Fighting corruption in a time of crisis: Lessons from a radical regulatory shift experience



This study investigates the establishment of new anticorruption structures arising from a radical regulatory shift experience. Rooted in a recent state-corporate crime scandal overlapping Quebec’s construction industry and political domain, we examine the organizational adaptation of regulatory entities across three major shifts: increased police resources; enhanced regulatory collaborations; and an overreliance on penal channels to prosecute wrongdoers. Based on interviews conducted with several police officials and regulatory agencies (inspectors, managers, and directors), this article presents the enforcement challenges experienced by anticorruption forces during this transition. Specific themes concern intra- and inter-agency struggles, media scrutiny, and prosecution. The study illustrates how heightened prosecution may come as a necessary step for many regulatory actors, albeit constituting a highly perilous road over the long-term. Such work remains critical in assessing contemporary anticorruption and regulatory progresses.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of CriminologyUniversité de MontréalMontréalCanada

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