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Table 1 Budget allocation vector

From: Sanctioning, selection, and pivotality in voting: theory and experimental results

Allocation option Incumbent retains Share of voter 1 Share of voter 2 Share of voter 3
Option 1
[120;(0,0,0)]
120 taler 0 taler 0 taler 0 taler
Option 2
[30;(30,30,30)]
30 taler 30 taler 30 taler 30 taler
Option 3
[0;(60,60,0)]
0 taler 60 taler 60 taler 0 taler
Option 4
[60;(30,30,0)]
60 taler 30 taler 30 taler 0 taler
Option 5
[0;(40,40,40)]
0 taler 40 taler 40 taler 40 taler
  1. The first number in the vector corresponds to the amount the incumbent keeps for herself and the following three numbers are the amounts transfered to each of the voters. For e.g., in [120;(0,0,0)], 120 is the amount the incumbent keeps and each of the voters receives 0