Constitutional moments in Eastern Europe and subjectivist political economy

  • Anthony J. EvansEmail author
Original Paper


This article provides epistemic foundations for traditional rational-choice political science, to explain when and how ideas matter. Operational codes, epistemic communities and the structural patterns of ideas demonstrates the constitutional moments that occur during crises, and how ideas can underpin and direct the formation of interest groups. The implications for policy reform are discussed, along with an application to the Constitutional Moments during the transition of Central and Eastern Europe.


Constitutional moments Epistemic communities Institutions Public choice Rational-choice Transition economies 

JEL Classifications

A12 B53 D78 D8 P3 P16 P48 



I am grateful to the Earhart Foundation, the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, and the College of Liberal Arts and Human Sciences at George Mason University for providing financial support during the research for this article. I thank Paul Dragos Aligica, Peter Boettke, Richard Wagner, participants of the HCS Circle, the editor of this journal, and an anonymous referee for useful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.


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© Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.ESCP-EAP European School of ManagementLondonUK

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