Approximating Solutions for Nonlinear Dynamic Tracking Games
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- Behrens, D.A. & Neck, R. Comput Econ (2015) 45: 407. doi:10.1007/s10614-014-9420-4
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This paper presents the OPTGAME algorithm developed to iteratively approximate equilibrium solutions of ‘tracking games’, i.e. discrete-time nonzero-sum dynamic games with a finite number of players who face quadratic objective functions. Such a tracking game describes the behavior of decision makers who act upon a nonlinear discrete-time dynamical system, and who aim at minimizing the deviations from individually desirable paths of multiple states over a joint finite planning horizon. Among the noncooperative solution concepts, the OPTGAME algorithm approximates feedback Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium solutions, and the open-loop Nash solution, and the cooperative Pareto-optimal solution.