Abstract
My contribution presents a possibility to unify Europe based on newly emerging political units focused on solving problems rather than on historically given nation states. These Endogenous Political Entities (EPE), as they shall be called, are better suited to reach the goals of European unification as they strengthen the fundamental European values of variety and freedom. I make three propositions: to base the unification of Europe on nation states is unfortunate as the latter are responsible for the political disaster of the two World Wars; the unification must proceed in a problem-oriented manner. The constitution of Europe must allow and promote EPE to emerge specifically to deal with particular problems; the new political units can be introduced in marginal steps. Over time, a flexible and dynamic net of political entities will arise taking care of the large economic, social and cultural diversity in Europe.
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Notes
The statement by German Chancellor Merkel, that “If the euro falls, the EU falls, and then falls Europe”, is noteworthy.
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Acknowledgments
The author is grateful for helpful remarks to Geoffrey Brennan, Roger Congleton, Lars Feld, Jana Gallus, Barbara Krug, Viktor Vanberg, Richard Wagner, and excellent comments by two referees.
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Frey, B.S. European unification: a new proposal. Const Polit Econ 24, 285–294 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-013-9147-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-013-9147-6