Environmental and Resource Economics

, Volume 47, Issue 4, pp 567–588 | Cite as

Taxation of a Polluting Non-renewable Resource in the Heterogeneous World

  • Julien DaubanesEmail author
  • André Grimaud


This paper extends the literature on the taxation of polluting exhaustible resources by taking international heterogeneities and national tax-setting into account. We propose a two-country Romer model of endogenous growth in which the South is endowed with the stock of an essential polluting non-renewable resource and world economic growth is driven by a northern research sector. We consider the stock of pollution as affecting global welfare. First, we characterize the optimal environmental taxation policies. Second, we examine the impacts of national taxes. Their time profile determines the extraction path, the dynamics of pollution accumulation and that of world output. Their respective levels entail inter-country interactions by altering the efficiency of the world resource allocation, the tax revenues and the resource rents. We study isolatedly the distortional and distributional effects of local taxes. Then, we completely assess the overall impact of a unilateral tax increase. Finally, we find that, even if heterogeneous countries coordinate their taxation policies to correct the global environmental problem, their divergent strategic interests cause another global, non-environmental distortion in the allocation of the resource.


Non-renewable resources Stock pollution Endogenous growth Environmental taxation Inter-country effects 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.CER-ETH at ETHZSwiss Federal Institute of Technology ZürichZürichSwitzerland
  2. 2.IDEI and LERNA at TSEToulouse School of Economics, and ESCT, Toulouse Business SchoolToulouseFrance

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