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The social and political impact of the new (private) National Security: private actors in the securitization of immigration in the U.S. post 9/11

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Abstract

Neoliberal ideology has driven privatization across the globe steadily since the 1970s, advocating that the only way to meet macroeconomic objectives is to privatize public enterprise (Schmitt Journal of Public Policy, 31(1), 95, 1). As a result, market-like mechanisms are now embedded into what was traditionally public domain; this is the context under which immigration enforcement currently operates. Our previous research study showed the prison industrial complex is now also involved in immigration detention as a result of rigorous lobbying, policymaking, managing private contracts, and in the running of immigration detention centers themselves. We add to this line of research by suggesting that the ability of private actors to push for a more securitized state, due to their profit motive, results in a distortion of securitization that negatively impacts the groups it disproportionately targets, such as Latinos, immigrants, and Muslims in the U.S. Our research question is, what is the social and political impact of securitization of immigration in the U.S. on racial, ethnic minorities and immigrants? To do so, we turn to the existing lines of inquiry on prison privatization, its role in growing mass incarceration (due to profit motive), and its social and political effects on minorities in the U.S. because we believe these research areas overlap in a number of ways. Then, we run a series of quantitative analyses using hierarchical regression models to test nationally representative data from 2013 and compare our dependent variables measuring social and political elements across different social groups; our findings show that Latinos and immigrants in the U.S., which represent the groups most vulnerable to securitization, are worse off compared to whites and African Americans, even when controlling for education, income, and age in both social and political aspects.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University Plaza, Brooklyn, NY, 11201, USA

    Karina Moreno

  2. Medgar Evers College of the City University of New York, 1650 Bedford Avenue, Brooklyn, NY, 11225, USA

    Byron Eugene Price

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  1. Karina Moreno
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Correspondence to Karina Moreno.

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Moreno, K., Price, B.E. The social and political impact of the new (private) National Security: private actors in the securitization of immigration in the U.S. post 9/11. Crime Law Soc Change 67, 353–376 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-016-9655-1

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