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The collapse of the second Yatsenyuk government: roll call vote and dynamic network analysis

  • Natasha Kossovsky
  • Kathleen M. CarleyEmail author
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Abstract

This paper investigates the cause of the collapse of the Second Yatsenyuk Ukrainian government in 2016 and the factions formed throughout the process using a novel method that combines roll call vote analysis and dynamic network analysis. Our findings suggest that a major factor in the dissolution of the coalition government was the 2015 constitutional amendment .We also found that the coalition split into two factions following this event: the People’s Front and Petro Poroshenko Bloc as one faction, and the Union and Fatherland as the other. This split could have a large impact on the 2019 Ukrainian Election and give current President Petro Poroshenko an advantage over Yulia Tymoshenko, who is leading in the polls.

Keywords

Roll call voting analysis Dynamic network analysis Community detection Coalition stability Ukrainian parliament 

Notes

Acknowledgements

This work is supported in part by the Office of Naval Research under the Multidisciplinary University Research Initiatives (MURI) Program award number N000141712675, Near Real Time Assessment of Emergent Complex Systems of Confederates, and by the center for Computational Analysis of Social and Organizational Systems (CASOS). The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the ONR or the U.S. government.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Center for Computational Analysis of Social and Organizational Systems (CASOS), Institute for Software ResearchCarnegie Mellon UniversityPittsburghUSA

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