The party discipline inspection in China: Its evolving trajectory and embedded dilemmas

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For two very early studies on the CCP’s disciplinary control agencies, see Sullivan, Lawrence R. (1984) The Role of the Control Organs in the Chinese Communist Party, 1977–1983. Asian Survey 24(6), 597–567; and Yang, Graham (1984) Control and Style: Discipline Inspection Commissions since the 11th National Congress. The China Quarterly 97 (1), 24–52. Although Andrew Wedeman had a good discussion of the system in his article The Intensification of Corruption in China (2004) The China Quarterly 180(4), 895–921, it was rather brief.

  2. 2.

    Ellen M. Immergut, “The Theoretical Core of the New Institutionalism,” Politics and Society, 1998 (26:1), pp. 5–34. For more on new institutionalism, see Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor, “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms,” Political Studies, 1996 (44:5), pp. 936–957; Steinmo, S., Thelen, K., & Longstreth, F. (Eds). (1992), Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Perspective Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, eds., The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).

  3. 3.

    Richard, Scott W. (2000). Institutions and Organizations (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications), p. 48.

  4. 4.

    Pierson, P. (2004). Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis Princeton: Princeton University Press. p. 14.

  5. 5.

    North, D. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.; Arthur, B. W. (1994). Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.; David, P., Why are Institutions the ‘Carriers of History’? Path Dependence and the Evolution of Conventions, Organizations and Institutions. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, 5(2), 205–220.

  6. 6.

    Cocks, P. (1979). The Rationalization of Party Control. In C. Johnson (Ed.), Change in Communist Systems(pp. 178–185). Stanford: Stanford University Press.

  7. 7.

    Gong, T. (1994). The Politics of Corruption in Contemporary China: An Analysis of Policy Outcomes. Westport, CT: Praeger.

  8. 8.

    Tolbert, P. S., & Zucker, L. G., (1996). The Institutionalization of Institutional Theory. In S. R. Clegg, C. Hardy & W. R. Nord (Eds.), Handbook of Organization Studies. London: Sage Publications.

  9. 9.

    Zedong, M. (1977). Selected Works, Vol 5 (p. 64.). Beijing: Foreign Languages Press.

  10. 10.

    The party’s disciplinary agencies were not able to function normally during the war in the late 1940s; this is why the party leaders decided to reorganize them in 1949.

  11. 11.

    Zhaojun, W. (2004). The Evolution of the CCP’s Disciplinary Inspection System. Journal of Huainan Normal University(5), 34–36; Xige, Y. & Guohai, J. (2005). The History of the CCP’ s Central Disciplinary Inspection Institutions. Journal of Hunan Institute of Humanities, Science and Technology, August 2005(4), 17–20.

  12. 12.

    Liu Qingshan and Zhang Zishan, who were accused and convicted of embezzling more than 1,550,000 yuan of public funds, received the death penalty.

  13. 13.

    See, for example, Shambaugh, D. (2000). The Chinese State in the Post-Mao Era. In D. Shambaugh (ed.) The Modern Chinese State (pp. 161–187). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  14. 14.

    For views on this, see Powell, W. W. & DiMaggio, P. J. (1991). The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (p.153). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

  15. 15.

    Chen, F. & Gong, T. (1997). Market vs. Party in Post-Mao China: The Change of the Leninist Institution from Below. Journal of Communist Studies and TransitionPolitics, 13(3), 148–166.

  16. 16.

    Myers, J. T., James (1989). Modernization and "Unhealthy Tendencies." Comparative Politics, 21(1), 194–97.

  17. 17.

    See, for example, the “Rules Concerning the Party’s Political Life,” a very important party document on regulating the party organization by imposing institutional constraints. The Selected Works on Keeping Government Honest and Fighting Corruption, ed. by The Supreme People’s Procuratorate (Beijing: Zhongguo zhengfa daxue chuban she, 1989), 130.

  18. 18.

    Zaojun, W. (2004). The Historical Development of the CCP’s Discipline Inspection System. Hunan shifan xueyuan xuebao, 6(5), 34–36.

  19. 19.

    Xuexi shibao, April 18, 2007.

  20. 20.

    China Economic Review, “Mayor: Cash from Shanghai scandal recovered” 29 January 2007; http://www.chinaeconomicreview.com/dailybriefing/info/Mayor:_Cash_from_Shanghai_scandal_recovered.html; see, also, Cheng Li, “Was the Shanghai Gang Shanghaied?The Fall of Chen Liangyu and the Survival of Jiang Zemin’s Faction,” China Leadership Monitor, No. 20, http://media.hoover.org/documents/clm20cl.pdf.

  21. 21.

    Ning, R. (2006). Reflections on the Development of the Supervisory Systems of the Party and Government in Contemporary China. Yunan xingzheng xueyuan xuebao(2), 29–32; Lihong, M. (2004). The Chang and Development of the CCP’s Disciplinary Inspection Leadership System since the PRC. Jianguoyilai zhonggong jijian lingdaotizhi de biange yue fazhan, Lingnan xuekan(4), 58–62.

  22. 22.

    Dagongbao, December 4, 2006.

  23. 23.

    Xuexi shibao, April 18, 2007.

  24. 24.

    See, Zhongguo Jijian Jiancha Bao, September 26, 2005.

  25. 25.

    Fazhi Ribao, June 18, 1994.

  26. 26.

    For a detailed discussion, see Gong, T. (2000). Whistleblowing: What Does it Mean in China?" International Journal of Public Administration, 2311, 1899–1924.

  27. 27.

    Buwen, Zhang (2005). Shuanggui Shuangzhi: Relative Rationality and Limited Legitimacy. Hebei faxue(1).

  28. 28.

    Fazhi Ribao, 3 April 1998.

  29. 29.

    The latest practice is that the local DIC chief serves as a standing member of the local party committee.

  30. 30.

    See Shuang, L. & Hai, W. (2006). A Historical Review of the CCP’s Discipline Inspection System. Xinjiang shehui kexue(3), 12–16.

  31. 31.

    Gong, T. (2006). Corruption and Local Governance: The Double Identity of Chinese Local Governments in Market Reform. The Pacific Review, 191, 85–102.

  32. 32.

    Anjiang, Yide, and Chuan Jin. Taian Fantan Fengbao (Anti-corruption Storm in Tai An). (Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe, 1996).

  33. 33.

    Xinmin Weekly, September 6, 2003.

  34. 34.

    Wen Hui Bao (Hong Kong), Feb. 24, 2007.

  35. 35.

    Ta Kung Pao (Hong Kong) July 4, 2007.

  36. 36.

    Harmon, M. (1995) Responsibility as Paradox: A Critique of Rational Discourse on Government. Thousand Oaks: Sage, 134.

  37. 37.

    Scott, R. W. (2001). Institutions and Organizations, 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 57.

  38. 38.

    Terry, L. C. (1998). The Responsible Administrator: An Approach to Ethics for the Administrative Role San Francisco : Jossey-Bass Publishers; Mosher, F. (1968). Democracy and the Public service New York: Oxford University Press; and Winter, G. (1966). Elements for a Social Ethic New York : Macmillan.

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Gong, T. The party discipline inspection in China: Its evolving trajectory and embedded dilemmas. Crime Law Soc Change 49, 139–152 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-007-9097-x

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Keywords

  • Chinese Communist Party
  • Party Member
  • Party Committee
  • Policy Capacity
  • Party Discipline