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Responsive Regulation, Enforced Self-regulation, and Corporate Liability

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Abstract

This article focuses on the issue of determining to what extent a regulation that encourages and rewards companies to take measures to prevent corporate wrongdoing may be a better alternative to a pure command and control regulation. It also discusses whether a context-sensitive regulation is viable in legal systems in which a principle of obligatoriness is in force rather than a measure of discretion regarding punitive responses. The main ideas presented here are very similar to the concepts of responsive regulation and enforced self-regulation promoted by Ayres and Braithwaite; however, a comparative analysis of legal systems is carried out, highlighting current trends and their practical results.

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Notes

  1. The text will always use the expression companies for ease of reading, avoiding other expressions such as corporations, enterprises, undertakings, legal entities and so forth.

  2. The concept of voluntary self-regulation goes back to Braithwaite, Mich. L. Rev. 80 (1982), 1466 (1469).

  3. Braithwaite gives the example of the self-regulation system set up by the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), under Section 15A of the Securities Exchange Act, of 1934. This system conferred real powers of inspection on this private association over its members’ premises, books and records to confirm compliance with or any breaches of the regulations of the securities exchange regulator (cf Braithwaite, supra note 2, 1468).

  4. There are those who prefer a broad concept of regulators, however, this article uses the expression exclusively in the sense of independent administrative authorities, as per the original model of U.S. independent agencies. In favour of the broad concept that encompasses, for example, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), cf Braithwaite, in: Coglianese (ed.), Achieving Regulatory Excellence, 2017, p. 23 (23). However, the reference to the FBI is totally confusing as it is not a regulatory agency, let alone an independent one. Furthermore, even if it treats it as de facto independent for some purposes, its main role in this context is largely to support the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) prosecutors. Instead, we prefer the narrow concept of regulators.

  5. The concept of enforced self-regulation must be credited to Braithwaite, supra note 2, 1470.

  6. The definition of enforced self-regulation used in this text can be found in Ayres/Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation – Transcending the Deregulation Debate, 1992, p. 6.

  7. cf Ayres/Braithwaite, supra note 6, p. 6.

  8. The concept of responsive regulation goes back to Ayres/Braithwaite, supra note 6, p. 4, and passim.

  9. The concept of the “enforcement pyramid” goes back to Ayres/Braithwaite, supra note 6, pp. 4, 35–38, and passim.

  10. cf Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation, 2002, p. 29.

  11. cf Braithwaite, supra note 10, p. 30.

  12. cf Braithwaite, supra note 10, p. 32.

  13. Braithwaite’s training as a criminologist inclines him towards this type of approach to the phenomena studied.

  14. New York Central R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909).

  15. Most historical accounts of American corporate criminal liability start with the Industrial Revolution, the rise of the regulatory State, and the Supreme Court’s landmark 1909 decision. In New York Central, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Elkins Act, a federal statute regulating railway rates that imposed criminal liability on companies that violated the statute’s mandates. The Court adopted the civil law doctrine of respondeat superior, holding that a company could constitutionally be convicted of a crime when one of its agents had committed a criminal act (1) within the scope of his or her employment, and (2) for the benefit of the corporation. That standard remains good law to this day. Using New York Central as the starting point for American entity liability is certainly logical because the case established the authority of Congress to criminalise corporate conduct. However, doing so overlooks a very important movement that was afoot well before New York Central, one that is critical to understanding how and why entity liability expanded so rapidly in its wake. While New York Central involved a statute that explicitly extended criminal liability to corporations, some fifty years before Congress passed the Elkins Act, prosecutors across the country had been creatively pursuing criminal sanctions against corporations by applying general criminal laws to corporate conduct, cf Diskant, The Yale Law Journal, 118 (2008), 126 (134–142); see also Laufer, Vanderbilt Law Review, 52 (1999), 1343 (1359–1368). Given that corporate criminal liability existed before 1909, and that compliance is also response to civil regulatory liability, it is possible to conjecture that compliance began gradually even before corporate criminal liability was solidified in 1909; however, empirical data are lacking to confirm this view.

  16. cf Haugh, in: Sokol/van Rooij (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Compliance, 2021, p. 133 (135).

  17. cf Haugh, supra note 16, p. 135.

  18. cf Haugh, supra note 16, p. 135 f.

  19. Online: https://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/organizational-guidelines (last accessed on 10/03/2022); see also Murphy, Iowa Law Review 87 (2002), 697 (699–702).

  20. cf Haugh, supra note 16, p. 136. The criteria for assessing the effectiveness of compliance programmes are defined in the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual, § 8B2(1)(a)-(b) (2018). Online: www.ussc.gov (last accessed on 03/04/2022).

  21. cf Murphy, supra note 19, 712–713. The JM was previously known as the United States Attorneys’ Manual (USAM). It was comprehensively revised and renamed in 2018.

  22. cf Haugh, supra note 16, p. 137.

  23. cf Haugh, supra note 16, p. 139.

  24. The goal of SOX is to give stronger protection for those who invest in publicly traded companies by upgrading corporate responsibility and transparency. It establishes corporate responsibility for financial reports, and penalties for corporate executives and boards whose personal actions were unlawful or negligent (see SOX, specially sections 302, 802, 807, 906). Unlike SOX, Dodd-Frank does not create any new obligations on companies to implement compliance programmes. However, Dodd-Frank alters the context of internal compliance programmes by offering huge financial incentives for employees to report violations of the federal securities laws to the SEC (see Dodd-Frank Act, specially section 922). This significantly reinforces the need to have an effective compliance programme and a real culture of compliance.

  25. cf Haugh, supra note 16, pp. 137–138.

  26. Organic Law 5/2010, dated 22/06/2010.

  27. Organic Law 10/1995, dated 23/11/95.

  28. The 1995 Penal Code has been amended countless times over the years (32 amendments, including the most recent made by Organic Law 2/2019, dated 01/03/2019) with the last major reform occurring on 30/03/2015 (Organic Law 1/2015).

  29. cf Gómez-Jara Díez, Autorregulación y Responsabilidad Penal de las Personas Jurídicas, 2015, p. 82.

  30. Merkel’s fourth cabinet was the 24th Federal Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and consisted of a coalition between the German Christian Democrats (“Christlich Demokratischen Union Deutschlands – CDU”), the Christian Social Union in Bavaria (“Christlich-Sozialen Union in Bayern – CSU”) and the German Social Democratic Party (“Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands – SPD”).

  31. cf “Gesetzesentwurf für ein Gesetz zur Sanktionierung von verbandsbezogenen Straftaten”, dated 16/06/2020; cf Waßmer, in: Hilgendorf/Kudlich/Valerius (eds.), Handbuch des Strafrechts, Vol. 3 (Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil II), 2021, pp. 3–94 (11–12, § 49 mn. 16); crit. Schweiger, ZIS 2 (2021), 137–154.

  32. Scholz’s cabinet is the 25th Federal Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and is composed of a coalition between the German Social Democratic Party (“Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands – SPD”), Alliance 90/The Greens (“Bündnis 90/Die Grünen”) and the Free Democratic Party (“Freie Demokratische Partei – FDP”), an arrangement known as a “traffic light coalition” because of the parties' traditional colours of red, yellow, and green; see Coalition Deal, dated 07/12/2021 (“Koalitionsvertrag 2021-2025 zwischen der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen und den Freien Demokraten”). Online: https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/service/gesetzesvorhaben/koalitionsvertrag-2021-1990800 (last accessed on 12/04/2022).

  33. It is still contentious if these are really criminal sanctions. Most authors speak of sui generis sanctions or, more specifically, something between criminal sanctions and administrative sanctions.

  34. cf §§ 16 and 17 VerSanG; see also Lehmkuhl, in: Rotsch (ed.), Criminal Compliance – Status quo und Status futurus, 2021, p. 165 (170–175).

  35. cf § 30 OWiG; see also Prittwitz/Zink, in: Rotsch (ed.), Criminal Compliance, supra note 34, p. 251 (271). It is also noteworthy that the fines under the VerSanG will be much higher.

  36. BVerfGE 51, 324–351.

  37. cf Richtlinien für das Strafverfahren und das Bußgeldverfahren (RiStBV), dated 01/01/1977, amended most recently, at federal level, on 01/11/2007 (BAnz. Nr. 208).

  38. cf Bibbo, Kriterien zur Konkretisierung des Opportunitätsprinzips im Bussgeldverfahren, 2006, pp. 177–178, and Maiazza, Das Opportunitätsprinzip im Bussgeldverfahren unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Kartellrechts, 2003, p. 192.

  39. The fact that the VerSanG introduces mandatory prosecution will not constitute an obstacle to discretion, as it only means that the decision not to open or not to continue investigations aimed at establishing the company's administrative or criminal liability cannot be arbitrary.

  40. This lacuna is not filled by the empirical surveys already conducted of the compliance programmes of German companies, of which the prime example is the study by Sieber/Engelhart, Compliance Programs for the Prevention of Economic Crimes: An Empirical Survey of German Companies, 2014, passim. Of course, there are also reports from leading audit firms, such as, for example: “PwC’s Global Economic Crime and Fraud Survey 2020 – Wirtschaftskriminalität – Ein niemals endender Kampf”. Online: https://www.pwc.de/de/consulting/forensic-services/wirtschaftskriminalitaet-ein-niemals-endender-kampf.pdf (last accessed on 10/03/2022). Significantly, this report highlights the fact that supervisory and enforcement agencies have paid growing attention to corporate compliance programmes and ask for evidence of their effectiveness.

  41. cf Donald, German Law Journal 3 (2005), 649 (650).

  42. The Citigroup case presented elements that brought it to the attention of several European legal orders: Citigroup had its registered office in London, the Eurex future exchange is based in Frankfurt (am Main) and MTS is an Italian trading system that is operated on different national platforms by various subsidiaries. It is therefore no surprise that the Citigroup case gave rise to investigations by financial markets supervisory authorities in several countries.

  43. cf Luchtman, in: Luchtman (ed.), Choice of Forum in Cooperation Against EU Financial Crime – Freedom, Security and Justice and the Protection of Specific EU-Interests, 2013, p. 3 (7–8).

  44. The FSA was replaced in 2012 by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA).

  45. cf Herbst/Rutter, The Financial Regulator 2 (2005), 65–68.

  46. cf Sousa Mendes, ZIS 2 (2009), 55–58.

  47. cf Sousa Mendes, supra note 46, 55–58.

  48. cf GwG, dated 23/06/2017 (BGBl. I S. 1822), amended most recently by Article 92 of the Law passed on 10/08/2021 (BGBl. I S. 3436).

  49. cf KWG, dated 09/09/1998 (BGBl. I S. 2776), amended most recently by Article 90 of the Law on 10/08/2021 (BGBl. I S. 3436).

  50. cf WpHG, dated 09/09/1998 (BGBl. I S. 2708), amended most recently by Article 56 of the Law on 10/08/2021 (BGBl. I S. 3436); see also Sieber, in: Arroyo Zapatero/Nieto Martín (eds.), El Derecho Penal Económico en la Era de la Compliance, 2013, p. 63 (99).

  51. Especially arguing that LkSG stays behind the draft EU directive which in the meantime has been formally presented by the Commission, see Ambos, “Neun Thesen zum Lieferkettensorgfaltspflichtgesetz (03/08/2021)”. Online: https://verfassungsblog.de/neun-thesen-zum-lieferkettensorgfaltspflichtgesetz/ (last accessed on 11/04/2022).

  52. According to the former CDU/CSU and SPD Coalition Agreement dated 12/03/2018, legislation was planned improve the effectiveness of measures to combat corporate wrongdoing and to encourage companies to investigate their own compliance failings.

  53. cf Sieber, supra note 50, p. 82. Also cf Rotsch, in: Hilgendorf/Kudlich/Valerius (eds.), Handbuch des Strafrechts, Vol. 1 (Grundlagen des Strafrechts), 2019, pp. 1183–1224 (1188–1190, § 26 mn. 9).

  54. cf AktG, dated 06/09/1965 (BGBl. I S. 1089), amended most recently on 07/08/2021 (BGBl. I S. 3311).

  55. cf DCGK, dated 26/02/2002, amended most recently on 07/02/2017. A new German Corporate Governance Code was published on 20/03/2020 and took effect immediately.

  56. cf Sieber, supra note 50, p. 79.

  57. cf HGB, de 10/05/1897, amended most recently on 10/08/2021 (BGBl. I S. 3436).

  58. cf Sieber, supra note 50, p. 80.

  59. cf Tiedemann, in: Arroyo Zapatero/Nieto Martín (eds.), El Derecho Penal Económico…, supra note 50, p. 31 (37 f.).

  60. cf MSA, dated 26/03/2015.

  61. cf Law 2017–399 on the Due Diligence of Parent Companies and Contracting Companies, dated 27/03/2017.

  62. cf Wzk, dated 01/05/2019.

  63. cf Quintela de Brito, in: Palma/Silva Dias/Sousa Mendes (eds.), Estudos sobre Law Enforcement, Compliance e Direito Penal, 2nd ed., 2018, p. 57 (89). Also cf Rodrigues, Direito Penal Económico – Uma Política Criminal na Era Compliance, 2019, pp. 65–70. Likewise, cf Aires de Sousa, Questões Fundamentais de Direito Penal da Empresa, 2019, pp. 128–135.

  64. cf Decree-Law 109-E/2021, dated 09/12/2021, Law 93/2021, dated 20/12/2021, Law 94/2021, dated 21/12/2021 and Law 4/2022, dated 06/01/2022.

  65. cf Law 20,393 (“Ley 20,393 – Ley que Establece la Responsabilidad Penal de las Personas Jurídicas en los Delitos que Indica”), dated 25/11/2009, amended most recently by Law 21,240, dated 20/06/2020.

  66. cf Law 30,424 (“Ley que Regula la Responsabilidad Administrativa de las Personas Jurídicas por el Delito de Cohecho Activo Transnacional”), dated 01/04/2016.

  67. cf Engelhart, Sanktionierung von Unternehmen und Compliance – Eine rechtsvergleichende Analyse des Straf- und Ordnungswidrigkeitenrechts in Deutschland und den USA, 2nd ed., 2012, p. 285 ff.

  68. The ISO was founded as a non-governmental and independent international entity in 1946 by delegates from 25 countries and today has representatives from 165 countries. It plays a leading role in setting and certifying universal management standards for voluntary compliance programmes, in particular through the “Compliance Management Systems – Guidelines”, the latest version being ISO 37301:2021(en). Online: https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso:37301:ed-1:v1:en (last accessed on 10/03/2022).

  69. cf Coca Vila, in: Silva Sánchez/Fernández (eds.), Criminalidad de Empresa y Compliance – Prevención y Reacciones Corporativas, 2013, p. 43 (51 f.).

  70. cf Braithwaite, supra note 10, p. 30.

  71. The theory of responsive regulation has emerged as a means of regulating business but has gradually evolved to encompass crime prevention, peace building and an increasingly vast range of applications in fields of public and private governance, cf Braithwaite, U.B.C. L. Rev. 44 (2011), 475 (475–476).

  72. Taking a highly critical view of enforced self-regulation, cf Busato, in: Palma/Silva Dias/Sousa Mendes (eds.), Estudos sobre Law Enforcement…, supra note 63, pp. 21–55.

  73. On 03/12/2020, the European Union’s Sixth Anti-Money Laundering Directive (6AMLD) came into effect for all Member States; see also Ambos, European Criminal Law, 2018, p. 318, n. 31 (although this does not contain the most recent directive).

  74. cf Sousa Mendes, GA 6 (2016), 380 (383, note 24).

  75. cf Hermes, in: Kempf/Lüderssen/Volk (eds.), Die Finanzkrise, das Wirtschaftsstrafrecht und die Moral, 2010, p. 26 (38 f.).

  76. cf Haugh, supra note 16, pp. 138–140.

  77. cf Wils, World Competition 3 (2016), pp. 327–388.

  78. cf Haugh, supra note 16, pp. 138–140.

  79. On duties of collaboration, Böse, Wirtschaftsaufsicht und Strafverfolgung – Die verfahrensübergreifenden Verwendung von Informationen und die Grund- und Verfahrensrechte des Einzelnen, 2005, p. 755. Likewise, cf Wohlers, in: Ackermann/Wohlers (eds.), Finanzmarkt ausser Kontrolle? Selbstregulierung – Aufsichtsrecht – Strafrecht: 3. Zürcher Tagung zum Wirtschaftsstrafrecht, 2009, p. 267 (285).

  80. Online: https://www.noerr.com/en/newsroom/news/corporate-sanctions-act-dropped (last accessed on 10/03/2022).

  81. However, more analysis is needed to show why strongly incentivising internal investigations and the sharing of what they find is beyond the pale. Doing so may reduce overall compliance and enforcement strategies or it may not, however, given the relative risks it may make a lot of sense given the government’s limited resources. This is an empirical question that should not be decided upon by a mere “may” or “may not” premise.

  82. cf Arlen/Buell, Southern California Law Review 93 (2020), 697 (719–720). Likewise, cf Reeb, Internal Investigations – Neue Tendenzen privater Ermittlungen, 2011, pp. 95–108; also cf Antunes, RPCC 1 (2018), 119 (124) and Leite Filho, Corrupção Internacional, Criminal Compliance e Investigações Internas – Limites à Produção e Valoração dos Interrogatórios Privados, 2018, pp. 153–156.

  83. cf Laufer, supra note 15, 1371–1372.

  84. That makes less sense as a legal matter in the U.S., where offences by an employee are seen as offences of the company. As such, the point is more that a company may hope, as a practical matter, that offering up individual scapegoats will appease the regulators. However, efforts by a company to blame its employees also lead employees to then blame others in the company, a cascading effect referred to as the standard cooperation dynamic (“Prisoner’s Dilemma”). This means that pressures on management that get transferred to individuals can also lead to these would-be scapegoats providing information on management, cf Diskant, supra note 15, 131–132. Either way, empirical studies are needed to test this hypothesis.

  85. Online: https://www.nbcnews.com/business/peter-madoff-sentenced-10-years-role-ponzi-scheme-1C7660243 (last accessed on 10/03/2022).

  86. Given his culpability, Peter Madoff was hardly a scapegoat and does not really serve as an example of a company shifting blame to the compliance officer. This was very much a case about his own individual liability, however, it must not be forgotten that he was the chief compliance officer.

  87. cf Ambos, in: Ambos/Duff/Roberts/Weigend (eds.), Core Concepts in Criminal Law and Criminal Justice – Anglo-German Dialogues, vol I, 2020, p. 17 (20 ff.).

  88. BGH 5 StR 394/08, 17/07/2009. See also Roxin, in: Rotsch (ed.), Criminal Compliance, supra note 34, p. 351 (355).

  89. Online: https://dejure.org/dienste/vernetzung/rechtsprechung?Text=5%20StR%20394/08 (last accessed on 10/03/2022).

  90. cf Konu, Die Garantenstellung des Compliance-Officers – Zugleich ein Beitrag zu den Rahmenbedingungen einer Compliance-Organisation, 2014, pp. 91–143. Likewise, cf Demetrio Crespo, in: Serrano-Piedecasas/Crespo (eds.), Cuestiones Actuales de Derecho Penal Económico, 2008, p. 61 (64).

  91. cf Scandelari, in: Franco David (ed.), Compliance e Direito Penal, 2015, p. 158 (174 ff.).

  92. cf Carrión Zenteno/Urquizo Videla, in: Ambos/Caro Coria/Malarino (eds.), Lavado de Activos y Compliance – Perspectiva Internacional y Derecho Comparado, 2015, p. 371 (383).

  93. cf Scandelari, supra note 91, p. 191.

  94. However, it can be argued that the cost-benefit analysis is completely dependent on the magnitude of the misconduct involved. Indeed, where the misconduct is widely considered uniquely grievous, there may be no loss of trust at all. In any case, empirical studies are needed to determine whether there is a loss of internal trust in compliance officers when they act as a direct source of information on corporate wrongdoing for competent public authorities.

  95. cf Reyna Alfaro, ADPE 3 (2015), 273 (277).

  96. cf Article 5 (omisión de comunicación de operaciones y transacciones sospechosas) of DL 1106, published on 19/04/2012, in: Diario Oficial “El Peruano”, amending the provisions of the Penal Anti-Money Laundering Law (“Ley Penal contra el Lavado de Activos – LPLA”), ie Law no. 27,765.

  97. cf Rotsch, ZStW 3 (2013), 481 (483 f.)

  98. See supra note 19.

  99. cf Haugh, supra note 16, pp. 136–137.

  100. BGH 1 StR 265/16, dated 09/05/2017, p. 456 (457); see also Roxin, supra note 34, p. 352.

  101. cf Nienaber, Umfang, Grenzen und Verwertbarkeit compliance basierter unternehmensinterner Ermittlungen, 2019, p. 42; Abendroth, Prolegomena einer strafrechtlichen Bewertung von Corporate Governance, Compliance und Business Ethics – Eine Untersuchung unter Berücksichtigung der Besonderheiten der Kreditwirtschaft, 2011, pp. 140–142.

  102. cf Roberts, in: Jackson/Langer/Tillers (eds.), Crime, Procedure and Evidence in a Comparative and International Context – Essays in Honour of Professor Mirjan Damaška, 2008, p. 295 (308).

  103. cf Rothstein, “Demystifying Burdens of Proof and the Effect of Rebuttable Evidentiary Presumptions in Civil and Criminal Trials”, (04/10/2017), available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3050687 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3050687 (last accessed on 12/04/2022).

  104. Only four years after New York Central was decided, companies were asking courts to consider the complexity of the corporate form, the critical importance of clearly stated firm policies prohibiting unethical and illegal acts and the good faith efforts of firms to ensure compliance with the law, cf Laufer, supra note 15, 1368. See John Gund Brewing Co. v. United States, 204 F. 17 (8th Cir.), modified, 206 F. 386 (8th Cir. 1913).

  105. On the basis of the rule established in the precedent In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 1970; see also Allen, Mich. L. Rev. 76 (1977), 30 (36 ff.).

  106. For example, in Dixon vs. US, 548US___(2006), the defendant Keshia Dixon pleaded that she had acted under duress, but the district court, in Dixon, 126 S. Ct. at 2440, deemed duress not proven by the standard of preponderance of the evidence, and this was upheld by the Court of Appeals, in United States vs. Dixon, 413 F.3d 520, 522, United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit (2005), and then by the U. S. Supreme Court, in a judicial review procedure to settle the case law (Writ of Certiorari), cf Supreme Court of the United States: Keshia Cherie Ashford Dixon, petitioner v. United States – On writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Online: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/05pdf/05-7053.pdf (last accessed on 10/03/2022).

  107. Due diligence (compliance) is conceived as an affirmative defence by the Model Penal Code (MPC), § 2.07. In 1962, the American Law Institute (ALI) codified in the MPC a narrowly drafted due diligence defence for all State regulatory offences designed to “encourage diligent supervision of corporate personnel by managerial employees in those cases in which the corporation is bound by the conduct of inferior personnel”. Notably, the National Commission on the Reform of the Federal Criminal Code, known as the Brown Commission, specifically rejected this defence, cf Laufer, supra note 15, 1369 n. 114.

  108. See supra note 19.

  109. cf The Volkov Law Group, “A Practical Look at the Compliance Defense Proposals”. Online: https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/a-practical-look-at-the-compliance-defen-91459/ (last accessed on 09/03/2022).

  110. cf Fletcher, The Yale Law Journal, 5 (1968), 880 (904, n. 82).

  111. cf Glaser, Beiträge zur Lehre vom Beweis im Strafprozess, 1883, pp. 99–103.

  112. cf Glaser, supra note 111, pp. 85–98.

  113. cf Glaser, supra note 111, p. 100.

  114. See for example Roxin/Schünemann, Strafverfahrensrecht – Ein Studienbuch, 30th ed., 2022, § 45 mn. 2–4.

  115. cf Figueiredo Dias, Revista de Legislação e de Jurisprudência 105 (1972–1973), 125–128 and 139–140.

  116. cf Beling, Die Lehre vom Verbrechen, 1906, p. 7.

  117. cf Fletcher, The Grammar of Criminal Law – American, Comparative, and International, vol 1, 2007, pp. 145–149.

  118. cf Fletcher, supra note 110, 913–915.

  119. Judicial presumptions (praesumptio judicis) are those which are not established in law but based only “the experience of life”, or, what some prefer to call “the rules of experience” (Erfahrungssätze). On “the rules of experience”, cf Aroso Linhares, Bol. Fac. Direito U. Coimbra 31 (1988), 1 (14).

  120. cf Decree-Law 3,689, dated 03/10/1941.

  121. Article 156 of the Brazilian Code of Criminal Procedure, as introduced by Law 11,690 in 2008, states: “The burden of proving the allegation rests on whoever makes that allegation, although the judge may, on his own initiative: [...] II – determine, in the course of the pre-trial investigation phase, or prior to rendering his decision, that evidence be taken to clarify doubt on a significant issue”.

  122. Namely under Article 3 of the Environmental Crimes Law (“Lei de Crimes Ambientais – LCA”), Law 9,605, dated 12/02/1998.

  123. cf Prakken/Sartor, in: Kaptein/Prakken/Verheij (eds.), Legal Evidence and Proof – Statistics, Stories, Logic, 2009, pp. 223–253.

  124. ECtHR, Engel and Others v. the Netherlands, 8 June 1976, § 82. Regarding the growing importance of ECtHR’s case law as a source of law, especially in defining the minimal guarantees in criminal proceedings, see Kostoris, in: Kostoris (ed.), Handbook of European Criminal Procedure, 2018, pp. 58–60.

  125. cf Braithwaite, supra note 71, 477. Likewise, cf Posner, in: Carpenter/Moss (eds.), Preventing Regulatory Capture – Special Interest Influence and How to Limit It, 2013, pp. 49–56.

  126. cf Emery/Faccio, "Exposing the Revolving Door in Executive Branch Agencies" (17/11/2020), available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3732484 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3732484 (last accessed on 10/03/2022).

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*Full Professor at the Faculty of Law of the University of Lisbon. I would like to thank the Research Centre for Private Law – CIDP (University of Lisbon) for supporting the English translation of this text. I would also like to thank Ian Silver for his invaluable support in reviewing this final English version. E-mail: paulosousamendes@fd.ulisboa.pt.

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De Sousa Mendes, P. Responsive Regulation, Enforced Self-regulation, and Corporate Liability. Crim Law Forum 33, 285–321 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10609-022-09445-5

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