Constitutional Political Economy

, Volume 19, Issue 3, pp 180–202

Deliberation, learning, and institutional change: the evolution of institutions in judicial settings

Original Paper

Abstract

Institutional change entails institutional design, assessment, and modification, which necessarily take place within the constraints and opportunities afforded by existing institutional arrangements. Viktor Vanberg has made major contributions to our understanding of how institutions evolve. We wish to contribute to this symposium in honor of Vanberg by analyzing how institutions for the management of water institutions in Southern California evolved primarily through the use of the courts as settings for deliberation, learning and institutional change.

Keywords

Institutional evolution Institutional analysis Courts Equity Water resources 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Political ScienceIndiana University Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI)IndianapolisUSA
  2. 2.Indiana University BloomingtonBloomingtonUSA
  3. 3.Arizona State UniversityTempeUSA

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