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Proving Arrow’s theorem by PROLOG


This paper presented a simple PROLOG implementation for Arrow’s Social welfare function (SWF). Arrow (Social choice and individual values, Yale University Press, 1963) proved that any SWF which satisfies a set of conditions IIA, Pareto, and unrestricted domain should be dictatorial. The PROLOG program can prove the theorem for 3-alternative 2-agent case. With a minor modification it proves a version of the theorem without the Pareto condition by Wilson (Journal of Economic Theory, 5, 478–486, 1972).

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Correspondence to Kenryo Indo.

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Indo, K. Proving Arrow’s theorem by PROLOG . Comput Econ 30, 57–63 (2007).

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  • Social welfare function
  • Arrow’s impossibility theorem