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Constitutional Political Economy

, Volume 26, Issue 2, pp 190–220 | Cite as

Direct voting and proxy voting

  • James Green-ArmytageEmail author
Original Paper

Abstract

I develop a hybrid of direct democracy and representative democracy in which each citizen may vote directly on each issue, or delegate his vote on any issue to a representative (that is, a proxy) of his own choosing. I construct both an axiomatic argument for such a system and an argument based on its ability to ameliorate the information problems inherent in both direct and representative democracy. I also propose practical measures for implementation, including new variations on existing proxy system proposals. These new variations include a ‘Dodgsonesque’ procedure, a proportional agenda-setting procedure, a provision for virtual committees, and a provision for continual consideration of issues.

Keywords

Proxy voting Direct democracy Participatory democracy Deliberative democracy Liquid democracy Proportional representation 

JEL Classification

D7 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsBard CollegeAnnandale-on-HudsonUSA

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