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Climatic Change

, Volume 123, Issue 2, pp 95–100 | Cite as

Why geoengineering is a public good, even if it is bad

  • David R. MorrowEmail author
Commentary

Abstract

Stephen Gardiner argues that geoengineering does not meet the “canonical technical definition” of a global public good, and that it is misleading to frame geoengineering as a public good. A public good is something that is nonrival and nonexcludable. Contrary to Gardiner’s claims, geoengineering meets both of these criteria. Framing geoengineering as a public good is useful because it allows commentators to draw on the existing economic, philosophical, and social scientific literature on the governance of public goods.

Keywords

Public Good Public Choice Aerosol Optical Depth Private Good Common Pool Resource 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgements

Thanks to Scott Barrett and Daniel Morrow for helpful comments.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Alabama at BirminghamBirminghamUSA

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