Abstract
This paper fully considers the influence of the government, platforms, drivers and passengers on the regulation of online car-hailing market, and constructs an evolutionary game model of four parties. Then, the strategic stability of evolutionary game model is analyzed. Eleven strategies satisfying the stability conditions are obtained. Finally, the simulation verify the results of analysis. The simulation shows that parties’ decisions will be changed by the strength of the initial willingness. When the rewards and punishments increase, the self-restraint ability of the platform and the drivers can be strengthened. And then, by analyzing the managerial cost, this paper finds that reducing cost can accelerate the system to the stable state. Based on this, the paper puts forward relevant policy suggestions to promote the regulation of online car-hailing market.
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Funding
The present research work has been supported by Social Science Planning Project of Chongqing, China [No. 2019YBGL049] and Transportation Science and Technology Project of Chongqing Transportation Bureau, No. 2022-17. The authors gratefully acknowledge the support of these institutions.
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Peng, Y., Hou, Y. & Gao, S. Online Car-Hailing Market Regulation Strategy in China: From the Perspective of Quadrilateral Evolutionary Games. Comput Econ (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10614-023-10461-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10614-023-10461-9