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Sheilagh Ogilvie: The European guilds: an economic analysis

Princeton University Press, Princeton and London, 2019, xvi + 645 pp, (subjects’ index)

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Correspondence to Sebastian Coll.

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Coll, S. Sheilagh Ogilvie: The European guilds: an economic analysis. Const Polit Econ 30, 358–362 (2019).

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