This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution.
References
Akerlof, G. A. (1970). The market for ‘lemons’: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84, 488–500.
Coll, S. (2008). The origins and evolution of democracy: An exercise in history from a constitutional economics approach. This Journal, 19, 313–355.
Greif, A., Milgrom, P., & Weingast, B. (1994). Coordination, commitment, and enforcement: The case of the merchant guild. Journal of Political Economy, 102, 912–950.
Gustafsson, B. (1987). The rise and economic behavior of medieval craft guilds. In Gustafsson (Ed.), Power and economic institutions: Reinterpretations in economic history (pp. 69–106). Aldershot: Edward Elgar.
Hickson, C. R., & Thomson, E. A. (1991). A new theory of guilds and European economic development. Explorations in Economic History, 28, 127–168.
Van Zanden, J.-L. (2009). The skill premium and the ‘Great Divergence’. European Review of Economic History, 13, 121–153.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
Publisher's Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Coll, S. Sheilagh Ogilvie: The European guilds: an economic analysis. Const Polit Econ 30, 358–362 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-019-09282-6
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-019-09282-6