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Crime, Law and Social Change

, Volume 61, Issue 1, pp 1–13 | Cite as

Too big to fail, too powerful to jail? On the absence of criminal prosecutions after the 2008 financial meltdown

  • Henry N. PontellEmail author
  • William K. Black
  • Gilbert Geis
Article

Abstract

Various explanations have been offered regarding the causes of the current global economic crisis that was spawned by the collapse of mortgage-based securities in the U.S. that were sold world-wide and that contained "toxic assets" comprised of subprime loans. There is ample evidence that such loans were originated through fraud. Firms recorded huge profits, and executives were awarded large bonuses even though some had led their companies into bankruptcy and plunged both the U.S. and global economies into the greatest recession since the Great Depression. This paper assesses the reasons why there have been no major prosecutions to date, and compares the U.S. government's response to that in the savings and loan crisis. It analyzes the influence of large financial institutions on lawmaking, regulation, and the allocation of enforcement resources, the continued general lack of understanding of financial fraud including control fraud, and problems related to the higher status and power of potential defendants.

Keywords

Corporate Crime Financial Fraud Large Financial Institution Financial Meltdown Mortgage Fraud 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Henry N. Pontell
    • 1
    Email author
  • William K. Black
    • 2
  • Gilbert Geis
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Criminology Law and SocietyUniversity of CaliforniaIrvineUSA
  2. 2.School of LawUniversity of MissouriKansas CityUSA

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