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Computational Economics

, Volume 48, Issue 1, pp 155–178 | Cite as

Belief Aggregation with Automated Market Makers

  • Rajiv SethiEmail author
  • Jennifer Wortman Vaughan
Article

Abstract

We consider the properties of a cost function based automated market maker aggregating the beliefs of risk-averse traders with finite budgets. Individuals can interact with the market maker an arbitrary number of times before the state of the world is revealed. We show that the resulting sequence of prices is convergent under general conditions, and explore the properties of the limiting price and trader portfolios. The limiting price cannot be expressed as a function of trader beliefs, since it is sensitive to the market maker’s cost function as well as the order in which traders interact with the market. For a range of trader preferences, however, we show numerically that the limiting price provides a good approximation to a weighted average of beliefs, inclusive of the market designer’s prior belief as reflected in the initial contract price. This average is computed by weighting trader beliefs by their respective budgets, and weighting the initial contract price by the market maker’s worst-case loss, implicit in the cost function. Since cost function parameters are chosen by the market designer, this allows for an inference regarding the budget-weighted average of trader beliefs.

Keywords

Prediction markets Automated market makers Belief aggregation 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Economics, Barnard CollegeColumbia UniversityNew YorkUSA
  2. 2.Microsoft ResearchNew YorkUSA

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