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Constitutional Political Economy

, Volume 27, Issue 1, pp 66–92 | Cite as

An empirical analysis of constitutional review voting in the polish constitutional tribunal, 2003–2014

  • Jarosław Kantorowicz
  • Nuno GaroupaEmail author
Original Paper

Abstract

Different theories have been developed, mainly in the context of the United States, to explain judicial decision-making. In this respect, there is an important ongoing debate over whether judges are guided by the law or by personal ideology. The analysis of the decision-making in the Polish Constitutional Tribunal seems to support the existence of some party alignment. It is to say that judicial behavior is influenced by the ideology, either because judges’ preferences coincide with the interests of a specific party or because the judges are incentivized to show their loyalty to a party. Party alignment exists but subject to institutional influences. These results are in line with previous findings for other constitutional courts in Europe.

Keywords

Judicial behavior Poland Constitutional review 

JEL Classification

K0 

Notes

Acknowledgments

We are grateful to Jarosław Bełdowski, Matthias Dauner, Nora El-Bialy, Jerg Gutmann, Elena Kantorowicz, Agnes Strauss, Stefan Voigt, Franziska Weber, the editors of this journal, two anonymous referees, the participants of the EDLE seminar held in Bologna on November 6, 2013 and the participants of the ‘Empirical Legal Studies at Erasmus School of Law’ seminar held at the Erasmus University Rotterdam on November 27, 2013 for useful comments on that paper. The usual disclaimers apply.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Rotterdam Institute of Law and EconomicsErasmus University RotterdamRotterdamThe Netherlands
  2. 2.Texas A&M University School of LawFort WorthUSA
  3. 3.Católica Global Law SchoolLisbonPortugal

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