilon \) is negative (positive), \(y_{i}^{UN\ }-y_{i}^{C}>(<)0\)). Note that at \(a=e, \Upsilon =e^{5}-90e^{3}\gamma +1{,}296e\gamma ^{2}>0\) for \(e^{2}<9\gamma \). Moreover, \(\frac{\partial \Upsilon }{\partial a}=e^{4}-1{,}296\gamma ^{2}<0\) for \(e^{2}<9\gamma \). Thus, \(\Upsilon \) may change sign as \(a\) increases. Setting \(\Upsilon =0\) and solving for \(a\), we get \(a=\frac{ 18e(5e^{2}-144\gamma )\gamma }{e^{4}-1{,}296\gamma ^{2}}>0\) given that \( e^{2}<9\gamma \). Therefore, \(y_{i}^{UN\ }-y_{i}^{C}<0\) for \(a<\frac{ 18e(5e^{2}-144\gamma )\gamma }{e^{4}-1{,}296\gamma ^{2}}\) and \( y_{i}^{UN}-y_{i}^{C}>0\) for \(a>\frac{18e(5e^{2}-144\gamma )\gamma }{ e^{4}-1{,}296\gamma ^{2}}\).

On the other hand, \(y_{i}^{UN\ }-y_{i}^{D} = -6(a-e)\gamma \digamma /((28e^{2}-405\gamma )^{2}(e^{2}-72\gamma )^{2}),\) where \(\digamma =(1{,}148ae^{5}+15{,}120ae^{3}\gamma -106{,}821e^{4}\gamma -1{,}849{,}230ae\gamma ^{2}+2{,}391{,}120e^{2}\gamma ^{2}+7{,}873{,}200\gamma ^{3})\). Since \(a>e>0\) and \(\gamma >0\), the sign of \(y_{i}^{UN\ }-y_{i}^{D}\) depends on the sign of \(\digamma \) (if \(\Upsilon \) is negative (positive), \(y_{i}^{UN\ }-y_{i}^{C}>(<)0\)).). At \(a=e, F=1{,}148e^{6}-91{,}701e^{4}\gamma +541{,}890e^{2}\gamma ^{2}+7{,}873{,}200\gamma ^{3}>0\) for \(e^{2}<9\gamma \). Moreover, \(\frac{\partial F}{\partial a} =1{,}148e^{5}+15{,}120e^{3}\gamma -1{,}849{,}230e\gamma ^{2}<0\) for \(e^{2}<9\gamma \). Thus, \(F\) may change sign as \(a\) increases. Setting \(\digamma =0\) and solving for \(a\), we get \(a=\frac{9(11{,}869e^{4}\gamma -265{,}680e^{2}\gamma ^{2}-874{,}800\gamma ^{3})}{2e(574e^{4}+7{,}560e^{2}\gamma -924{,}615\gamma ^{2})}>0\) given that \(e^{2}<9\gamma \). Therefore, \(y_{i}^{UN\ }-y_{i}^{C}<0\) for \(a< \frac{9(11{,}869e^{4}\gamma -265{,}680e^{2}\gamma ^{2}-874{,}800\gamma ^{3})}{ 2e(574e^{4}+7{,}560e^{2}\gamma -924{,}615\gamma ^{2})}\) and \(y_{i}^{UN}-y_{i}^{C}>0\) for \(a>\frac{9(11{,}869e^{4}\gamma -265{,}680e^{2}\gamma ^{2}-874{,}800\gamma ^{3})}{ 2e(574e^{4}+7{,}560e^{2}\gamma -924{,}615\gamma ^{2})}\).

The rest of the result follows. \(\square \)

Proof of remark (iv)

It is immediate to see that \(\pi ^{UN}-\pi ^{C}=\frac{27(a-e)^{2}\gamma ^{2}(e^{2}+36\gamma )}{(e^{2}-72\gamma )^{2}(e^{2}-18\gamma )^{2}} >0\ \) and \(\pi ^{UN}-\pi ^{D}=-\frac{81(a-e)^{2}\gamma ^{2}(180e^{2}+22{,}231e^{2}\gamma -226{,}800\gamma ^{2})}{(e^{2}-72\gamma )^{2}(28e^{2}-405\gamma )^{2}}<0\) given that \(e^{2}<9\gamma \). Thus, \(\pi ^{D}>\pi ^{UN}>\pi ^{C}\). Likewise, \(U_{i}^{UN}-U_{i}^{C}=\frac{ 162(a-e)^{2}e^{2}(5e^{2}-144\gamma )\gamma }{(e^{2}-72\gamma )^{2}(e^{2}-18\gamma )^{2}}<0\). Hence, irrespective of the relative ranking between \(U^{C}\) and \(U^{D}\), we know that \(U_{i}^{UN}<\max [U^{C}\),\(U^{D}] \square \)

Proof of remark (v)

It is easy to see that \(SW^{C}-SW^{UN}=162(a-e)^{2}\gamma ^{2}\omega \) where \(\omega =\left[ \frac{180e^{2}\gamma -7e^{4}}{(72\gamma -e^{2})^{2}(18\gamma -e^{2})^{2}}\right] >0\) for any \(e\) such that \(e^{2}<9\gamma \). Hence, \( SW^{C}-SW^{UN}>0\). Given that we know that \(SW^{D}>SW^{C}\), it follows that \( SW^{D}>SW^{C}> SW^{UN}. \square \)

1.2 Illustrations of Result in Proposition 5

In the main text, we have shown that emissions are higher under the decentralized structure than in the centralized structure for low market sizes but the opposite applies to large market sizes (see Proposition 5). This is a general result which we illustrate here with some numerical examples. In the tables below, we present the equilibrium results for given \( e\) and \(\gamma \) under a relatively small and a relatively large market size. As the reader can see from the three tables, when the market is relatively small, emissions are lower under a centralized structure than under a decentralized structure, although the opposite applies when the market is relatively large.Footnote 33 See Tables 12 and 3.

Table 1 Equilibrium results \((e=4,\; \gamma =2\))
Table 2 Equilibrium results \((e=1.5, \gamma =0.5)\)
Table 3 Equilibrium results \((e=1, \gamma =0.3)\)

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Asproudis, E., Gil-Moltó, M.J. Green Trade Unions: Structure, Wages and Environmental Technology. Environ Resource Econ 60, 165–189 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-014-9768-x

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