Abstract
Results derived from empirical analyses on the stability of climate coalitions are usually very sensitive to the large uncertainties associated with the benefits and costs of climate policies. This paper provides the methodology of Stability Likelihood (SL) that links uncertainties about benefits and costs of climate change to the stability of coalitions. We show that the concept of SL improves upon the robustness and interpretation of stability analyses. Moreover, our numerical application qualifies conclusions from a recent strand of literature based on stylised models with ex-ante symmetric players that learning has a negative impact on the success of coalition formation in context of uncertainty.
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Open Access This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License ( https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0 ), which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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Dellink, R., Finus, M. & Olieman, N. The stability likelihood of an international climate agreement. Environ Resource Econ 39, 357–377 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-007-9130-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-007-9130-7
Keywords
- Climate change modelling
- International environmental agreements
- Non-cooperative game theory
- Uncertainty