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Does Social Welfare Preference Always Promote Cooperation on Barabási and Albert Networks?

An Agent-Based Approach

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Abstract

Existing models of evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game always assume that agents are self-interest only. But more and more evidences show that agents may have other-regarding preference. The present article extents the model of prisoner’s dilemma on Barabási and Albert networks to include heterogeneous social welfare preference agents and studies its effects on the cooperation emergence on networks. The simulation results show that social welfare preference may promote cooperation in many cases, especially in the situation where the defection attraction is high. However, there are some situations where social welfare preference does not favor cooperation on complex networks. Simulations also display that it is not always true that the higher weight on social welfare preference corresponds with the higher cooperation frequency. Neighborhood size and initial cooperation also have important effects on the cooperation frequency as well, the features which are not observed in the situations without social welfare preference agents. These results are all related to the locality of social welfare preference. This article reveals the complex relationship between social preference and cooperation frequency in complex networks, which may help researchers reconsider the role of pro-social preference in the evolution of cooperation on complex networks.

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Correspondence to Bo Xianyu.

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Xianyu, B., Chen, P. Does Social Welfare Preference Always Promote Cooperation on Barabási and Albert Networks?. Comput Econ 37, 249–266 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10614-010-9246-7

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