The small core of the German corporate board network

  • Mishael MilakovićEmail author
  • Simone Alfarano
  • Thomas Lux


We consider the bipartite graph of German corporate boards and identify a small core of directors who are highly central in the entire network while being densely connected among themselves. To identify the core, we compare the actual number of board memberships to a random benchmark, focusing on deviations from the benchmark that span several orders of magnitude. The board appointment decisions of largely capitalized companies appear to be the driving force behind the existence of a core in Germany’s corporate network.


Board and director interlocks Network core Network formation Market capitalization 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mishael Milaković
    • 1
    Email author
  • Simone Alfarano
    • 2
  • Thomas Lux
    • 1
    • 3
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of KielKielGermany
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsUniversity of Castellón (Jaume I)Castellón de la PlanaSpain
  3. 3.Kiel Institute for the World EconomyKielGermany

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