Computational Economics

, Volume 47, Issue 1, pp 67–96

Bank Capital Shock Propagation via Syndicated Interconnectedness

  • Makoto Nirei
  • Vladyslav Sushko
  • Julián Caballero
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s10614-015-9493-8

Cite this article as:
Nirei, M., Sushko, V. & Caballero, J. Comput Econ (2016) 47: 67. doi:10.1007/s10614-015-9493-8

Abstract

Loan syndication increases bank interconnectedness through co-lending relationships. We study the financial stability implications of such dependency on syndicate partners in the presence of shocks to banks’ capital. Model simulations in a network setting show that such shocks can produce rare events in this market when banks have shared loan exposures while also relying on a common risk management tool such as value-at-risk (VaR). This is because a withdrawal of a bank from a syndicate can cause ripple effects through the market, as the loan arranger scrambles to commit more of its own funds by also pulling back from other syndicates or has to dissolve the syndicate it had arranged. However, simulations also show that the core-periphery structure observed in the empirical network may reduce the probability of such contagion. In addition, simulations with tighter VaR constraints show banks taking on less risk ex-ante.

Keywords

Syndicated lending Systemic risk Network externalities  Value at risk Bank capital shocks Rare event risk 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Makoto Nirei
    • 1
  • Vladyslav Sushko
    • 2
  • Julián Caballero
    • 3
  1. 1.Institute of Innovation ResearchHitotsubashi UniversityKunitachiJapan
  2. 2.Bank for International SettlementsBaselSwitzerland
  3. 3.Inter-American Development BankWashingtonUSA

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