The small core of the German corporate board network
We consider the bipartite graph of German corporate boards and identify a small core of directors who are highly central in the entire network while being densely connected among themselves. To identify the core, we compare the actual number of board memberships to a random benchmark, focusing on deviations from the benchmark that span several orders of magnitude. The board appointment decisions of largely capitalized companies appear to be the driving force behind the existence of a core in Germany’s corporate network.
KeywordsBoard and director interlocks Network core Network formation Market capitalization
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- Borgatti SP, Foster PC (2003) The network paradigm in organizational research: A review and typology. J Manag 29(6):991–1013 Google Scholar
- Hermalin BE, Weisbach MS (2003) Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution: A survey of the economic literature. Econ Policy Rev Fed Reserve Bank of New York 9:7–26 Google Scholar