Constitutional Political Economy

, Volume 27, Issue 2, pp 179–193 | Cite as

Gordon Tullock’s implicit analytical history of government

Original Paper

Abstract

Gordon Tullock wrote widely on the emergence and effects of political and legal institutions. Although he did not provide an analytical narrative, perse, his work provides explanations for the emergence of the state, civil law, constitutional law, and democracy. When his work is organized as a historical narrative, it becomes clear that conflict, rather than trade or cooperation, are at the core of Tullock’s approach to constitutional political economy.

Keywords

Gordon Tullock Coercion Conflict Law Authoritarian Constitutional political economy 

JEL Classification

B2 K4 H1 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.West Virginia UniversityMorgantownUSA

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