Claims that a Nordic model exists should be viewed with scepticism when we examine the implementation of black letter law within the regulatory environment. Although there appears to be reasoned argument that a common policy approach to prostitution exists, ‘once we interrogate the regulatory environment, we are likely to find that the norms that actually guide day-to-day dealing are quite different to the rules that have achieved notoriety in the law books.’ ([39] at 199). Indeed once we examine the implementation of the law, it is evident that these Nordic countries have experienced problems post-transferal, when those whose role it is to utilise the law do not do so. Therefore, the context in which a legal policy is transferred is critical to its successful implementation and adoption. As Hage explains ‘the operation of black letter law depends on how legal agents use it in their work. And this in turn depends on the general culture of the country or region within which the law and the legal agents must function’ ([40] at 50). Thus, although legislation has been introduced to make it an offence to pay for sex, it is not necessarily being implemented which undermines the claim that a coherent ‘model’ exists in practice.
As a result, Dolowitz and Marsh claim that policy transfers can lead to policy failure [41]. They suggest there are three factors that can lead to policy failure: uninformed transfer, incomplete transfer, and inappropriate transfer. The first, uninformed transfer arises when a country borrows the policy from another but does not have sufficient information on how the policy operates. The second, incomplete transfer, occurs when key elements of the policy are not transferred. Thirdly, inappropriate transfer takes place when critical economic, political, social and ideological contexts are overlooked or ignored by the borrowing country. Zweigert and Kotz identify that when any policy transfer from one country to another is being considered that two important questions must be asked ‘first whether it has proved satisfactory in its country of origin, and secondly, whether it will work in the country where it is proposed to adopt it’ ([42] at 17). The following part of the article will therefore examine the law in context in order to explore whether there is a coherent model in practice.
Uninformed transfer?
The adoption of the Swedish approach to prostitution without considering sufficient information about the negative effects could lead to the uninformed transfer of legal policy as ‘if there had been a more thorough analysis … then it is likely that the government would have realized some of the drawbacks’ ([41] at 18–19). A consequence of ill-informed transfer of legal policy, could lead to what Teubner describes as a ‘legal irritant’ [43], in that ‘the attempted transfer may not just fail but further exacerbate the very problems to which a policy is addressed’ ([44] at 228). Research has shown that the Swedish approach has a number of negative consequences that should be considered by borrowing counties, as well as the negative impact this approach has had on other Nordic countries.
The negative effects of the Swedish approach has included increasing the vulnerability of those who sell sexual services and trafficked victims. Some have even claimed that the Swedish government ignores and turns a blind eye to the negative effects of the law. As one interviewee in Levy’s study stated ‘they didn’t really think about what effects this will have on the lives of individuals. And they still close their eyes and ears for the effect it has had’ ([24] at 64). In Sweden, it has been argued that rather than reducing exploitation and abuse, the law has made sex workers more vulnerable to exploitation [45]. Those who sell sexual services on the street in Sweden have been shown to take less time negotiating with clients and this therefore reduces their ability to assess the potential risks [46]. Previous studies in Sweden and the UK have demonstrated that police enforcement can push the industry underground which can lead to greater risks to both sex workers and clients as they attempt to evade police prosecution [47,48,49]. Likewise in France, research by Le Bail and Giametta has shown how the criminalisation of clients in France has increased levels of violence and risks that those who sell sex face and shifted the power relationship in favour of clients who feel more able to make demands and impose conditions [50].
The negative effects of adopting the Swedish approach can also be observed in Norway where the Pro Sentret report indicated that the law to criminalise clients made sex workers much more susceptible to violence because the sex industry moves further underground to avoid criminal prosecution [51]. According to this 2012 report, 59% of the participants said they had experienced violence after the sex purchase law was introduced ([51] at 4). In responding to the report Conservative Party Member of Parliament, Anniken Hauglie claimed that ‘the reality is that the law has made it more difficult for women in prostitution’ [52]. In contrast, research has demonstrated that decriminalisation in New Zealand has enabled those who sell sex to determine what services they will and will not provide, which clients they will provide services to, as well as negotiate safer sex practices [53]. Their legal position means that when instances of exploitation do occur they can take their case to a human rights tribunal or through other legal processes [54].
A further problem associated with the Swedish approach is the evidence base upon which it has been rationalised. It has been suggested that its introduction was needed to tackle sex trafficking. The belief held is that through reducing demand for prostitution, sex trafficking would reduce. This is an interesting supposition when we explore research undertaken where the purchase of sex is not criminalised in New Zealand, which found that only 4% of sex workers surveyed reported that they had been forced to work [55]. Instead, critics of the Swedish model have argued that the criminalisation of the purchase of sex in Sweden has not led to a reduction in the extent of trafficking. As the Global Alliance against Traffic in Women have claimed ‘There is no evidence that criminalising or otherwise penalising sex workers’ clients has reduced either trafficking in persons or sex work’ ([56] at 1). Instead, the penalisation of clients has made sex workers more vulnerable to exploitation [45], and trafficked victims more reluctant to report their exploitation to the police for fear of reprisals from traffickers, and because of their inherent distrust of the authorities. Furthermore, in Finland Detective chief sergeant Kenneth Eriksson claims that the Finish law is counterproductive as clients are deterred from reporting potential evidence of sex trafficking and exploitation to the police, because they themselves fear criminal prosecution ([57] at 28). Despite these negatives consequences a report commissioned by the Finnish Ministry of Justice clearly indicated its support for a complete ban on the purchase of sex (currently Finland operates a ‘partial’ ban). Its preference is to follow the Swedish model which is seen as having few problems, is less ambiguous and has little negative impact on sex workers [20].
The claim that ‘the ban on purchasing sexual services has reduced demand for sex and thus contributed to reduce the extent of prostitution in Norway’ ([58] at 11), has also been put under critical scrutiny. For example, although research has identified that prevalence of the purchase of sex tends to be higher in countries where prostitution is legal, the authors also highlight that self-reporting rates are likely to be lower in a country where prostitution is illegal and this therefore explains these lower prevalence rates [59]. Indeed, research has shown that in countries where prostitution is illegal the industry becomes more hidden as those involved seek to avoid being identified or prosecuted by the authorities [48, 60]. One consequence of this can be ‘spatial switching’ where prostitution moves to less visible spaces, enabled by the developments in technology those who sell sex do not leave the industry, but instead adapt their practices to avoid prosecution [61]. Thus, the apparent reduction in prostitution is merely a reflection of the invisibility of the industry from public or visible spaces.
Spatial switching and the desire to avoid prosecution may also help to explain research that has identified that in countries where prostitution is legal, higher trafficking rates are also higher [62]. Research on male clients of commercial sex have indicated their reluctance to report instances of potential exploitation or abuse to the authorities in the UK because they may face prosecution [63]. Furthermore, whilst research by Kotasdam and Jakobsson found that sex trafficking rates are higher in countries where prostitution is legal, they also acknowledge that countries with a wealth of resources, more enhanced law enforcement skills and legal systems may be better placed to detect and prosecute sex trafficking [64]. Research has also shown that some migrants who sell sexual services have claimed victimhood status have done so to gain access to resources and avoid deportation, further complicating the findings of sex trafficking prevalence rates [46, 65].
The potential ineffectiveness and legitimacy of the Swedish or Nordic legal policy approach has however, not been ignored by other countries. For example, in Luxembourg a Bill which would have criminalised the purchase of sex was dropped by the Luxembourg government in 2014 because it was believed that the law could increase the dangers for sex workers as they would be more likely to work alone if the law was introduced [28]. According to Luxembourg MEP Cécile Hemmen ‘We’re not going to apply the Swedish model or another. On prostitution, the government’s idea is to find an approach tailored to Luxembourg’ [66]. Likewise, the Nordic country Denmark has not made the purchase of sex a criminal offence despite campaigns by women’s groups and politicians to change the law [67].
Incomplete and inappropriate transfer
Simply adopting a model from another country, because it appears to work, does not take wider social issues into consideration and may thus not work in another country. Policy transfer can be a diverse, multi-faceted process which can be fraught with many challenges and problems, and may be mediated by a particular social, historical, cultural context. Canton and McFarlane argue:
Just as each policy is unique, different areas of public policy pose their own distinct challenges for transfer. This is certainly true of criminal justice. There are considerable variations among different nations in their views about the origins of crime, and about how the state and the community should respond to offenders … It is increasingly recognised that the trajectory of criminal justice policy development depends upon a wide range of political, economic, social, cultural and emotional influences, interacting with each other in uncertain ways ([68] at 1-2).
Issues which can cause problems for legal policy transfer may include ‘economic organization’, ‘differences in political institutional contexts’, ‘the role played by the media’, and ‘a particular set of “cultural traits”’ ([69] at 442–3). As Stenson and Edwards argue, ‘if naive emulation of policies is to be avoided then greater attention needs to be given … to the concept of ‘social filtering” ([44] at 228). Indeed, the attempted adoption of the Nordic model may be rejected by the host nation because of its incompatibility with social and cultural values of that country. This was observed in the UK when United States arrangements of open access to the sex offender register, known as ‘Community Notification’ (or Megan’s law) were rejected in parliament in 1997. As Alun Michael (for the opposition) claimed ‘We may learn some lessons from the United States [but] …our culture, law, police service and other services are different’ [70].
Many comparative legal studies have demonstrated that transferred or copied laws have failed to work because of resistance to full enforcement of the law or because of non-compliance by lawmakers or law enforcers [39]. Using the example of the consumer marketplace in Europe and the increasing harmonising directives of the marketplace for consumers, Brownsword describes how ‘even though directives can be copied out, they do not copy across into practice in the same way’ ([39] at 198).
Thus, problems with the implementation of the Nordic model can also take place post-transferal when those whose role it is to utilise the law do not do so because they are unable, unwilling or inept. Despite the legal focus of enforcement focusing on clients in France, those who sell sex are still more heavily prosecuted and face intimidation and threats from the police [50]. In Sweden, despite selling sex not being a criminal offence, research has demonstrated the biased and discriminatory way that the police respond to and deal with those who sell sexual services [71]. The belief that a person who sells sexual services cannot be raped was expressed by police officers in Levy’s research in Sweden [14], and echoed in research in England [72]. In England and Wales, Kingston and Thomas found that the police were not using the partial law that criminalised men for purchasing sexual services from trafficked women. The police were unable to detect whether a sex worker was the victim of exploitation or force because the law is either not needed, the police were not appropriately trained to identify victims or because of sex workers inability/unwillingness to report their victimisation to the police [73]. Thus although the offence of paying for sex can be prosecuted, those whose role it is to enforce this law, the police, are not doing so.
Similarly in Norway, despite the apparent success of campaign groups to bring about a change in the law, critics have argued that there has been a lack of political support for the law and a consequent lack of implementation of the legislation by the police [74]. In September 2013, Norwegian political parties such as the Liberal Party (Venstre), the Conservative Party (Høyre), the right-wing, populist Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet), and the Green Party (Miljøpartiet de Grønne) all made repealing the Sex Purchase Act part of their election campaign [74]. Stø and Håland claimed that there was a lack of political support for the law to criminalise clients ([74] at 4). As they state:
We could never have imagined how strong the opposition to the Norwegian Sex Purchase Act would be when it was first implemented on January 1, 2009 — by the police, who hardly enforce it; by politicians, who have made lifting the ban part of their election promises; and by the media, who are providing a platform for opponents of the act and for those who praise prostitution … It is no secret that the Sex Purchase Act was implemented against the will of the leaders of both the Labour Party and the Socialist Left Party. Minister of Justice at the time, Knut Storberget, was a strong opponent of the new act and the one who was set to implement it. Knowing this, it might not come as a surprise that the law has been enforced in a very lax manner.
In Iceland, Stø and Håland report that the feminist movement is still fighting for the police to actually use the law against the purchasers of sexual services [74]. One underground group called ‘Stóra Systir’ (‘Big Sister’) put fake advertisements on websites such as einkamal.is, mypurplerabbit.com., raudatorgid.is and put classified ads offering ‘massages’ in the daily newspaper Fréttabladid. They obtained the names of 56 men, 117 telephone numbers and details of 29 emails of men who had shown an interest in purchasing sexual services over a three week period. The group claimed that they had decided to take action and expose the men because of police inaction [75].
In Sweden, it is clear from Levy’s work that there are many practitioners who do not support the Swedish law and have heavily criticised the evaluation of the law by the Swedish government [14]. As one participant in his study claimed, ‘by far it’s the worst crap I’ve read amongst commissioned reports …its extremely poor, and its full of contradictions and inconsistencies’([14] at 55). Evidence of a lack of support for law and divide in public opinion in Sweden has also been acknowledged by the Swedish Institute who claim that:
despite the official position, there is still a debate in Sweden regarding attitudes to prostitution. Those who defend prostitution argue that it is possible to differentiate between voluntary and non-voluntary prostitution, that adults should have the right to freely sell and freely purchase sex, and that the ban on the purchase of sexual services represents an outdated position based on sexual morality ([13] at 5).
As with any laws that are introduced, its implementation by practitioners does not come automatically. This can be seen very clearly in the case of the UK’s 1998 Crime and Disorder Act (ss. 14–15) which allows for local authorities to apply for local curfew orders for children under 10 in specified areas. Subsequently, not one local authority across England and Wales to this day has ever sought to use this power. It could be argued that the adoption and transfer of the Swedish legal policy approach was a form of ‘coercive transfer’ ([76] at 344), and has resulted in ‘implementation failure’ ([41] at 21). As there is a lack of support for its introduction in some countries, a failure in its implementation by practitioners has followed. These post-transferral implementation debates evidently highlight the fragmented, inconsistent, and incoherent utilisation of the law by law-enforcers and a lack of support by other practitioners. As a result, the function of the law is not put into practice.