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Constitutional Political Economy

, Volume 28, Issue 2, pp 142–166 | Cite as

Domestic institutions and the ratification of international agreements in a panel of democracies

  • Florian Kiesow Cortez
  • Jerg GutmannEmail author
Original Paper

Abstract

A recent literature explores how domestic institutions affect politicians’ incentives to enter into international agreements (IAs). We contribute to this field by systematically testing the impact of a broad set of domestic institutional design features. This allows us to compare new and established political economy explanations of IA entry. For this purpose, 99 democracies are analyzed over the period 1975–2010. We find that domestic institutions determine countries’ disposition to enter into IAs, as predicted by political economic theory. For example, democracies with majoritarian electoral institutions are less likely to conclude IAs than other democracies. Countries also conclude more IAs when their democratic institutions are long-lived and they lack an independent judiciary. However, programmatic parties and the number of domestic veto players are not associated with IA-making. The key take-away of this study is that specific domestic institutions matter for how frequently states make formal deals with each other.

Keywords

Political economy Constitutional economics International agreements Electoral systems Power-sharing institutions Judicial independence 

JEL Classification

F53 H41 H87 K33 

Notes

Acknowledgements

Florian Kiesow Cortez gratefully acknowledges funding by the German Research Foundation (DFG). Helpful comments and suggestions by Christian Bjørnskov, Agnes Brender, Rola El-Kabbani, Dina El-Sayed, Andrew Guzman, Jiwon Lee, Viola Lucas, Nada Maamoun, Stephan Michel, Katharina Pfaff, Konstantinos Pilpilidis, Katharina Pistor, Stefan Voigt, Franziska Weber, and Teresa Wittgenstein are appreciated

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of Law and EconomicsUniversity of HamburgHamburgGermany

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