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The Clock Proxy Auction for Allocating Radio Spectrum Licenses

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Abstract

The combinatorial clock-proxy auction is analyzed as a selling mechanism of a portion of the “digital dividend” in an European country. We assumed bidders with bounded rationality making their bidding decisions based on a system of recommendation that learns from the environment. The auction outcome when all bidders follow the proposed strategies was compared with the efficient outcome of the auction. Although significant differences were found in the seller’s income, no significant variations were found in the distribution of spectrum licenses among bidders.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Applied Economics, UNED, Pº Senda del Rey, 11, 28040, Madrid, Spain

    A. Mochon & J. L. Gómez-Barroso

  2. Department of Computer Science, Artificial Intelligence, University Carlos III of Madrid, Av. Universidad 30, 28911, Leganes, Madrid, Spain

    Y. Saez & P. Isasi

Authors
  1. A. Mochon
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  2. Y. Saez
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  3. J. L. Gómez-Barroso
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  4. P. Isasi
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Correspondence to A. Mochon.

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Mochon, A., Saez, Y., Gómez-Barroso, J.L. et al. The Clock Proxy Auction for Allocating Radio Spectrum Licenses. Comput Econ 37, 411–431 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10614-010-9245-8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10614-010-9245-8

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