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Criminalized electoral politics in Brazilian urban peripheries

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Abstract

Criminal violence can be used to sustain and construct local political orders that undermine democratic processes. In this article, I conceptualize how criminal violence and clientelism are jointly used at local levels (e.g. neighborhoods, municipalities) to influence electoral outcomes in Brazilian urban peripheries. I call this criminalized electoral politics. With the help of two dimensions–the nature of the relationship between political and criminal actors, as well as the type of activity that provides a criminal group’s primary source of income–I construct a descriptive typology that allows me to classify different forms of criminalized electoral politics prevalent in urban spaces. Throughout the text I use examples from the metropolitan area of Rio de Janeiro to illustrate cases of criminalized electoral politics. In this way, this article offers a conceptual foundation to understand how criminal violence can affect the electoral linkages between citizens and politicians and, therefore, the quality of democracy and forms of local order in developing countries.

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Notes

  1. Rio de Janeiro, Itaboraí, São Gonçalo, Magé, Nova Iguaçu, Duque de Caxias, Guapimirim and Japeri.

  2. O Globo, “Violência durante campanhas é questão criminal e não eleitoral,” 09/19/2012.

  3. UOL, “Após atentado e ameaça do tráfico, TRE-RJ faz reunião para normalizar campanha eleitoral em Itaboraí,” 09/26/2012.

  4. Carta Capital, “O poder da milícia nas eleições do Rio de Janeiro,” 9/30/2014.

  5. In my analysis, I include groups that engage in illicit activities as a main source of income and develop the capacity to use violence to protect their criminal income. A broader definition allows me to include criminal practices that are not always considered in the literature but are prevalent in many urban peripheries (like illegal gambling), while excluding certain criminal practices that are not minimally organized, like pickpocketing.

  6. Criminal groups also use force in (non-political) ways. They can, for example, engage in turf wars with rivaling criminal organizations or destroy the property of victims that refuse to pay protection taxes. These violent actions constitute examples of criminal violence [22].

  7. Information from an original dataset on Criminal Political Violence in Brazil, 1985–2016.

  8. The report of an investigative committee of the Rio de Janeiro State Assembly [2] provides de- tailed information on this matter. Interviews X004, X010, and X078 also provided corroborating information.

  9. The PCC is a criminal network that regulates the criminal underworld, as well as most of the prison system in the state of São Paulo [14, 71], and has expanded to other states.

  10. The parapolítica scandal in Colombia closely resembles some of the dynamics of criminalized electoral politics. By 2010, 102 Colombian legislators were being investigated for their possible collusion with paramilitary groups to win their seats in Congress. While the national relevance of this case is evident, it is important to note that most of these legislators hyper-concentrated their votes in some municipalities ([38], 29), i.e. their electoral dominance was eminently local. Moreover, their national relevance and visibility was ultimately important to expose and prosecute these legislators. Thus, the parapolítica reveals how criminalized electoral processes are usually local and visibility limits its occurrence at a national scale.

  11. It is important to point out that by drug gangs I am referring to group involved in the retail sale of illicit drugs. Other groups involved in drug trafficking at other points of the production chain may have another relationship with the population and political institutions (see [18]). This in turn may conduce to other types of criminalized electoral politics.

  12. See: O Globo, “Cozzolândia com os dias contados,” 08/14/2011.

  13. See: O Globo, “Na Baixada Fluminense um Odorico Paraguaçu de Saias,” 03/13/2011.

  14. For example, recently, to attract less public attention, some milícia leaders in Rio de Janeiro are less likely to be candidates themselves. Interview X004.

  15. Information also corroborated in interviews X004 and X010.

  16. In the current election cycle, for example, competing milícia groups in Rio de Janeiro have assassinated politicians linked to their groups (Interview X085). See also: El Pais, “A campanha de matar quem atrapalha nas eleições municipais do Rio,” 07/24/2016.

  17. G1, “Secretaria de Segurança e MP fazem operação contra milícia de Caxias, RJ,” 10/31/2013.

  18. There are reports that brokers would pay 30 reais (9 US dollars). See: Procuraduria Regional do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, “Parlamentares presos, mas ainda poderosos,” http://www.prerj.mpf.mp.br/noticias/extra- parlamentares-presos-mas-ainda-poderosos/.

  19. G1, “Secretaria de Segurança e MP fazem operação contra milícia de Caxias, RJ,” 10/31/2013.

  20. Interview X080.

  21. For example, politicians Cidinha Campos and Carlos Minc claimed to have suffered from these types of actions in 2014, see: Agencia Brasil, “Denuncia: cabos eleitorais do Rio são perseguidos por traficantes,” 08/14/2014.

  22. Interview X0

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Acknowledgements

Previous versions of this article were presented at the 2016 Meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, the Comparative Politics Workshop and the Kroc-Kellogg Peace, Conflict, Crime and Violence Workshop at the University of Notre Dame. I thank Sandra Botero, Benjamin Denison, Tanisha Fazal, Hernán Flom, Sandra Ley, Scott Mainwaring, Lucia Manzi, Steven McDowell, Ann Mische, Camilo Nieto, Richard Price, Jason Ruiz, Maggie Shum, Lucía Tiscornia, Guillermo Trejo, Amy Erica Smith, two anonymous reviewers, and the editors of this special issue for valuable comments and suggestions. The author acknowledges the generous support of the Inter-American Foundation (IAF) through a Grassroots Development Fellowship, a Fulbright scholarship, as well as the Department of Political Science and the Kellogg Institute for International Studies of the University of Notre Dame. I also thank Antonio Moreira and Julia Stadler for their superb research assistance.

Funding

This study was funded by the Inter-American Foundation (Grassroots Development Fellowship) and the Kellogg Institute for International Studies, University of Notre Dame.

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  1. Department of Political Science & Kellogg Institute, University of Notre Dame, 2060 Jenkins-Nanovic Halls, Notre Dame, IN, 46556, USA

    Juan Albarracín

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In this article I only reference the names of people who have been mentioned in pubic sources (e.g. news, academic literature, criminal investigations). To protect interviewees, I use a code to reference the interview and do not disclose their names or other information that can reveal their identity. To further guarantee the safety of some interviewees, I do not reveal the exact location of a case mentioned in this article.

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Albarracín, J. Criminalized electoral politics in Brazilian urban peripheries. Crime Law Soc Change 69, 553–575 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-017-9761-8

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