Skip to main content
Log in

Lessons to be Drawn from U.S. Drug Control Policies

  • Published:
European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

U.S. drug policy has sometimes implicitly — and incorrectly — assumed that all drug-related harm is caused by drug use, so reducing drug use necessarily reduces drug harm proportionately. Instead, drug policy should try to reduce the sum of both harms incident to drug consumption — including harms to users as well as harms to others — and policy-generated harm in the form of illicit markets, enforcement costs, and increased harmfulness of drug-taking due to controls. A strict prohibition can meet these criteria when it succeeds in keeping illicit markets “thin” and consumption very low. However, promulgating wise policies toward “thick” markets with widespread consumption necessarily involves trade-offs among competing objectives. Recent U.S. history illustrates both the futility of trying to control already “thick” markets using very long prison sentences for dealers (as in the cocaine market) and the risks of allowing “thin” markets to “thicken” by neglecting regulatory and enforcement efforts as prevalence starts to rise (as in the market for prescription opioids).

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Fig. 1
Fig. 2
Fig. 3

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Until the mid-to-late 1990s, the major drugs would be listed as heroin, cocaine, methamphetamine, and marijuana, but heroin has been joined by fentanyl and various diverted prescription opioids and liberalization of marijuana policy has been accompanied by a proliferation of product forms — including edibles, concentrates, lotions, dabs, and vapes — not all of which are even smoked.

  2. Here and throughout prices should be thought of in terms of purity-adjusted (for cannabis, potency-adjusted) prices. Often the way that effective prices rise in drug markets is via a decline in purity. If the proportion of material in bags of white powder falls from 40% heroin to 20% heroin, then users will have to buy twice as many grams to get the same “high”. If the nominal price per gram remains the same, that doubles the effective cost. Cf., Caulkins 2007.

  3. MacCoun (1993) describes additional mechanisms that operate in parallel with these structural consequences of illegality.

  4. Kilmer and Burgdorf (2013) provide a detailed analysis of cannabis price increases along the distribution chain from Morocco to final market countries in Europe.

References

  • Babor, T., Caulkins, J., Edwards, G., Foxcroft, D. Humphreys, K., Mora, M. M., Obot, I., Rehm, J., Reuter, P., Room, R., Rossow, I., & Strang. J. 2010. Drug policy and the public good. New York: Oxford University Press.

  • Barratt, M. J., Ferris, J. A., & Winstock, A. R. (2014). Use of silk road, the online drug marketplace, in the United Kingdom, Australia and the United States. Addiction, 109(5), 774–783.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Belenko, S. (1998). Research on drug courts: A critical review. National Drug Court Institute Review, 1(1), 1–42.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bjerk, D., & Mason, C. (2014). The market for mules: Risk and compensation of cross-border drug couriers. International Review of Law and Economics, 39, 58–72.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Blumenson, E., & Nilsen, E. (1998). Policing for profit: The drug war's hidden economic agenda. The University of Chicago Law Review, 65(1), 35–114.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Braga, A. A., Kennedy, D. M., Waring, E. J., & Piehl, A. M. (2001). Problem-oriented policing, deterrence, and youth violence: An evaluation of Boston's operation ceasefire. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 38(3), 195–225.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Braga, A. A., & Weisburd, D. L. (2011). The effects of focused deterrence strategies on crime: A systematic review and meta-analysis of the empirical evidence. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 49(3), 323–358.

  • Burrus, R. T. (1999). Do efforts to reduce the supply of illicit drugs increase turf war violence? A theoretical analysis. Journal of Economics and Finance, 23(3), 226–234.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Canty, C., Sutton, A., & James, S. (2000). Models of community-based drug law enforcement. Police Practice and Research, 2, 171–187.

    Google Scholar 

  • Caulkins, J. P. (2007). Price and purity analysis for illicit drug: Data and conceptual issues. Drug and Alcohol Dependence, 90, S61–S68.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Caulkins, J. P. (2014). Effects of prohibition, enforcement, and interdiction on drug use. In J. Collins, (ed)The Economics of International Drug Policy. London: LSE IDEAS special report, pp.16–25.

  • Caulkins, J. P., Johnson, B., Taylor, A., & Taylor, L. (1999). What drug dealers tell us about their costs of doing business. Journal of Drug Issues., 29(2), 323–340.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Caulkins, J. P., Kilmer, B., & Kleiman, M. A. R. (2016). Marijuana legalization: What everyone needs to know, 2nd edn. New York: Oxford University Press.

  • Caulkins, J. P., & Kleiman, M. A. R. (2011). Drugs and crime. In M. Tonry (Ed.), Oxford handbook of crime and criminal justice (pp. 275–320). New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Caulkins, J. P., & Reuter, P. (2009). Towards a harm-reduction approach to enforcement. Safer Communities, 8(1), 9–23.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Caulkins, J. P., & Reuter, P. (2010). How drug enforcement affects drug prices. Crime and Justice, 39(1), 213–271.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Caulkins, J. P., & Reuter, P. (2017). Dealing with drugs more effectively and humanely. In D. S. Nagin & M. Tonry (Eds.), Crime and justice – reinventing the criminal justice system. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Caulkins, J. P., Rydell, C. P., Schwabe, W. & Chiesa, J. (1997). Mandatory minimum drug sentences: Throwing away the key or the taxpayers' money? Santa Monica: RAND.

  • Chesney-Lind, M., & Mauer, M. eds. (2003). Invisible punishment: The collateral consequences of mass imprisonment. New York: New Press.

  • Clemens, J. (2008). Opium in Afghanistan: Prospects for the success of source country drug control policies. Journal of Law and Economics, 51(3), 407–432.

  • Cohen, J., Gorr, W., & Singh, P. (2003). Estimating intervention effects in varying risk settings: Do police raids reduce illegal drug dealing at nuisance bars. Criminology, 41, 257.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Corsaro, N. Brunson, R. K., & McGarrell, E. F. (2010). Evaluating a policing strategy intended to disrupt an illicit street-level drug market. Evaluation Review, 34(6), 513–548

  • Curtis, R., & Wendel, T. (2007). You're always training the dog: Strategic interventions to reconfigure drug markets. Journal of Drug Issues, 37(4), 867–891.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Davis, C. S., Ruiz, S., Glynn, P., Picariello, G., & Walley, A. Y. (2014). Expanded access to naloxone among firefighters, police officers, and emergency medical technicians in Massachusetts. American Journal of Public Health, 104(8), e7–e9.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dell, M. (2015). Trafficking networks and the Mexican drug war. The American Economic Review, 105(6), 1738–1779.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dolliver, D. S. (2015). Evaluating drug trafficking on the Tor Network: Silk Road 2, the sequel. International Journal of Drug Policy, 26(11), 1113–1123.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Durlauf, S. N., & Nagin, D. S. (2010). The deterrent effect of imprisonment. In Controlling crime: Strategies and tradeoffs (pp. 43-94). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

  • Farabee, D., Prendergast, M., & Anglin, M. D. (1998). The effectiveness of coerced treatment for drug-abusing offenders. Federal Probation, 62, 3.

    Google Scholar 

  • Glue, P., Courts, J., Gray, A., & Patterson, T. (2016). Influence of law changes affecting synthetic cannabinoid availability and frequency of hospital presentations: 4-year national survey. The New Zealand Medical Journal, 129, 37–40..

  • Golub, A., Johnson, B. D., & Dunlap, E. (2007). The race/ethnicity disparity in misdemeanor marijuana arrests in new York City. Criminology & Public Policy, 6(1), 131–164.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gottfredson, D. C., Najaka, S. S., & Kearley, B. (2003). Effectiveness of drug treatment courts: Evidence from a randomized trial. Criminology & Public Policy, 2(2), 171–196.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Greenfield, V. A., & Paoli, L. (2012). If supply-oriented drug policy is broken, can harm reduction help fix it? Melding disciplines and methods to advance international drug-control policy. International Journal of Drug Policy, 23(1), 6–15.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hammett, T. M., Bartlett, N. M., Chen, Y., Ngu, D., Cuong, D. D., Phuong, N. M., Tho, N. H., et al. (2005). Law enforcement influences on HIV prevention for injection drug users: Observations from a cross-border project in China and Vietnam. International Journal of Drug Policy, 16(4), 235–245.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hamilton, Z., Campbell, C. M., Wormer, J., Kigerl, A., & Posey, B. (2016). Impact of swift and certain sanctions. Criminology & Public Policy, 15(4), 1009–1107.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hawken, A. (2010). Behavioral triage: A new model for identifying and treating substance-abusing offenders. Journal of Drug Policy Analysis., 3(1), 1941–2851.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hawken, A. (2016). All implementation is local. Criminology & Public Policy, 15(4), 1229–1239.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hawken, Angela, Jonathan Kulick, Kelly Smith, Jie Mei, Yiwen Zhang, Sara Jarman, Travis Yu, Chris Carson, and Tifanie Vial (2016). HOPE II: A follow-up to Hawaii's HOPE evaluation. U.S. Department of Justice grant report available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/249912.pdf.

  • Hedrich, D., Alves, P., Farrell, M., Stöver, H., Møller, L., & Mayet, S. (2012). The effectiveness of opioid maintenance treatment in prison settings: A systematic review. Addiction, 107(3), 501–517.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hughes, C. E., & Stevens, A. (2010). What can we learn from the Portuguese decriminalization of illicit drugs? British Journal of Criminology, 50, 999–1022.

  • Kennedy, D. M. (Spring 1997). Pulling levers: chronic offenders, high-crime settings, and a theory of prevention. Valparaiso University Law Review, 31(2), 449–484.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kennedy, D. M. (2008). Deterrence and crime prevention: Reconsidering the prospect of sanction. London: Routledge.

  • Kidd, D. (2006). The High Point West End Initiative: A New Strategy to Reduce Drug-Related Crime. The Criminal Justice Institute’s Management Quarterly (Fall), http://www.cji.edu/Files/MQ2006Fall.pdf Accessed November 2009.

  • Kilmer, B., Burgdorf, J. (2013).Insights about cannabis production and distribution costs in the EU. In F. Trautman, B. Kilmer & P. Turnbull (eds.), Further Insights Into Aspects of the Illicit EU Drugs Market. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, pp. 389–404.

  • Kilmer, B., Everingham, S. S., Caulkins, J. P., Midgette, G., Pacula, R. L., Reuter, P. H., Burns, R. M., Han, B., & Lundberg, R. (2014). What America’s Users Spend on Illicit Drugs: 2000-2010. Santa Monica: RAND.

  • Kilmer, B., Nicosia, N., Heaton, P., & Midgette, G. (2013). Efficacy of frequent monitoring with swift, certain, and modest sanctions for violations: Insights from South Dakota’s 24/7 sobriety project. American Journal of Public Health, 103(1), e37–e43.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kirby, K. N., & Petry, N. M. (2004). Heroin and cocaine abusers have higher discount rates for delayed rewards than alcoholics or non-drug-using controls. Addiction, 99(4), 461–471.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kleiman, M. A. R. (1988). Crackdowns: The effects of intensive enforcement on retail heroin dealing. In M. R. Chaiken (Ed.), Street-level drug enforcement: Examining the issues. Washington, D.C: National Institute of Justice.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kleiman, M. A. R. (1992). Against excess: Drug policy for results. New York: Basic Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kleiman, M. A. R. (1993). Enforcement swamping: A positive-feedback mechanism in rates of illicit activity. Mathematical and Computer Modeling, 17, 65–75.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kleiman, M. A. R. (1997). Coerced abstinence: A neo-paternalistic drug policy initiative. In L. A. Mead (Ed.), The new paternalism. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, pp. 182–219.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kleiman, M. A. R. (2009). When brute force fails: How to have less crime and less punishment. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

  • Kleiman, M. A. R. (2016). Swift–certain–fair: What we know now, and what we need to know. Criminology & Public Policy, 15(4), 1185–1193.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kleiman, M. A. R., Caulkins, J. P., Jacobson, T., & Rowe, B. (2015). Violence and drug control policy. In Oxford Textbook of Violence Prevention: Epidemiology, Evidence, and Policy, Donnelly, P. D., & Ward, C. L. (eds). 297.

  • Kleiman, M. A. ., & Davenport, S. (2012). Strategies to control Mexican drug-trafficking violence. Journal of Drug Policy Analysis, 5(1).

  • Kleiman, Mark A. R., Kilmer, B., & Hawken, A. (2016). Desistance mandates compared with treatment mandates in criminal justice populations. Addiction http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/add.13635/full.

  • Kleiman, M. A. R., & Young, R. M. (1995). The factors of production in retail drug-dealing. Urban Affairs Review, 30(5), 730–748.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kuziemko, I., & Levitt, S. D. (2004). An empirical analysis of imprisoning drug offenders. Journal of Public Economics, 88(9), 2043–2066.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lattimore, P. K., MacKenzie, D. L., Zajac, G., Dawes, D., Arsenault, E., & Tueller, S. (2016). Outcome findings from the HOPE demonstration field experiment: Is swift, certain, and fair an effective supervision strategy. Criminology & Public Policy, 15, 1103–1141.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lind, B., Weatherburn, D., Chen, S., Shanahan, M., Lancsar, E., Haas, M., & De Abreu Lourenco, R. (2002). New South Wales drug court evaluation: Cost-effectiveness. Sydney: NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research/Centre for Health Economics Research and Evaluation.

    Google Scholar 

  • MacCoun, R. J. (1993). Drugs and the law: A psychological analysis of drug prohibition. Psychological Bulletin, 113(3), 497.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Martin, J. (2014). Lost on the silk road: Online drug distribution and the ‘cryptomarket’. Criminology & Criminal Justice, 14(3), 351–367.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mitchell, O., & Harrell, A. (2006). Evaluation of the breaking the cycle demonstration project: Jacksonville, FL and Tacoma, WA. Journal of Drug Issues, 36(1), 97–118.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • MacCoun, R. J., & Reuter, P. (2011). Assessing drug prohibition and its alternatives: A guide for agnostics. Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 7, 61–78.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • MacCoun, R. J., Reuter, P., & Schelling, T. (1996). Assessing alternative drug control regimes. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 15, 330–352.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Maher, L., & Dixon, D. (1999). Policing and public health: Law enforcement and harm minimization in a street-level drug market. British Journal of Criminology, 39(4), 488–512.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mazerolle, L., Soole, D. W., & Rombouts, S. (2006). Street-level drug law enforcement: A meta-analytical review. Journal of Experimental Criminology, 2(4), 409–435.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mejía, D., & Restrepo, P. (2016). The economics of the war on illegal drug production and trafficking. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 126, 255–275.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Meng, J., & Burris, S. (2013). The role of the Chinese police in methadone maintenance therapy: A literature review. International Journal of Drug Policy, 24(6), e25–e34.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mill, J. S. On liberty (1859). https://www.gutenberg.org/files/34901/34901-h/34901-h.htm

    Google Scholar 

  • Miron, J. (2003). The effect of drug prohibition on drug prices: Evidence from the Markets for Cocaine and Heroin. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 85(3), 522–530.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Moeller, K., & Hesse, M. (2013). Drug market disruption and systemic violence: Cannabis markets in Copenhagen. European Journal of Criminology, 10(2), 206–221.

  • Moore, M. H. (1973). Policies to achieve discrimination on the effective price of heroin. The American Economic Review, 63(2), 270–277.

    Google Scholar 

  • Moore, M. H. (1977). Buy and bust: The effective regulation of an illicit market in heroin. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

  • Moreno-Sanchez, R., Kraybill, D. S., & Thompson, S. R. (2003). An econometric analysis of coca eradication policy in Colombia. World Development, 31(2), 375–383.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Musto, D. F. (1999). The American disease: Origins of narcotic control. New York: Oxford University Press.

  • Nicosia, N., Kilmer, B., & Heaton, P. (2016). Can a criminal justice alcohol abstention programme with swift, certain, and modest sanctions (24/7 sobriety) reduce population mortality? A retrospective observational study. The Lancet Psychiatry, 3(3), 226–232.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • O'Connell, D., Visher, C., Brent, J. J., Bacon, G., & Hines, K. (2013). Utilizing swift and certain sanctions in probation: Final results from the Delaware’s decide your time program. Paper presented at the annualmeeting of the American Society ofCriminology, Atlanta, GA.

  • O'Connell, D. J., Brent, J. J., & Visher, C. A. (2016). Decide Your Time. Criminology & Public Policy, 15(4), 1073–1102.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Owens, E. G..(2011) Are underground markets really more violent? Evidence from early 20th century America. American Law and Economics Review, 13(1), 1–44, .

  • Pollack, H. A., & Reuter, P. (2014). Does tougher enforcement make drugs more expensive? Addiction, 109(12), 1959–1966.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Press, A. (1987). Piecing together the system: The response to crack. New York: Bar Association.

    Google Scholar 

  • Reuter, P. (1983). Disorganized crime: The economics of the visible hand. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

  • Reuter, P. (2013). Why has US drug policy changed so little over 30 years? Crime and Justice, 42(1), 75–140.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Reuter, P., & Kleiman, M. (1986). risks and prices: An economic analysis of drug enforcement. In N. Morris & M. Tonry (Eds.), Crime and justice: An annual review of research. London: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Reuter, P. H., MacCoun, R. J., Murphy, P., Abrahamse, A., & Simon, B. (1990). Money from crime. Santa Monica: RAND.

  • Ríos, V. (2013). Why did Mexico become so violent? A self-reinforcing violent equilibrium caused by competition and enforcement. Trends in organized crime, 16(2), 138–155.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rolles, S., & McClure, C. (2009). After the war on drugs: Blueprint for regulation. Bristol: Transform Drug Policy Foundation.

    Google Scholar 

  • Russo, F. F. (2014). Cocaine: The complementarity between legal and illegal trade. The World Economy, 37(9), 1290–1314.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rydell, C. P., & Everingham, S. S. (1994). Controlling cocaine: Supply versus demand programs, vol 331. Santa Monica: RAND.

  • Saunders, J., Lundberg, R., Braga, A. A., Ridgeway, G., & Miles, J. (2015). A synthetic control approach to evaluating place-based crime interventions. Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 31(3), 413–434.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Saunders, J.,Ober, A. J., Kilmer, B., & Greathouse, S. M. (2016). A community-based, focused-deterrence approach to closing overt drug markets. Santa Monica: RAND

  • Schulhofer, S. J. (1993). Rethinking mandatory minimums. Wake Forest L. Rev., 28, 199.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sevigny, E. J., Pollack, H. A., & Reuter, P. (2013). Can drug courts help to reduce prison and jail populations? The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 647(1), 190–212.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sheridan, J., Dong, C. Y., Butler, R., & Barnes, J. (2013). The impact of New Zealand's 2008 Prohibition of piperazine-based party pills on young people's substance use: Results of a longitudinal, web-based study. International Journal of Drug Policy, 24(5), 412–422.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Skodbo, S., Brown, G., Deacon, S., Cooper, A., Hall, A., Millar, T., Smith, J., & Whitham, K. (2007). The Drug Interventions Programme (DIP): addressing drug use and offending through ‘tough choices’. Home Office. www.homeoffice.org.uk/rds.

  • Smart, R., Caulkins, J. P., Kilmer, B., Davenport, S., & Midgette, G. (2017). Variation in cannabis potency and prices in a newly-legal market: Evidence from 30 million cannabis sales in Washington state. Addiction, 112(12), 2167–2177.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Smyth, B. P., James, P., Cullen, W., & Darker, C. (2015). “So prohibition can work?” changes in use of novel psychoactive substances among adolescents attending a drug and alcohol treatment service following a legislative ban. International Journal of Drug Policy, 26(9), 887–889.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Storti, C. C., & De Grauwe, P. (2009). Globalization and the price decline of illicit drugs. International Journal of Drug Policy, 20(1), 48–61.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Thaler R., & Rosen, S. (1976). The value of saving a life: Evidence from the labor market. In N. E. Terleckj (Ed.) Household production and consumption. Cambridge: NBER, pp. 265–302. http://www.nber.org/books/terl76-1.

  • Tonry, M. (2014). Remodeling american sentencing: a ten-step blueprint for moving past mass incarceration. Criminology & Public Policy, 13(4), 503–533.

  • Tragler, G., Caulkins, J. P., & Feichtinger, G. (2001). Optimal dynamic allocation of treatment and enforcement in illicit drug control. Operations Research, 49(3), 352–362.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • UN Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report 2013. Vienna: United Nations. http://www.unodc.org/unodc/secured/wdr/wdr2013/World_Drug_Report_2013.pdf.

  • Van Buskirk, J., Roxburgh, A., Farrell, M., & Burns, L. (2014). The closure of the silk road: What has this meant for online drug trading? Addiction, 109(4), 517–518.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Viscusi, W. K. (1993). The value of risks to life and health. Journal of Economic Literature, 31, 1912–1946.

    Google Scholar 

  • Weisburd, D., & Green, L. (1995). Policing drug hot spots: The Jersey City drug market analysis experiment. Justice Quarterly, 12(4), 711–735.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wilkins, C., & Sweetsur, P. (2013). The impact of the prohibition of benzylpiperazine (BZP)‘legal highs’ on the prevalence of BZP, new legal highs and other drug use in New Zealand. Drug and Alcohol Dependence, 127(1), 72–80.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wilson, D. B., Mitchell, O., & MacKenzie, D. L. (2006). A systematic review of drug court effects on recidivism. Journal of Experimental Criminology, 2(4), 459–487.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Jonathan P. Caulkins.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Caulkins, J.P., Kleiman, M. Lessons to be Drawn from U.S. Drug Control Policies. Eur J Crim Policy Res 24, 125–144 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10610-018-9376-3

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10610-018-9376-3

Keywords

Navigation