Abstract
Many international treaties come into force only after a minimum number of countries have signed and ratified the treaty. Minimum participation constraints are particularly frequent in the case of environmental treaties dealing with global commons, where free-riding incentives are strong. Why do countries that know they have an incentive to free-ride accept to “tie their hands” through the introduction of a minimum participation constraint? This article addresses the above issues by modeling the formation of an international treaty as a three-stage non-cooperative coalition formation game. Both the equilibrium minimum participation constraint and the number of signatories—the coalition size—are determined. This article, by showing that a non-trivial partial coalition, sustained by a binding minimum participation constraint, forms at the equilibrium, explains the occurrence of minimum participation clauses in most international environmental agreements. It also analyses the endogenous equilibrium size of the minimum participation constraint.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Barrett S (1994) Self-enforcing international environmental agreements. Oxf Econ Pap 46: 878–894
Barrett S (1997) Towards a theory of international cooperation. In: Carraro C, Siniscalco D (eds) New directions in the economic theory of the environment. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Barrett S (2003) Environment and statecraft. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Barrett S (2007) Why cooperate? the incentive to supply global public goods. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Black J, Levi MD, de Meza D (1992) Creating a good a atmosphere. Minimum participation for tackling the greenhouse effect. Economica 60: 281–293
Bloch F (1996) Sequential formation of coalition with fixed payoff division. Games Econ Behav 14: 90–123
Bloch F (1997) Non-cooperative models of coalition formation in games with spillovers. In: Carraro C, Siniscalco D (eds) New directions in the economic theory of the environment. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Botteon M, Carraro C (1997) Strategies for environmental negotiations: issue linkage with heterogeneous countries. In: Folmer H, Hanley N (eds) Game Theory and the Global Environment. E. Elgar, Cheltenham
Carraro C (ed) (1997) International environmental agreements: strategic policy issues. E. Elgar, Cheltenham
Carraro C, Marchiori C (2003) Stable coalitions. In: Carraro C (eds) The endogenous formation of economic coalitions. E. Elgar, Cheltenham
Carraro C, Siniscalco D (1992) The international protection of the environment: voluntary agreements among sovereign countries. In: Dasgupta P, Maler KG, Vercelli A (eds) The economics of transnational commons. Clarendon Press, Oxford
Carraro C, Siniscalco D (1993) Strategies for the international protection of the environment. J Public Econ 52: 309–328
Carraro C, Siniscalco D (1995) Policy coordination for sustainability: commitments, transfers, and linked negotiations. In: Goldin I, Winters A (eds) The economics of sustainable development. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Carraro C, Siniscalco D (1998) International environmental agreements. Incentives and political economy. Eur Econ Rev 42: 561–572
Chander P, Tulkens H (1995) A core-theoretical solution for the design of cooperative agreements on trans-frontier pollution. Int Tax Public Financ 2: 279–293
Chander P, Tulkens H (1997) The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities. Int J Game Theory 26: 379–401
d’Aspremont CA, Jacquemin A, Gabszewicz JJ, Weymark J (1983) On the stability of collusive price leadership. Can J Econ 16: 17–25
Diamantoudi E, Sartzetakis E (2006) Stable international environmental agreements: an analytical approach. J Public Econ Theory 8: 247–263
Finus M (2003) Stability and design of international environmental agreements: the case of global and transboundary pollution. In: Folmer H, Tietenberg T (eds) International yearbook of environmental and resource economics, 2002/3. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham
Finus M (2008) Game theoretic research on the design of international environmental agreements: insights, critical remarks and future challenges. Int Rev Environ Resour Econ 2: 1–39
Ray D, Vohra R (1997) Equilibrium binding agreements. J Econ Theory 73: 30–78
Ray D, Vohra R (1999) A theory of endogenous coalition structure. Games Econ Behav 26: 286–336
Rubio S, Ulph A (2006) Self-enforcing international environmental agreements revisited. Oxf Econ Pap 58: 233–263
Rutz S (2001) Minimum participation rules and the effectiveness of multilateral environmental agreements, Working paper 01/22, Centre for Economic Research, SFIT, Zurich
Tulkens H (1998) Cooperation versus Free-riding in international environmental affairs: two approaches. In: Folmer H, Hanley N (eds) Game theory and the global environment, E. Elgar, Cheltenham. Also in Carraro C (ed) Governing the global environment, E. Elgar, Cheltenham, 2002
Yi SS (1997) Stable coalition structures with externalities. Games Econ Behav 20: 201–237
Yi SS (2003) Endogenous formation of economic coalitions. Asurveyofthepartitionfunctionapproach. In: Carraro C (eds) The endogenous formation of economic coalitions. E. Elgar, Cheltenham
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Carraro, C., Marchiori, C. & Oreffice, S. Endogenous Minimum Participation in International Environmental Treaties. Environ Resource Econ 42, 411–425 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-009-9264-x
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-009-9264-x