Crime, Law and Social Change

, Volume 60, Issue 5, pp 515–534 | Cite as

The electoral consequences of corruption scandals in Spain

  • Pedro Riera
  • Pablo Barberá
  • Raúl Gómez
  • Juan Antonio Mayoral
  • José Ramón Montero


Previous studies of the electoral consequences of corruption in Spanish local elections (Jiménez Revista de Investigaciones Políticas y Sociológicas, 6(2):43–76, 2007; Fernández-Vázquez and Rivero 2011, Consecuencias electorales de la corrupción, 20032007. Estudios de Progreso, Fundación Alternativas; Costas et al. European Journal of Political Economy: 28(4):469-484, 2012) have found that voters do not necessarily punish corrupt mayors. As has been pointed out in the comparative literature, the average loss of electoral support by corrupt incumbents is small and does not prevent their reelection most of the times (Jiménez and Caínzos 2006, How far and why do corruption scandals cost votes? In Garrard, J. and Newell, J. (eds.) Scandals in past and contemporary politics. Manchester: Manchester University Press). What remains unsolved, however, is the remarkable variability in this pattern. This article explores some of the micro-level variables that may mediate the effect of corruption scandal on the votes. We focus on three factors: ideological closeness to the incumbent party, political sophistication, and employment status. Our results provide only partial support for our hypotheses, suggesting that the effects of corruption are much more complex than what may seem at first sight.


Vote Behavior Local Election Ideological Position Political Corruption Incumbent Party 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Pedro Riera
    • 1
  • Pablo Barberá
    • 2
  • Raúl Gómez
    • 3
  • Juan Antonio Mayoral
    • 1
  • José Ramón Montero
    • 4
  1. 1.European University InstituteFiesoleItaly
  2. 2.New York UniversityNew YorkUSA
  3. 3.University of DerbyDerbyUK
  4. 4.Universidad Autónoma de MadridMadridSpain

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