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Generalized Target-Allocation Functions and their Evaluation by the Branch-And-Bound Method

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In this article, we generalize Krasnoschekov’s scheme [6] to improve the solution of the max-min targetallocation problem by excluding some types of targets that are not entirely suited for the allocation of the available defense tools. The problem is not submodular, it is therefore solved by the general branchand- bound method using objective-function upper bounds. We show how to construct such bounds using Germeier’s generalized equalization principle. This development endows the branch-and-bound method with new practical significance.

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Correspondence to A. G. Perevozchikov.

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Translated from Prikladnaya Matematika i Informatika, No. 66, 2021, pp. 89–103.

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Perevozchikov, A.G., Reshetov, V.Y. & Yanochkin, I.E. Generalized Target-Allocation Functions and their Evaluation by the Branch-And-Bound Method. Comput Math Model 32, 183–197 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10598-021-09525-y

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10598-021-09525-y

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