Modeling the governance of cooperative firms

  • Harold Paredes-Frigolett
  • Pablo Nachar-Calderón
  • Carmen Marcuello


Most studies of cooperative firms have been conducted using neoclassically inspired economic models that consider the characteristics and behavior of capitalist companies and their owners, thus failing to accommodate the wide range of criteria that motivate the creation of cooperative firms. These models have traditionally been at odds with the real objectives of cooperative firms due to their inability to accommodate a series of often conflicting criteria. We put forth a set-theoretic model of governance of cooperative firms that allows us to investigate how different models of cooperative governance can be implemented and how cooperative decision-making can be solved using a multicriteria decision analysis approach.


Cooperative firms Cooperative behavior Corporate governance Multicriteria decision analysis Common goods theory 



The authors owe a debt of gratitude to the management team of Copeval for their time and cooperation regarding the case study described in Sect. 4 of this article and to two anonymous reviewers whose comments and suggestions greatly improved earlier versions of this article. The authors were supported by the Faculty of Economics and Business at Diego Portales University in Chile and by the Department of Business Administration at the University of Zaragoza in Spain.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Harold Paredes-Frigolett
    • 1
  • Pablo Nachar-Calderón
    • 1
  • Carmen Marcuello
    • 2
  1. 1.Faculty of Economics and BusinessDiego Portales UniversityHuechurabaChile
  2. 2.Department of Business AdministrationUniversity of ZaragozaZaragozaSpain

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