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Crime, Law and Social Change

, Volume 53, Issue 1, pp 5–22 | Cite as

Anti-corruption agencies: between empowerment and irrelevance

  • Luís de Sousa
Article

Abstract

The anti-corruption activity of the 1990s is characterized by the rise of new players, such as specialized anti-corruption bodies. Anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) are public bodies of a durable nature, with a specific mission to fight corruption and reducing the opportunity structures propitious for its occurrence in society through preventive and/or repressive measures. Independently of their format and powers, ACAs encounter various constraints to their mandate, which explains the meagre results obtained by some of them. This introductory paper tries to understand the rise, future, and implications of this new kind of “integrity warrior” and to locate them in the evolving doctrine of corruption control. The objective of this edited volume is to re-launch the debate on ACAs as the most innovative feature of the anti-corruption movement of the last two decades.

Keywords

Southern African Development Community Civil Society Actor Financial Crime Transparency International Institutional Failure 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Gulbenkian FellowRSCAS / European University InstituteFlorenceItaly

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