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Constitutional Political Economy

, Volume 28, Issue 1, pp 48–61 | Cite as

Gordon Tullock and the Virginia School of Law and Economics

  • Francesco ParisiEmail author
  • Barbara Luppi
  • Alice Guerra
Original Paper

Abstract

In 1999 Gordon Tullock became Professor at the George Mason University Law School. Tullock’s arrival at George Mason brought the economics department and the law school close together. The work that resulted during those years consolidated the methodological foundations for a different way of thinking about the economic analysis of law—the “functional” approach to law and economics. The functional law and economics approach espoused by the Virginia School was not attacking any of the results of the Chicago School or the Yale School, but rather proposing a methodological shift. This paper presents some of the results developed by this school and illustrates Tullock’s controversial positions on trials and on the common law system, through anecdotes, Tullock’s own work and related scholarly contributions.

Keywords

Rent-seeking Litigation Fee-shifting rule Virginia School of Law and Economics 

JEL Classification

C72 D72 K10 K41 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Francesco Parisi
    • 1
    • 2
    Email author
  • Barbara Luppi
    • 3
  • Alice Guerra
    • 4
  1. 1.University of Minnesota Law SchoolMinneapolisUSA
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsUniversity of BolognaBolognaItaly
  3. 3.Department of EconomicsUniversity of Modena and Reggio EmiliaModenaItaly
  4. 4.Department of Business and PoliticsCopenhagen Business SchoolFrederiksbergDenmark

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